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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to arrive at a characterisation of twentieth century poetry and 
science by means of a detailed study of the work of four poets who engaged extensively 
with science and whose writing lives spanned the greater part of the period. The study of 
science in the work of the four chosen poets, Hugh MacDiarmid (1892 – 1978), Judith 
Wright (1915 – 2000), Edwin Morgan (1920 – 2010), and Miroslav Holub (1923 – 1998), 
is preceded by a literature survey and an initial theoretical chapter. This initial part of the 
thesis outlines the interdisciplinary history of the academic subject of poetry and science, 
addressing, amongst other things, the challenges presented by the episodes known as the 
‘two cultures’ and the ‘science wars’. Seeking to offer a perspective on poetry and 
science more aligned to scientific materialism than is typical in the interdiscipline, a 
systemic challenge to Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) is 
put forward in the first chapter. Additionally, the founding work of poetry and science, I. 
A. Richards’s Science and Poetry (1926), is assessed both in the context in which it was 
written, and from a contemporary viewpoint; and, as one way to understand science in 
poetry, a theory of the creative misreading of science is developed, loosely based on 
Harold Bloom’s The Anxiety of Influence (1973). The detailed study of science in poetry 
commences in Chapter II with Hugh MacDiarmid’s late work in English, dating from his 
period on the Shetland Island of Whalsay (1933 – 1941). The thesis in this chapter is that 
this work can be seen as a radical integration of poetry and science; this concept is 
considered in a variety of ways including through a computational model, originally 
suggested by Robert Crawford. The Australian poet Judith Wright, the subject of Chapter 
III, is less well known to poetry and science, but a detailed engagement with physics can 
be identified, including her use of four-dimensional imagery, which has considerable 
support from background evidence. Biology in her poetry is also studied in the light of 
recent work by John Holmes. In Chapter IV, science in the poetry of Edwin Morgan is 
discussed in terms of its origin and development, from the perspective of the 
mythologised science in his science fiction poetry, and from the ‘hard’ technological 
perspective of his computer poems. Morgan’s work is cast in relief by readings which are 
against the grain of some but not all of his published comments. The thesis rounds on its 
theme of materialism with the fifth and final chapter which studies the work of Miroslav 
Holub, a poet and practising scientist in communist-era Prague. Holub’s work, it is 
argued, represents a rare and important literary expression of scientific materialism. The 
focus on materialism in the thesis is not mechanistic, nor exclusive of the domain of the 
imagination; instead it frames the contrast between the original science and the 
transformed poetic version. The thesis is drawn together in a short conclusion.  
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Introduction 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The study of science in literature in Britain is flourishing. There is a dedicated society, 
the British Society for Literature and Science (BSLS), which has affiliations in North 
America and Europe. The BSLS holds annual conferences which attract an international 
gathering of literary scholars; the tenth such conference was held in Liverpool in 2015. 
This thesis aims to make a contribution to the study of poetry and science, a sub-
discipline of literature and science, from the perspective of a scientist – I am a mature 
student who was educated in physics, and who subsequently followed a career in 
software engineering. The BSLS is reporting considerable and rising interest in its 
subject. A 2014 ‘call for papers’ posting on the BSLS website notes: ‘Literature and 
Science is currently gaining popularity amongst undergraduates, but opportunities for 
discussing how – and why – to teach it remain thin on the ground’.1 Poetry (or literature) 
and science is intuitively attractive: it seems to offer a bridge or even a bond between two 
widely different and usually separate aspects of learning. But there is a pedagogical 
challenge. While the interface between the two subjects holds the promise of productive 
interdisciplinary thinking, unfortunately it also has a long and not altogether harmonious 
history. No thesis of this type can ignore the controversy which is tempered by the 
notorious ‘two cultures’ dispute between C. P. Snow and F. R. Leavis in the 1950s and 
60s. Cultural division and ‘two cultures’ modes of argument are of course now widely 
deprecated; however, there remains an imbalance in the study of science in literature: as 
Helen Small notes, literature and science is ‘interdisciplinary principally from the vantage 
                                                 
1 http://www.bsls.ac.uk/2014/10/bsls-teaching-symposium-reminder/, 28/10/2014. 
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point of the humanities’.2 An important reason for this is simply institutional – science 
departments have no facility for the study of literature. The perceived imbalance 
therefore presents an opportunity, and Chapter I of the thesis engages with the theoretical 
implications of shifting the study of science in poetry towards scientific materialism. 
The core subject matter of this study is science in the writing of four poets: Hugh 
MacDiarmid (1892 – 1978), Judith Wright (1915 – 2000), Edwin Morgan (1920 – 2010), 
and Miroslav Holub (1923 – 1998), discussed in Chapters II to V respectively. This 
choice allows a considerable diversity of poetry and poetic approaches to science to be 
studied, while maintaining a consistent timeframe of research. In addition to the temporal 
link between the poets, there are two main themes which draw together the four 
individual studies. The first of these is a consistent analytical method, the assumption 
that, whatever the end result of science in poetry, the starting point is scientific 
materialism. The intention is not to impose scientific materialism on the poetry, but rather 
to highlight the nature of the transition from the original science to its realisation as art. A 
corollary to this approach is the idea of the creative misreading of science, discussed at 
the end of the first chapter. The second linking theme is politics. A political outlook, and 
a radical response to the societies in which they lived, may be, as with MacDiarmid and 
Wright, overt and explicit, or as with Morgan and Holub, more quietly expressed; but for 
all four chosen poets it is an important factor in their writing. The temporal overlap of the 
writing lives of the chosen poets is considerable: the earliest poems studied are by 
MacDiarmid, and date from his period on the Shetland Island of Whalsay (1933 – 1941). 
Wright began publishing poetry in the mid-1940s, followed by Morgan in the late 1940s 
                                                 
2 Helen Small, ‘The Function of Antagonism: Miroslav Holub and Roald Hoffmann’, in John Holmes, 
(ed.), Science in Modern Poetry, New Directions, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2012), 19-37, 19; 
Small(2012); Holmes(2012). 
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and Holub in the 1950s. All four poets, in different ways, brought a historical perspective 
to their work, and the poetry of all of them is conditioned by the catastrophes of the 
twentieth century. In the period when all four poets were writing science was advancing 
rapidly, both in the East and in the West. The excitement of this, and also the trepidation 
it induced, is reflected variously in the work of the chosen poets. Diversity is introduced 
into the study with three national and cultural backgrounds being represented: Scotland, 
over two generations, Australia, at a time when the country was starting to define its 
independent identity, and Czechoslovakia during the Cold War and through the fall of 
communism.  
A necessary condition of the choice of writers is the richness and the amount of 
science in their poetry. Three of the poets, MacDiarmid, Morgan, and Holub, meet this 
condition easily and are well known to the study of poetry and science. The literary 
innovator MacDiarmid, in the corpus known as his late work, developed a broad 
‘Whitmanesque’ vision in which the inclusion of science in verse was a key part. 
MacDiarmid famously characterised this idea in his call for ‘a poetry of fact’, a phrase 
which can be read as simply ‘poetry and science’. The scale of MacDiarmid’s use of 
science, coupled with the disciplined creative freedom with which he pressed it to the 
service of his wider concerns, has not been considered in detail before. Preeminent 
among MacDiarmid’s wider concerns is socialism, and a striking example of science 
being pressed to service is his association of the heady excitement of the then-new 
quantum physics with progress in revolutionary politics; examples such as this, and the 
radical nature of his late text with (as I argue) its compelling abstract structure, defines 
the centrality of MacDiarmid’s work to twentieth-century poetry and science. The 
Introduction 4 
influence of science in Wright’s work is less immediately obvious than in the writing of 
the other three poets, but careful reading of her poetry in conjunction with the rich and 
diverse intellectual synthesis behind it shows the presence of physics, particularly in 
relation to her treatment of time and her use of four-dimensional imagery. The chapter 
opens with an introduction to Wright’s work which highlights her political activism in 
regard to Aboriginal rights and conservation via a number of her well known poems. 
These considerations provide important contexts later in the chapter in relation to her use 
of time and physics, and in a discussion of John Holmes’s essay ‘From Bergson to 
Darwin: Evolutionary Biology in the Poetry of Judith Wright’. 3 In her essays, Wright 
said a considerable amount about science: she argued against science’s value-free terms 
of enquiry, and, in general, her attitude to science was closer to the traditional literary 
point of view than that of the other poets. This counterpoint is helpful in widening the 
range of poetic approaches to science, especially because, as I argue, science was central 
to Wright’s thinking.  
A generation after MacDiarmid, Morgan responded with enthusiasm to the rapid 
growth in science and technology after the Second World War; in numerous statements 
and in the direction of some of his work, he allowed himself to be symbolic of positivity 
and optimism in regard to science. Although of course Morgan’s optimism is often real, 
the picture which emerges from his poetry is much more rounded: his ludic wit and talent 
for misdirection hide a conflict between his promotion of the scientific tropes of 
adventure and exploration and his life-long opposition to imperialism and war. It is 
notable how bleak the futurist visions of Morgan’s science-fiction poems are. Morgan 
                                                 
3 John Holmes, ‘From Bergson to Darwin: Evolutionary Biology in the Poetry of Judith Wright’ in 
Holmes(2012), 194-209. 
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also incorporated technological modes of articulation into his craft and wrote a number of 
‘simulated computer’ poems. Against the grain of some of Morgan’s own remarks, these 
poems are read more as parodies of computers, rather than as prophecies of artificial 
intelligence. Holub was a practising experimental biologist in communist-era Prague; his 
work is a first-hand encounter of science and poetry, and something of a benchmark in 
the field. Even so, Holub’s work has not yet been fully explored in the West: his 
laboratory poems, for example, are both shocking and complex in their nuanced but 
resolute focus on materialism, and as far as I know, are without peer. ‘The root of the 
matter’ is a subtle poetic representation of quantum mechanics within an intricate 
theatrical and literary framework, and might come to be seen as a major work of literature 
and science.4 The political background to Holub’s work is of a different character to the 
other three poets; in the chapter, his political situation and his sometimes allegorised 
response to it in his poetry is examined. More generally, even if Holub was not free to 
develop an independent political analysis, the materialist outlook he puts forward in his 
writing can be seen as a secure grounding for political thought. 
The aim of this study is to justify, through a series of detailed, extended, and fresh 
readings, the claim that the four chosen poets together, by virtue of their depth of 
engagement with the subject, are representative of twentieth-century poetry and science. 
There are of course limitations. The fact that no American poets are included restricts the 
scope to European and primarily European-influenced work; North American writing, 
however, is widely represented in the theoretical literature. A study complementary to 
this can be found in Vicky MacKenzie’s PhD thesis, Contemporary Poets’ Responses to 
                                                 
4 Miroslav Holub, Poems Before and After, 2nd edn., (Tarset, Northumberland: Bloodaxe, 2006); first pub. 
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Introduction 6 
Science.5 MacKenzie offers a differing theoretical approach, and, with the exception of 
Holub, a selection of still-working poets who engage with science. These include Jorie 
Graham (physics), Michael Symmons Roberts (the human genome), and John Burnside 
(ecology). 
The remainder of this Introduction is devoted to a survey of selected critical 
literature from both the general field of literature and science, and the specific field of 
poetry and science. Theoretical works from both parts of the interdiscipline interrelate 
and form the critical framework within which this thesis is written. The survey starts with 
a very brief outline of the key formative developments in the study of literature and 
science. The rest of the survey is divided into thematic groups which introduce relevant 
or typical works.  
The rise of science was accompanied by considerable unease amongst poets. A 
well-known early reaction is John Keats’s remark that Isaac Newton destroyed the poetry 
of the rainbow by ‘reducing it to the prismatic colours’.6 However, the modern transition 
from expressions of concern about science to the academic field of Poetry and Science, 
started, arguably, with the publication of I. A. Richards’s Science and Poetry in 1926; 
this work is in part a popularisation of his earlier Principles of Literary Criticism (1924) 
which explored the notion of psychological poetic affect.7 Richards’s popular work was 
commissioned by C. K. Ogden, who had earlier also commissioned J. B. S. Haldane’s 
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Daedalus.8 Richards is probably reacting to Daedalus; but in addition to expressing 
concerns about science, his work also treats poetry and science as an object of study in its 
own right. After the Second World War interest in literature and science began to 
develop. The background to Douglas Bush’s 1950 Science and English Poetry is a 
broadside against the rapidly growing presence of science in Western culture.9 David 
Daiches’s 1956 Critical Approaches to Literature includes a chapter on science and 
poetry which centres on Richards’s aforementioned works.10 In academic terms, 
however, it can probably be argued that the interdisciplinary field started to assume its 
modern shape as a result, not of Richards’s free and open discussion, but because of a 
darker turn of events: F. R. Leavis’s furious response in 1962 to C. P. Snow’s 1959 
lecture ‘The Two Cultures’.11 Many writers were stimulated to comment. Aldous 
Huxley’s Literature and Science (1963), for example, searches for a middle ground.12 
The literary legacy of the two cultures dispute persists, if only due to the necessity of 
including it in any retrospective, as for example in Helen Small’s 2013, The Value of the 
Humanities.13 Guy Ortolano’s 2009 The Two Cultures Controversy is a useful historical 
account.14 
Up to the early 1960s, the response to science from literary scholars was 
predominantly expressed as a fear that the supposed advance of mechanistic thinking 
would set the imaginative world into retreat. The response solidified, however, into an 
                                                 
8 J. B. S. Haldane, Daedalus, 8th impression, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1928); 
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11 C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures, (Cambridge: Canto, 2010); Snow(1959); Introduction by Stephan Collini. 
12 Aldous Huxley, Literature and Science, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1963). 
13 Helen Small, The Value of the Humanities, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Small(2013). 
14 Guy Ortolano, The Two Cultures Controversy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); 
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attack on the foundations of science, beginning, arguably, with the publication of Thomas 
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962.15 Kuhn’s work appeared to 
licence a more widespread philosophical attack on scientific materialism, and a growing 
number of literary and cultural theories associated with continental philosophy emerged. 
Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar’s Laboratory Life (1979) is one of the founding works 
of constructionism.16 Laboratory Life describes an anthropological study of scientific 
practice and claims that the observed process leads to the construction (as opposed to the 
discovery) of scientific facts. It is significant, however, that in an article in 2004, ‘Why 
has Critique Run out of Steam?’, Latour recants the undiscriminating nature of his earlier 
position.17 
A related attack on scientific materialism is made by David Bloor in Knowledge 
and Social Imagery (1976).18 Bloor introduces the so-called ‘Strong Programme of 
Sociology of Knowledge’, claiming that even the hard sciences are dependent on social 
factors, and in addition that social construction applies to mathematics. Bloor 
acknowledges the apparent unassailability of mathematics: ‘Truly, some Reality must be 
responsible for this remarkable state of affairs in which a body of self-subsistent truth 
appears to be apprehended in ever greater detail and ever wider scope’.19 His argument 
opens with a re-assessment of the ‘psychologism’ of mathematics offered by J. S. Mill, 
again acknowledging the difficulty by noting that Gottlob Frege’s response to Mill is 
                                                 
15 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 4rd edn., (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
2012); Kuhn(1962). 
16 Bruno Latour, and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) 
Latour&Woolgar(1979). 
17 Bruno Latour, ‘Why has Critique Run Out of Steam?’, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 30, No. 2. (Winter 2004), 
225-485; Latour(2004). 
18 Bloor, David, Knowledge and Social Imagery, 2nd edn., (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991); 
Bloor(1976). 
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‘widely accepted as being fatal’.20 Bloor’s argument is complex, but as I understand, it 
depends on the idea that because a precise (non-mathematical) definition of mathematical 
theory is elusive, then there must exist a psychological dimension, in other words, a 
psychology of maths. Other elements of Bloor’s argument dwell on nuanced variations of 
interpretation of mathematical entities; these seem peripheral to mathematical content, 
and the remainder of his argument is equally unconvincing.21 Bloor, however, is to be 
commended for accepting that if the social construction of science is to be established, 
then a sociology of mathematics must similarly be established. The historian of science 
Steven Shapin, however, in his 2010 collection of his own essays, Never Pure, fails to 
address the role of mathematics convincingly.22 Shapin laments that ‘in the most extreme 
versions of what the mathematical discourse consisted in, it was unclear what role could 
or should be played by philosophers’; it is unclear if this is really true, or why it 
matters.23 Shapin’s thesis is a systemic attack on science, in that it is supposed to be 
never pure because it is done by real people; but such a proposition cannot be made 
simply by reportage of discourse which lacks a detailed treatment of the structural 
components of science, including mathematics. All this seems to resonate with Latour’s 
quite anguished lament in the 2004 article mention above. Latour writes: ‘fortunately 
(yes, fortunately!), one after the other, we witnessed that the black boxes of science 
remained closed and that it was rather the tools that lay in the dust of our workshop, 
                                                 
20 Bloor(1976), 87. 
21 E.g. Bloor(1976), 110. 
22 Stephen Shapin, Never Pure, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2010), 132-5, 389; 
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23 Shapin(2010), 133. 
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disjointed and broken. Put simply, critique was useless against objects of some 
solidity’.24 
The putative origin of the attempts to undermine science’s foundations, Kuhn’s 
relativizing attack on science, presents something of a roadblock if one is going to 
establish a position of scientific materialism. A view of the philosophy of science more 
closely aligned to my own is put by the physicist Freeman Dyson in his essay ‘The 
Scientist as Rebel’.25 Dyson writes that: ‘Science is an art form and not a philosophical 
method’, that ‘squeezing science in to a single philosophical viewpoint’ is Procrustean, 
and that ‘Science flourishes best when it uses freely all the tools to hand, unconstrained 
by preconceived notions of what science ought to be’.26 This is by no means to say that 
the search for a philosophy of science is unimportant. James Ladyman notes in the 
Introduction to his 2002 university primer Understanding the Philosophy of Science: ‘We 
may not yet know how to define science or how to tell whether contentious activities or 
beliefs count as science or not’; however, the remainder of his primer represents a 
persuasive argument for the importance of the philosophical endeavour.27 The field is too 
specialised to explore thoroughly in this thesis; it is worth noting however that there are, I 
believe, at least two major obstacles to arriving at a comprehensive statement of the 
philosophy of science: quantum mechanics, and mathematics. To characterise the former 
issue very briefly, Jeffery Bub, in his essay ‘Indeterminacy and Entanglement’ in Peter 
Clark and Katherine Hawley’s Philosophy of Science Today (2000), raises questions 
                                                 
24 Latour(2004), 242. 
25 Freeman Dyson, ‘The Scientist as Rebel’, John Cornwell, (ed.), Nature’s Imagination, (Oxford: Oxford 
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26 Dyson(1995), 10. 
27 James Ladyman, Understanding the Philosophy of Science, (London: Routledge, 2002), 4; 
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concerning quantum entanglement and the many worlds interpretation of physics, and 
ends with the remark: ‘The investigation into such questions has just begun. The core 
conceptual questions remain to be answered’.28  Regarding the philosophy of 
mathematics, Stewart Shapiro’s Thinking About Mathematics (2000) presents the 
contemporary state of the subject in its full diversity.29 The range of thought may be seen, 
for example, in two successive chapter titles: Shapiro’s Chapter 8 is entitled, ‘Numbers 
Exist’; Chapter 9 is headed ‘No They Don’t’.30  
 The approach taken in this thesis arises from the foregoing considerations. At the 
beginning of Chapter I, a systemic challenge to Kuhn is put forward, though note that an 
evidence-based rather than a philosophical argument is presented. It is hoped that this is 
sufficient to establish, unambiguously, this author’s stance on scientific materialism. 
Subsequent to this, rather than explore the philosophy of science further, a task which 
could not be conclusive, nor lead to further refinement of my own position, the thesis, in 
the first chapter, seeks a number of ways to characterise the interdisciplinary subject of 
poetry and science. Moreover, it is hoped that this approach – presentation of a challenge 
to (what is seen as) an idealist interpretation of science, and then (for the most part), 
backing off – is conducive to finding a working consensus within the interdiscipline, and 
thus providing a basis for the central thrust of the thesis – a qualified appreciation of what 
the humanities and the poetry and science interdiscipline have to offer. An overly 
combative thesis would risk replaying the two cultures dispute in modern guise.  
                                                 
28 Jeffery Bub, ‘Indeterminacy and Entanglement’ in Peter Clarke and Katherine Hawley, The Philosophy 
of Science Today, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 236-54, 252. 
29 Stewart Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Shapiro(2000). 
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Returning to the literature survey, the heady atmosphere of relativism which 
developed, I would argue as a result of the apparent substance behind the work of Kuhn, 
Latour, and Bloor, and also Richard Rorty, Paul Feyerabend, and others, seemed to grant 
literary and cultural critics a licence to speculate freely about science. Wendy Wheeler’s 
The Whole Creature (2006), for example, demands that science must be non-positivist 
and non-reductionist; she valorises complexity and non-linearity, and proposes a theory 
of ‘biosemiotics’.31 A particular difficulty for scientists reading some works of literature 
and science is the imposition of belief – being told what one thinks – sometimes with a 
barely disguised sneer. Charlotte Sleigh, for example, in her 2011 Literature and Science, 
says: ‘Sokal’s fellow travellers are believers in a single scientific method and a single 
thing called “science”. This is their totem’.32 A related difficulty is imposition of theory. 
The philosopher John Dupré in his collection Humans and Other Animals (2002) writes 
as if Kuhn’s paradigmatic structure of scientific knowledge is essentially fact.33 For 
instance, evolutionary psychology is said to be pre-paradigm; it is suggested that its status 
as Kuhnian normal science is ‘faked’.34 One doesn’t feel patronised or boxed in, 
however, by Patricia Waugh’s opening essay ‘Revising the Two Cultures Debate’ in her 
1999 collection (with David Fuller), The Arts and Sciences of Criticism – just somewhat 
breathless.35 Waugh assumes, without comment, the validity of interpreting physical 
theory in non-physical terms: classical physics is described emotionally as ‘a universe of 
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physical determinism, laws of causality, and blind mechanical motion’.36 This delivered, 
she suggests, in Schiller’s opposition, its antithesis, a sort of inverse twin or ‘redemptive 
aesthetic’ into the ‘alienated and mechanistic Laplacean blankness of interstellar cold’.37 
Waugh argues that ‘If the quantum world is fundamentally indeterminate’, then this 
might allow the ‘free space of the aesthetic’ to become integral with physical science 
because ‘if this quantum world seems to be at odds with the laws of Newtonian 
mechanics’, then ‘what is “true” in one world is not necessarily “true” in the other’.38 
Science is relativized and culturalised; I have puzzled at length over the strange claims 
and formulations in this essay, and concluded that due to the value of its retrospective 
account of the field, one should not over-react.  
Free-ranging criticism of science attains a focus in Mary Midgley’s 2001 Science 
and Poetry.39 In her Introduction she writes of her ‘revulsion against the way of thinking 
which deliberately extends the impersonal, reductive, atomistic methods that are 
appropriate to physical science into social and psychological enquiries’.40 She rounds on 
two scientific writers, Richard Dawkins, and the chemist Peter Atkins, and regarding 
their extra-scientific writing, I agree she has a point. Unfortunately this early clarity gets 
lost as the book develops, and the apparent condescending attitude towards science, 
implicit in the passage just quoted, tends to dominate. I am left profoundly disengaged by 
the way she seems to sweep judgementally over the surface of science, with claims such 
as this: ‘Einstein, when he objected to the reasonings of quantum mechanics by insisting 
that God does not play dice, was talking metaphysics, not physics’; one is taken 
                                                 
36 Waugh(1999), 35-6. 
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40 Midgley(2001), 1-2. 
Introduction 14 
nowhere.41 Midgley had been developing the ideas in Science and Poetry for some time, 
and her apparent suggestion that science has nothing to do with imagination, and her 
persistent charge of reductionism led to a gathering of scientists, and Midgley herself, at 
Jesus College, Cambridge, in 1994; the outcome is a series of vigorous essays in the 
volume Nature’s Imagination, introduced by the scientist who chaired the gathering, 
Freeman Dyson (and whose essay is quoted above).42 Roger Penrose argues in ‘Must 
Mathematical Physics be Reductionist?’ that the mathematics of the Möbius band and 
other mathematical topologies is inherently holistic.43 Nature’s Imagination, however, 
seems to fade into the greater pattern of collections making claim and counter claim 
which was developing at the time. I will say more about this pattern shortly, but first it is 
worth probing a little into science. 
The medical neuroscientist Raymond Tallis is well known as a passionate critic of 
postmodernism, and his essays are widely anthologised, for example in Fuller and 
Waugh’s collection.44 Tallis sometimes also turns his fire on science. He discusses the 
limits of science in his essay ‘The Poverty of Neurophilosophy’.45 Tallis is trying to 
resolve the difficulty that, while he himself is a ‘believing clinician’ in the field of 
neuroscience, what he sees as ‘neuromythology’, ‘actually impoverish[s] our idea of 
human consciousness’.46 The main target of his attack is the computational model of the 
mind as put forward by Daniel Dennett and Stephen Pinker which has ‘cast no light on 
                                                 
41 Midgley(2001), 35. 
42 Dyson(1995). 
43 Roger Penrose, ‘Must Mathematical Physics be Reductionist?’ in Cornwall(1995), 12-26, 13-16. 
44 Fuller&Waugh(1999). 
45 Raymond Tallis, ‘The Poverty of Neurophilosophy’ in Michael Grant (ed.), The Raymond Tallis Reader, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), 3-28; Tallis(2000). 
46 Tallis(2000), 6, 5. 
Introduction 15 
how there is such a thing as the mind’, or ‘how in a fundamental sense it “works”’.47 
Tallis’s argument is perhaps a little over-played. While Pinker discusses a computational 
model of the mind in various books, there is a growing scepticism that it should be taken 
literally; rather, the computational model is more appropriately used as a tool or a probe, 
perhaps like a microscope though more limited, and as a much-needed source of 
metaphors. Tallis’s 2011 Aping Mankind develops his earlier argument against naïve 
computational models of the mind, into the excesses of what he calls neuromania and 
Darwinitis in contemporary science, and directly challenges well-publicised 
neuroscientific results.48 This work, while a little wild and undisciplined at times, is given 
substantial credence by an editorial in New Scientist in 2013. The editorial (and later 
article) describes what happened when a researcher at the University of California, in a 
test run, put a frozen salmon through an MRI scanner – the researcher found that ‘The 
fish’s brain and spinal column were showing signs of neural activity’.49 Provocatively, 
the New Scientist contends, ‘It is now clear that the majority – perhaps the vast majority – 
of neuroscience findings are as spurious as brain waves in a dead fish’.50 
Physics too is encountering difficulties. Brian Green’s (admittedly fascinating) 
The Hidden Reality (2011), describes no fewer than seven types of parallel universe, or 
multiverse, most of them associated with the framework of theories known as string 
theory.51 Green is aware that string theory has become ‘a battle ground for the very soul 
of science’.52 This is because many physicists believe – and there appear to be no strong 
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counter-arguments – that the existence of parallel universes is untestable in principle. 
Notable works which regard string theory as having failed, and argue that theoretical 
physics must return to making testable predictions, are Peter Woit’s Not Even Wrong and 
Lee Smolin’s The Trouble with Physics, both from 2006.53 A later book by Smolin, Time 
Reborn (2013), makes the post-string theory hypothesis that time, on a universal scale, is 
in fact absolute.54  Lisa Randall’s Knocking on Heaven’s Door (2011), occupies 
something of the middle ground, and extends the hope that perhaps if a violation of the 
conservation of energy was observed at CERN, this might be indirect evidence for hidden 
spatial dimensions (another requirement of string theory) or even the multiverse.55 The 
mathematical physicist Roger Penrose has written two books which combine a detailed 
exposition of physical theory with a passionate argument against the possibility of 
artificial intelligence (AI), the latter centring on Gödel’s theorem of undecidability.56 Due 
to their argument, Penrose’s The Emperor’s New Mind (1989) and Shadows of the Mind 
(1994) have been branded controversial and have been the subject of much criticism – a 
fatal blow against AI would threaten the existence of whole university departments.57 
However, these and a third book, The Road to Reality (2004), are chosen here as 
reference points due to their extensive detail which includes mathematics, and also their 
historical development of the theories of physics.58 
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Science, then, (excepting Penrose) is every bit as susceptible as the humanities to 
overwrought theory, and is even, as with Green, making arguments for downgrading 
testability as a central requirement.59 Sometimes though, scientific scepticism cannot be 
suppressed. The most pyrotechnic event in literature and science of recent years was 
undoubtedly the publication of the physicist Alan Sokal’s ‘Transgressing the Boundaries: 
Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity’ in the journal Social Text 
in 1996.60 Sokal’s parody, and his follow up with Jean Bricmont, Intellectual Impostures 
(1997), is unquestionably provocative, but it has a quite different character to the only 
comparable event in the history of literature and science, the two cultures dispute. While 
passionate, Sokal and Bricmont’s attack is based on reason, and is strictly within the 
domain of legitimate academic discourse; and science, it’s worth noting, got similar 
treatment in a ‘reverse-Sokal’ hoax known as the Bogdanov Affair.61 Sokal’s 2008 
Beyond the Hoax, perhaps unavoidably, strays outside the domain of academic discourse 
into worldview, but this acts to the detriment of the work.62 The aftermath of the parody, 
known as the ‘science wars’, fanned the flames of an already extant conflagration, and 
the pattern of claim and counter-claim in literature and science developed. George 
Levine’s collection, One Culture from 1987, is in the tradition Sokal was attacking.63 
Levine writes in his Introduction that ‘This volume’, ‘assumes that science is embedded 
in culture’; he goes on to claim that ‘Science is socially constituted; knowledge is 
culturally constituted’, and even that ‘this is very old news’, without explaining how, say, 
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the physics of moving bodies can be socially constructed.64 Paul Gross and Norman 
Levitt’s Higher Superstition from 1994 is an early volume-sized response to 
postmodernism from scientists.65 Gross and Levitt quote, for example, Katherine 
Hayles’s claim that ‘“The special theory of relativity lost its epistemological clarity when 
it was combined with quantum mechanics to form quantum field theory. By midcentury 
all three had been played out or had undergone substantial modification”’.66 As Gross 
and Levitt remark, ‘This will come as a terrible shock to physicists!’.67  Noretta 
Koertge’s A House Built on Sand (1998) is a questioning of postmodernism from within 
the humanities.68 The One Culture? (2001), edited by Jay Labinger and Harry Collins, is 
notable for its fairness, with contributions from both sides.69 It is divided into three parts, 
with an initial part setting out authorial positions, a second section with responses from 
the book’s community of authors, and a third with responses to responses. Theory’s 
Empire from 2005, edited by Daphne Patai and Will Corral, is perhaps science’s most 
open and rounded attack on postmodernism, with essays by notable writers such as Noam 
Chomsky, Frank Kermode, Raymond Tallis, and Paisley Livingstone.70  
The primary sense developed on reading the 2011 Routledge Companion to 
Literature and Science, edited by Bruce Clarke and Manuela Roussini, is that many of the 
contributors were oblivious to the arguments made by scientists in defence of their 
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subject.71 The editors of this woefully missed opportunity to establish an introductory 
reader for the interdiscipline, in their summary, cite the essayist Neil Badmington’s 
contention (in turn quoting from Donna Haraway’s ‘A manifesto for cyborgs’ (1985)) 
that: ‘one of the recognitions of posthumanist culture has been that “the boundary 
between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion”’.72 There are, however, 
notable exceptions such as the essay by the German scholar Dirk Vanderbeke, who writes 
in ‘Physics’, that Sokal’s famous hoax, ‘to some extent cleansed the atmosphere with a 
heavy dose of well-administered ridicule’.73 It’s worth emphasising that while an explicit 
challenge to Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is put forward at the 
beginning of the first chapter, a similar challenge to postmodernist writing on science is 
not developed in the interest of diversity in the wider study; such a challenge should be 
regarded as implicit. In her retrospective, The Value of the Humanities (2013), Small 
acknowledges that science won a partial victory in the science war: she notes that ‘the 
language of cultural studies has shifted’.74 Whether due to Sokal or not, the atmosphere 
in literature and science is clearing. 
One book in particular, I think, broke the mould which was casting out too many 
similar positions: Contemporary Poetry and Contemporary Science (2006), edited by 
Robert Crawford.75 This innovative work is structured around a series of encounters 
where poets enter the laboratory with their scientist colleagues. The latter explain, and the 
former create poetry based on their newly acquired knowledge. Poetic science is thus the 
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centrepiece and the collection develops a fraternal, though still open and candid, 
discussion in some of the associated essays. Such is its success that Gillian Beer opens 
her ‘Afterword’ by asking, ‘How do we avoid collapsing the differences between science 
and poetry in our eagerness to explore their interactions?’.76 An earlier attempt to find 
common ground between the arts and science is E. O. Wilson’s Consilience (1998).77 
Unlike Crawford’s volume, with its carefully measured scope, Wilson’s monumental 
ambition is to outline a unity of knowledge. Wilson comes perilously close to asserting a 
scientific theory of art, but his search for a putative unity tends to extreme over-
simplification.78 Wilson was involved in the interdisciplinary experiment of using 
evolutionary theory as a basis to understand literature. He contributed a Forward to The 
Literary Animal (2005), edited by Jonathan Gottschall and David Wilson.79 Perhaps the 
founding work in this field was Joseph Carroll’s Evolution and Literary Theory (1995), 
and the ideas were still being developed in 2009 by Brian Boyd in On the Origin of 
Stories.80 As Terry Eagleton says in his review of the latter work, ‘The truth is that none 
of the functions of art just listed’ (Eagleton has been discussing quite general features of 
art), ‘is illuminated by being redescribed in evolutionary terms’.81 Cognitive poetics is 
another crossover between literature and science, this time with a heritage which can be 
traced to I. A. Richards. It is still, I believe, in the research phase, but the idea that poetry 
has psychological affect is intuitive, and might hold promise. There was evidence of 
                                                 
76 Gillian Beer, ‘Afterword’ in Crawford(2006), 204-10, 204; Beer(2006). 
77 E. O. Wilson, Consilience, (London: Abacus, 2009); Wilson(1998). 
78 Wilson(1998), 233-64. 
79 Jonathan Gottschall and David Wilson, The Literary Animal, (Evanston: Northwest University Press, 
2005), vii-xi. 
80 Joseph Carroll, Evolution and Literary Theory, (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995); Brian 
Boyd, On the Origin of Stories, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
81 Terry Eagleton, ‘Darwin Won’t Help’, LRB, 24/9/2009. 
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active research into the affect of metre at the 2014 BSLS conference.82 A measured guide 
to the subject can be found in Reuven Tsur’s Towards a Theory of Cognitive Poetics 
(2008).83 
While Tsur looks into cognitive poetics from the perspective of a theoretician, 
Don Paterson, in an insightful essay, ‘The Lyric Principle’, looks outward at linguistic 
science from the perspective of a poet.84 This advantageous viewpoint allows Paterson to 
challenge the Saussurian orthodoxy that the signifier is arbitrary. As a basis for his 
analysis of sound patterning in poetry, Paterson argues that while the ‘acoustic and 
semantic aspects [of language] may be separately described, they are not actually 
separable’.85 Further, drawing a number of threads of argument together, Paterson 
proposes as an important aspect of poetry a ‘phonosemantic’ system: ‘Poets can trust 
their ears to think and their minds to listen; no compromise between sound and sense 
need be negotiated, as they are understood to be aspects of the same thing’.86 Paterson is 
then in a position to offer a definition of the compositional process as a negotiation 
between ‘the sound and sense we intended to make, and the sound and sense we end up 
making’.87 
The concluding part of this literature survey looks at a number of scholarly works 
which demonstrate success of literature and science, and serve to illustrate why the field 
is flourishing. A work generally regarded as a classic study is Gillian Beer’s Darwin’s 
                                                 
82 Catherine Charlwood, University of Warwick, ‘Culture and Cognition: Expectancy Patterns within 
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Plots (1983).88 As Darwin struggled to articulate his theory of natural selection in On the 
Origin of Species, he was engaged, Beer convincingly shows, in an equal struggle with 
language itself; Darwin, she notes, ‘was telling a new story, against the grain of the 
language available to tell it in’.89 She argues that Darwin’s ‘language practice and 
scientific theory coincide’, saying that ‘In his use of words he is more preoccupied with 
relations and transformations than with limits’.90 Beer’s literary terminology both 
parallels Darwin’s theory and describes his form of argument. She shows how the latter, 
on the one hand, conditional, speculative, and situated in complexity and ignorance, is, on 
the other hand, compellingly transformed into Darwin’s confident vision of the 
interrelatedness of all life. Darwin, Beer shows, echoed the language available to him, 
from Ecclesiastes to his ‘new creation myth’, that ‘makes the tree of life and the tree of 
knowledge one’.91 Beer’s focus on language seems to enrich the science; she says Darwin 
‘did not invent laws. He described them’ – one could add: he discovered them.92 With an 
attitude towards science which is as rigorous as that towards literature, Beer develops the 
outward thrust of her work: a fine grained analysis of the reception and subsequent 
dissemination of Darwin’s ideas by writers such as George Eliot and Thomas Hardy.93 
Two works by Bernard Lightman (2007) and James Secord (2000) take a 
retrospective look at the fecundity of nineteenth-century science, and are fine literary re-
creations of science and its cultural context in this period.94 Lightman’s study of 
                                                 
88 Gillian Beer, Darwin’s Plots, 3rd edn., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Beer(1983). 
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Victorian popularisers of science shows the bewildering array of interpretations of the 
new scientific knowledge which confronted readers. From improving parables about the 
worker bee to justification of the imperial project, whether science revealed God or 
denied Him, Lightman captures the sheer vigour of the Victorian re-contextualisation of 
knowledge.95 But there are dark notes – certain popularisers of science ‘may have 
contributed to the perception in the closing decades of the century that mass culture had 
become “feminized” and the cause of the decline of civilization’; defence of ‘masculine 
high culture’ is evident, Lightman notes, in the work of Nietzsche and others.96 The lost 
perspective of accessible science as feminine also occurs in James Secord’s study of the 
reception of the anonymously published, Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation 
(1844).97 Secord focuses on the maelstrom which developed around this persuasively 
written theory-of-everything. It represents, he argues, a critical juncture in the mass 
dissemination of knowledge – so much so there was concern about its effect on ‘men 
from the lower middle class and women’ as (Secord reports) ‘both lacked the masculine 
strength of mind to detect its fallacious reasoning’.98 Secord recreates what can be 
accurately termed the raging controversy around Vestiges in such extraordinary detail that 
at times one almost feels present, for example in the ‘unusually intense’ exchanges in the 
meeting halls of Liverpool.99 His narrative, he claims, successfully avoids becoming 
‘engulfed in a cacophony of conflicting voices’ and reveals ‘wider patterns and structures 
of response’.100 Secord concludes that it is now ‘possible to escape the old image of 
                                                 
95 Lightman(2007), e.g. 142-54. 
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97 Secord(2000). 
98 Secord(2000), 274. 
99 Secord(2000), Chapter 6, 191-221, 199. 
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science as dominated by a handful of great theorists and simultaneously to understand 
theory making as a form of practice’, and that ‘Intellectual history, which used to be 
written as a story of dramatic changes of worldview (the “Darwinian Revolution”), can 
now be recast’.101 
Michael Whitworth in Einstein’s Wake (2001), and John Holmes in Darwin’s 
Bards (2009), both develop their own critical theories with which to study aspects of 
literature and science.102 In the Introduction to Einstein’s Wake, Whitworth considers the 
‘ontological problem’ raised by the study of literature and science.103 When ‘faced with 
two terms which are commonly understood as antithetical’, Whitworth writes, ‘we must 
explain in what sense is it possible to compare like with like’.104 Unlike Beer or Holmes, 
Whitworth is discussing a fully inanimate field of science, mechanics: Whitworth asks 
‘How can a history centred on language take into account forces which are irreducibly 
material?’.105 The popular intellectual excitement attending the study of moving objects 
is initially surprising to the scientific reader, as is the means by which the language of 
mechanics was transmitted into the modernist literary imagination. Whitworth develops a 
theory of transmission by metaphor carefully shaped against other theories of metaphor 
such as that of Lakoff and Johnson.106 The key to this intellectual transmission, 
Whitworth argues, is periodicals, where popularisations of science were juxtaposed with 
literary reviews. Whitworth’s careful picking apart of complex ideas and his refusal to 
accept uncritically received opinion underlies his study. For example, he notes that ‘the 
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critical tradition has tended to emphasise [the modernists’] hostility to mechanistic and 
materialist science’; he counters that ‘Not only was the modernist relation to technology 
less hostile than has often been argued, but a hostile relation to it need not imply hostility 
to pure science’.107 In framing his study, Whitworth emphasises that he ‘cannot address 
the theories as the scientists would have understood them’, and in ‘analysing theories into 
their component metaphors’, ‘one may produce results that would have seemed quite 
alien to a scientist’.108 This health warning is a signifier of free and open discourse and 
challenges the scientist to learn from this finely controlled study. 
In the opening theoretical chapter of Darwin’s Bards, Holmes challenges some of 
the claims of historians of science, and makes a forthright defence of scientific realism 
and the scientific method. Holmes writes: ‘My argument implies that two claims 
routinely dismissed by cultural historians and historians of science are in fact partially 
correct’.109 Holmes argues that there was a Darwinian revolution, ‘an epiphany in the 
history of ideas’ (note Secord’s comment reported above), and that ‘Darwinism has 
remained largely consistent’ since the publication of Origin.110 Regarding the latter, 
Holmes says: ‘as in any living science, there are healthy disagreements over how data 
should be interpreted’.111 Holmes’s acceptance of scientific diversity is refreshing in the 
face of ongoing attempts by cultural critics and the media to portray every disagreement 
in science as a fundamental rupture which undermines the legitimacy of the discipline. In 
an impressive summary which is nothing less than a defence of scientific realism, Holmes 
sets out ten key tenets of Darwinism which have ‘formed an influential strand in 
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scientific thinking since 1859 and [have] been accepted as correct across the scientific 
community since the 1940s’.112 The particular clarity and precision regarding science in 
Darwin’s Bards harmonises with Holmes’s penetrating style of close reading – Holmes’s 
shows the immense complexity of literary responses to Darwinism in the poetry of 
writers as diverse as George Meredith, Robert Frost, and Thom Gunn.  
Of later interest to this study is Holmes’s reading of Edwin Morgan’s parody of 
human vanity, ‘The Archaeopteryx’s Song’.113 Holmes has also recently edited a 
valuable collection, Science in Modern Poetry, New Directions (2012).114 In addition to 
Helen Small’s essay on Miroslav Holub and Roald Hoffman (an introductory remark 
from which was quoted above), and Holmes’s own essay ‘From Bergson to Darwin: 
Biology in the Poetry of Judith Wright’, both discussed later in the thesis, the collection 
includes work by Peter Middleton, Robert Crawford, and Michael Whitworth.115  
The four poets at the heart of this thesis were exposed, to varying extents, to the 
intense firmament of conflicting positions which literature and science has sometimes 
become. MacDiarmid was criticised by G. E. Davie, for example, for his ‘conversion to 
the point of view of modern science’.116 Wright adopted a more conventionally literary 
position, but regarding postmodernism, her biographer, Veronica Brady, noted that 
‘Literary theory seemed to Judith “radio-active territory”’.117 James McGonigal, 
Morgan’s biographer and formerly his student, recalls that when the ‘study of English 
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was becoming heavily influenced by continental literary theory’, Morgan taught the 
theory in the Masters course McGonigal followed, but ‘did not feel that he had the time 
or real inclination for wide or deep reading around it’.118 Holub, in his final essay, 
engaged with the abstract topic of poetry and science, perhaps a little shakily.119 He does, 
however, say at the end of the essay that ‘Science in poetry should shed some relatively 
new light’, in contrast to the ‘postmodern poetic way of wearing dark glasses on a 
moonless night’.120 Perhaps now, in view of the probable wane of postmodernism, it is 
possible as an interdisciplinary contributor from a scientific background, to re-assert the 
materialism of science, and to develop this thinking in a study of science in poetry, 
without unnecessary controversy. 
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I: CRITICAL BACKGROUND TO POETRY AND SCIENCE 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Alan Sokal, opening his famous parody, writes: ‘There are many natural scientists, and 
especially physicists, who continue to reject the notion that the disciplines concerned 
with social and cultural criticism can have anything to contribute, except perhaps 
peripherally, to their research’.1 The sentence is heavy with irony due to the context of its 
publication, but I believe that the sentiment expressed represents Sokal’s literal view. It is 
a conservative and established position which has been under substantial attack in recent 
years. Historically speaking, perhaps there is justice in this, and science is due a taste of 
its own iconoclastic medicine. For the first time since the Enlightenment science has not 
only been placed on the defensive as the widespread influence of the humanities has 
coloured the overall discourse on the subject, but science itself has been influenced, to 
some extent, by the wider developments in culture. The response in this thesis to the 
pressure which science is under is to retreat to a well-defined and defensible position. 
That position, put briefly, is that just as there is no comprehensive or fully convincing 
scientific theory of literature, there is similarly no comprehensive or fully convincing 
literary theory of science. At the same time, the interdisciplinary study of science in 
literature must function, and operate from the perspectives of both the humanities and 
science. A further point could be made: there is no fully convincing literary theory of 
science, but that does not mean there can be no literary or cultural descriptions of 
science. There is a tension between bringing poetry and science together either in a poem 
or as a methodology of study, and maintenance of their distinct domains of knowledge.  
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As noted in the Introduction, Gillian Beer, in her ‘Afterword’ to Contemporary 
Poetry and Contemporary Science, asks ‘How do we avoid collapsing the differences 
between science and poetry in our eagerness to explore their interactions?’.2 I would want 
to respond: it is literary relativism that collapses the differences; relativism’s 
homogenising influence operates in practice to make poetry and science like a 
comparison of texts, or a discourse on two related narratives. Beer’s elaboration of her 
question makes it clear that she holds a different view. She characterises the differences 
between poetry and science as the diversity of ‘forms of experience’, and sees the 
distance between them in terms of ‘approach, scope, and truth-telling’.3 This is a cultural 
view of science which at a certain level is undeniable, but it is not entirely neutral: the 
term ‘truth-telling’ is suggestively critical of science. Later Beer, differentiating between 
‘science’ and ‘science writing’, collectively describes the science in Crawford’s volume 
as ‘ecology, physics, astronomy, psychiatry, and other forms of gathered and shifting 
knowledge’.4 In the humanities, this is a mainstream way of characterising science, and 
few, I think, would object to it. If this same phrase was considered from the perspective 
of a scientist, however, one would object that there is no sense of the heuristic or the 
scientific method in the idea of ‘gathered’ knowledge, and add that it is very hard to see 
how knowledge such as the periodic table or classical physics can be described as 
shifting.  
The problem is not one of casual over-generalisation; Beer’s understanding of 
science is highly sophisticated. Whether or not the different views, Beer’s and that of a 
putative scientist, are simply two, potentially equally valid, perspectives on science, or 
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whether one view is right and the other is wrong has been seen, unfortunately, as the 
heart of the matter. The question is this: can science be both culturally situated and 
relative, and at the same time material and culturally independent, or are these definitions 
of science mutually exclusive? Put this way, I think the answer is clear. Literature and 
science scholarship has shown conclusively that the exclusivist view is not tenable – 
science can be described in cultural terms, and there is value in doing so. But equally, if 
exclusivism is not tenable, then science must also be material and culturally independent. 
Accepting that a description of science is not the same thing as a theory of science, and 
the former does not totalise, then the situation is simply that both views can co-exist. The 
issue then becomes one of balance, because if both perspectives are true, then both should 
be equally represented.  
An important change in literary attitudes to science has taken place as a result of 
the era of relativism. Science has lost its power to shock. The fear engendered by science, 
as expressed by Matthew Arnold, I. A. Richards, Douglas Bush, and others, no longer 
exists, because science, along with everything else, is regarded as just part of the cultural 
miasma. The achievement of relativism, if such it is, is that science has been tamed. Its 
theories have lost importance because it is asserted that they will become obsolete at 
some point anyway, and its claims can be considered as ephemeral as any other aspect of 
culture. While the intention is not to make science shocking again, if the difference 
between poetry and science is not to collapse (to borrow Beer’s terminology), and the 
interdiscipline is to achieve a natural balance, then a firm argument against exclusivist 
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relativism needs to be put forward: therefore, this chapter opens with a systemic 
challenge to the fine detail of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.5  
Rather than further explore the philosophy of science further, for reasons outlined 
in the Introduction, the remainder of the chapter seeks a sense of the identity of the 
subject of poetry and science. There are many ways in which this could be achieved; here 
I suggest three. The first is concerned with discourse. Quite different discourses related to 
poetry and science are identified in the intricate exchanges between William 
Wordsworth, Samuel Coleridge, and Humphry Davey; the debates in Scotland as 
described by G. E. Davie in The Democratic Intellect; and the two cultures dispute.6 The 
debates in the Romantic era and in Scotland are marked by the fact that the participants 
were bound by a common fabric of belief, a liberal consensus in the first case, and a 
philosophical consensus in the second. It is as if at the time when the two cultures dispute 
erupted mutual belief had been fatally eroded, and any that remained was destroyed.  
This consideration of discourse is followed by a section of the chapter which sets 
out a baseline for poetry and science with a study of I. A. Richards’s Science and Poetry 
and the context in which it was written.7 Lasting value is sought in Richards’s work by 
comparing it to contemporary research in cognitive poetics. The chapter ends with a brief 
theoretical discussion useful to the understanding of science in poetry. Science is 
understood here to be a materialist discipline. When science is in poetry, that is, when 
something formerly descriptive of material reality has become poetry, a transformation 
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must have taken place. There is no single way to understand this transformation, but as a 
lead-in to the detailed study, the idea of the creative misreading of science is developed 
by cherry picking from the work of Harold Bloom. The result is a useful position, which 
seeks to shed this author’s materialist biases: poets are free to make science their own, to 
mutate the meaning in any way they like, and they should mainly be judged on aesthetic 
grounds.  
 
A Systemic Challenge to Thomas Kuhn  
 
The philosopher Ian Hacking enthuses in his 2012 introductory essay to the 50th 
anniversary edition of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, ‘Thomas 
Kuhn was out to change our understanding of the sciences […] He succeeded’.8 
Hacking’s inclusive ‘our’ is certainly not wholly correct – few scientists or general 
readers have in fact changed their understanding of the sciences as a result of Kuhn’s 
work (or have even heard of it); however, for those in non-scientific disciplines who 
comment on science, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is undoubtedly seminal. The 
back cover of the 1996 third edition declares that Kuhn’s work is ‘Considered one of 
“The Hundred Most Influential Books Since the Second World War” by The Times 
Literary Supplement’.9 The state of general acceptance of Kuhn’s proposition is 
illustrated by Steven Shapin, a relativizing historian of science, who writes with 
confidence in 2010 the phrase: ‘Thomas Kuhn has shown us …’.10 Structure is a pillar of 
humanities pedagogy on science. At a postgraduate seminar entitled ‘The Sociology of 
Scientific Understanding’ in 2011, Kuhn’s ideas were presented as if it was established 
                                                 
8 Kuhn(1962), viii; 4th edn. unless otherwise noted. 
9 Kuhn(1962), 3rd edn., 1996. 
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fact that Structure overthrew the ‘Grand narrative’ that scientific knowledge is 
cumulative; then, as if relativized once, science could be relativized again by ‘The 
sociological turn’.11 This latter idea is a reference to the sociology of scientific 
knowledge or SSK associated with David Bloor of Edinburgh University, which claims 
that even mathematics is socially constructed.12 SSK has a family resemblance to Bruno 
Latour’s constructionism, which asserts that scientists construct facts in the laboratory.13 
Kuhn can be seen as the originator of this idealism, as the founder of the vast industry in 
the history, sociology, and philosophy of science which exists today.14 This industry, it is 
clear from the literature, is populated in large part by those Bernard Williams calls ‘the 
deniers’.15 Williams writes in Truth and Truthfulness (2002) that ‘the presence and 
relevance of […] everyday truths give the sciences a claim to seriousness that the 
humanities can easily lose’.16  
Kuhn’s theory has generated a vast amount of response and speculation. Although 
loose paradigm terminology is used by some scientists, the physicist David Deutsch 
argues that ‘stereotype has been elevated into a philosophy by Thomas Kuhn’, and he 
himself has ‘never come across anything like a Kuhnian situation’, and, regarding 
quantum mechanics, ‘it would be hard to find a more spectacular counter-example to 
Kuhn’s theory of paradigm succession’.17 By contrast, Garry Gutting’s 1980 collection of 
                                                 
11 ‘Theories and Methods’ at the University of Salford, 13-14 Jan 2011; ‘The Sociology of Scientific 
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Williams(2002). 
16 Williams(2002), 11. 
17 David Deutsch, The Fabric of Reality, (London: Penguin, 1998), 312, 325, 327; Deutsch(1997). 
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essays, Paradigms and Revolutions is largely an unquestioning eulogy.18 A summary of 
more critical positions than in Gutting’s collection, though from the point of view of 
continental philosophy, can be found in an editors’ commentary in the 1998 Norton 
anthology Philosophy of Science.19 A comprehensive and balanced account of Kuhn’s 
work is given in James Ladyman’s Understanding the Philosophy of Science; also, there 
is a more detailed perspective in his article ‘Structural Realism’.20 Paradigm theory has 
been put under considerable pressure. Structural realism aside, however, little of the 
criticism of Kuhn is systemic, but rather is intended to make way for another form of 
denial.21 By contrast, the stance of this thesis is outright rejection of paradigm theory.  
Kuhn’s explicit purpose is to challenge the idea that science accumulates 
knowledge.22 Although it is admitted that knowledge will accumulate in certain 
circumstances, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions offers a proposal, paradigm theory, 
which is a mechanism designed to stop the net gain of scientific knowledge resulting 
from the practice of science.23 Kuhn’s proposal can be concisely defined. There exists an 
abstract superstructure in science, which Kuhn calls paradigms.24 Immature science may 
be pre-paradigm, but once robust theories are established the scientific practice in that 
particular field enters a ‘paradigm’ within which day-to-day research is classed as 
                                                 
18 Garry Gutting, (ed.), Paradigms and Revolutions, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980). 
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22 Kuhn(1962): against accumulation, 2, 3, 169; appearance of accumulation, 137, 138; ambiguous about 
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162; re-admission of progress in ‘normal science’, 165; apparent admission of advance, xliv; see also ‘non-
cumulative’, 92; rejection of accumulation, 96, 108; ‘evolutionary’ claim, 172. 
24 Kuhn(1962): genesis of paradigms, xlii; introduction to paradigms, 11; on paradigms, 18; specialised 
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‘normal science’. However, as no theory is perfect, increasing pressure of anomalous 
results will eventually cause a crisis in the field of research; a period of ‘extraordinary 
science’ will follow resulting in a scientific revolution, and a subsequent paradigm shift. 
Kuhn claims that the process of moving from one paradigm to another necessarily 
invalidates old scientific knowledge, and replaces it with ‘incompatible’ or 
‘incommensurate’ new scientific knowledge.25 Of course it does not necessarily follow 
that the breakdown of one theory will mean that its successor will be incompatible rather 
than merely more general, nor that the imposition of an abstract superstructure on the 
entirety of scientific procedure should provide anything other than a vague descriptive 
framework.26 However implausible it might seem, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
claims otherwise. Scientific knowledge, it is asserted, cannot accumulate because it is 
periodically destroyed by revolutions. Thus science is rendered relative, unstable, and 
uncertain: scientists are living in an illusory world of their own invention, their actions 
governed by deterministic epistemological forces of which they are completely 
unaware.27 
Towards the end of the Introduction to Structure, after outlining his theory, Kuhn 
reflects: ‘Undoubtedly, some readers will already have wondered if historical study can 
possibly effect the sort of conceptual transformation aimed at here’.28 He admits that he 
may already have violated the ‘very influential contemporary distinction between “the 
context of discovery” and “the context of justification”’.29 Rather than make an argument 
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28 Kuhn(1962), 8. 
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on this point, he ends a brief discussion with an appeal to the reader: ‘How could history 
of science fail to be a source of phenomena to which theories about knowledge may be 
legitimately asked to apply?’.30 The reader is being asked to accept that the history of 
science is epistemologically equivalent to science itself. To put it another way, Kuhn is 
claiming that the historical evidence he presents is equivalent to scientific data, and that 
the conclusions drawn from these data have the robustness of scientific theory.31 This 
approach seems to privilege a specific reading of history, so at the very least one would 
expect a discussion, for instance, of the reliability of the evidence presented, the 
uncertainties involved, the potential bias of written sources, the completeness of the 
record, or the implications of the total loss of the oral discourse.32 Kuhn does not evaluate 
his own evidence in these terms, though scientists’ history of their own subject is 
criticised.33 Throughout Structure what passes for evidence is simply presented as fact.34 
The treatment of evidence is actually much worse than this: it is re-contextualised – 
Kuhn’s history of science arrives pre-packaged in Kuhn-shaped boxes.35 Paradigm theory 
is blatantly circular.36 The taxonomy is back projected onto history: Structure’s narrative 
is constructed in terms of this putative taxonomy to the point of absurdity; for example, 
even Aristotle is equipped with a paradigm (in order that Galileo can later overthrow 
                                                 
30 Kuhn(1962), 9. 
31 Kuhn(1962): evidence as data, xliii, 9; analytical treatment of history, 43; ‘great precision’, 52; rigid 
formulation of evidence, 56-7; see also ‘characteristic of all discoveries’, 62; ‘entirely typical’, 75; 
argument as universal, ‘A similar…’, 100. 
32 Kuhn(1962): treatment of evidence, e.g., awkward detail (rules) discarded, 43-6; ‘Philosophers…’, 76, if 
true should apply to paradigm theory; event described as ‘extremely rare’, when it could be the evidence 
which is rare, 84; overriding of missing data, 124. For a rounded criticism of Kuhn’s evidence which, 
however, backs away from systemic challenge, see Kenneth Williams and Constance Barsky ‘From Social 
Construction to Questions for Research’, in Labinger&Collins(2001), 142-155. 
33 E.g. Kuhn(1962), 20-1, 136. 
34 Kuhn(1962): evidence as fact, e.g., ‘paradigm rejection has been a historical fact’, 95. 
35 Kuhn(1962): pre-packaging: ‘The study of paradigms…’, 11; ‘fundamental unit’, 11; maturity and 
paradigms, 12; ‘Franklinian paradigm’, 18; theory imposed on evidence, 43-5, 52-3. 
36 Kuhn(1962): defence of circularity, 9; admission of circularity, 90; circular argument, ‘without 
commitment’, 100; further defence of circularity, 175. 
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it).37 Kuhn’s epistemologically privileged historiography strongly couples the evidence 
and the conclusions drawn – the theory must fit the evidence precisely. A woolly 
paradigm is no use because a woolly paradigm shift or a woolly revolution could not be 
an agent of epistemological transformation – in a woolly world it could never be clear 
what had actually changed. If a paradigm is woolly it becomes descriptive and not 
analytical as the theory requires. The direct and necessary consequence of Kuhn’s 
historiography is that paradigms must be precise and uniquely definable. This need for 
precision pervades the book and explains the prescriptive and mechanical style of the 
narrative.38 It is as if the history of science is not like other history, full of uncertainty and 
degrees of freedom, but is instead a series of analytical facts.39 Kuhn has identified the 
underlying fallacy himself in his Introduction – Structure confuses descriptive and 
theoretical knowledge. 
For the theory to work then, it is essential that paradigms can be defined simply 
and elegantly. Kuhn says confidently that ‘Despite occasional ambiguities, the paradigms 
of a mature scientific community can be determined with relative ease’.40 In fact they 
never do emerge in Structure, nor have they in any work since. An immediate problem is 
granularity – paradigms are assumed to apply at a sub-field level, for example electrical 
theory and mechanics in physics. This raises the issue of common principles, and Kuhn 
                                                 
37 Kuhn(1962): back projection: ‘usual development pattern’, 12; also, 15; ‘triumph’, 17, 18-19; hindsight 
applied, 22, 23, 27, 61; see also ‘paradigm rejection has been a historical fact’, 95; Aristotle’s paradigm: 
11; attempt to justify, 16-17. 
38 Kuhn(1962): mechanical, 5-6; near deterministic: 7, 15, 93; see also ‘paradigm forces scientists’, 25; 
prescriptive, 47; mechanisation of evidence, 57-9; ‘As a result of…’, 127; mechanisation of scientists’ 
activities, 143-4. 
39 Kuhn(1962): evidence as fact: ‘ever since’, 21; theory imposed on evidence, 43-5; see also ‘entirely 
unequivocal’, 67; historical determinism, 77, 78; ‘This genetic aspect…’, 93, 94; ‘paradigm rejection has 
been a historical fact’, 95; universalist claim: ‘Other examples…’, 106. 
40 Kuhn(1962), 43. 
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acknowledges that ‘global paradigms’ might exist.41 The conservation of energy could, 
for example, be identified as such a global paradigm across the physical sciences. By this 
reasoning there must a hierarchy of paradigms, and at the same time it must be possible 
for low-order paradigms to shift independently of the higher ones, although this seems to 
impose constraints on the permissible linkages between scientific theories. At one point 
Kuhn grants Newton’s laws a paradigm in their own right; at another he appears multiply 
to assign the laws as part of separate paradigms, implicitly acknowledging linkage 
between theories.42 Perhaps paradigms must shift in groups or parts of groups, but to say 
this means introducing another abstract entity, the group.43 The problems compound: if a 
paradigm which depends on the conservation of energy has a revolution, then it must do 
so without losing the parts of the paradigm, which could be extensive, which depend on a 
global paradigm which needs to stay in place; but the revolution could not then produce 
an incommensurate result.44  
If mathematics is brought into the picture, any hope of defining the paradigms of 
science seems to be lost. Roger Penrose notes that the Irish mathematician William 
Hamilton (1805 – 1865) had developed a theory of classical mechanics, with a ‘hint of a 
relation between waves and particles’.45 This hint, Penrose says, ‘and the form of the 
Hamilton equations themselves’, ‘was highly important in the later development of 
quantum mechanics’.46 In fact, an operator known as the Hamiltonian function appears 
(in generalised form) in Schrodinger’s equation of quantum mechanics; moreover, similar 
                                                 
41 Kuhn(1962), 43-4. 
42 Kuhn(1962): Newton is paradigm, 31; multiple assignment of theories to paradigms, 50; multiple 
assignment of Newton ‘stylistic’, 181; granularity, 49. 
43 Kuhn(1962): possibly overlapping paradigms, 50. 
44 The conservation of mass was generalised post-Einstein to the conservation of energy, an example of 
theory expansion; ‘historically implausibility’ of ‘logical inclusiveness’: Kuhn(1962), 98; denial, 7. 
45 Penrose(1989), 226. 
46 Penrose(1989), 226; italics original. 
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considerations apply to Maxwell’s equations.47 Ladyman reinforces this point: ‘There are 
numerous examples of continuity in the mathematical structure of successive scientific 
theories’.48 The presence of common mathematics throughout physical theory not only 
makes paradigm definition impossibly messy because it would need to model sub-theory 
level dependencies, it also seems to eliminate the possibility of an incommensurate 
paradigm shift altogether.49 Kuhn admits is his 1969 Postscript to Structure that the 
actual paradigms are not clear in his original text; one sympathetic reader, he reports, 
noted that paradigm was used in at least twenty-two different ways.50 In response, Kuhn 
introduces further complications, such as communities and disciplinary matrices, without 
apparently noticing that these seem more like descriptive terms, not the quasi-factual 
entity which a paradigm must be.51 A disciplinary-matrix shift hardly has the same ring 
as the original proposal, and in any case a change of historical description could not cause 
a scientific theory to be invalidated. Notwithstanding the declarations in The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions that this or that is a paradigm, there is absolutely no case for a 
clean and universal taxonomy, but for paradigm theory to be successful it must be both 
those things. The taxonomy must be clean because theories of the type under discussion 
are precise and thus can only be invalidated precisely. The taxonomy must be universal 
because otherwise science would start accumulating knowledge again. 
The problems multiply relentlessly as one works through The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions. Scientists’ reading and their publications during the so-called 
‘normal science’ period are mechanically prescribed: they are ‘usually either texts or 
                                                 
47 Penrose(1989), 372-3. 
48 Ladyman(2014), 6. 
49 This is not an ‘occasional ambiguity’, see Kuhn(1962), 43. 
50 Kuhn(1962), 181. 
51 Kuhn(1962), 176, 181. 
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retrospective reflections on one aspect or another of the scientific life’.52 Widespread 
evidence, however, of scientists’ publications including, for example, Arthur Eddington 
and Max Born in Kuhn’s time, or Richard Dawkins and Stephen Pinker more recently, 
show at the very least that the requirement for firm boundaries to ‘normal science’ cannot 
be met.53 Moreover, the treatment of ‘normal’ scientists as uniquely conditioned by their 
pedagogy is ethically unsound.54 The images of scientists behaving like brainwashed 
automata as if controlled by aliens or communists in the manner of 1950s science fiction 
would reward further study; so would the suggestions of behaviourist psychology in 
Structure.55 The results of crude psychological experiments are pulled out of the hat to 
support Kuhn’s assertions regarding scientists’ ‘normal’ behaviour. One example is an 
experimental result on the perception of anomalies in a pack of cards, which purports to 
show that subjects have trouble detecting irregularities such as a black four of hearts; this 
is cut from the laboratory and pasted into scientists’ real working lives.56 Not only that, 
but results from experimental psychology are granted the same status as descriptive 
historical evidence, that is, absolute certainty. There is a vague admission that there might 
be paradigms in psychological science, but no discussion of the effect this might have on 
the status of the evidence.57 
                                                 
52 Kuhn(1962), 20; narrowness of reading: 20; prescriptive, 50. 
53 Kuhn(1962): writing only addressed to professional colleagues, 20. 
54 Kuhn(1962): the scientific mind, 4-5; assignment of motives, 36-7; ‘proper sort of addict’, 38; 
psychologisation of scientists, 62, 64, 112; ‘scientists’ vision’, 64; ducks/rabbits, 111-12; isolation of 
scientific communities, 163-4. 
55 Kuhn(1962): scientists’ deterministic behaviour, 78-9, 80, 81, 85; ‘largely unconscious’, 86; ‘most 
prevalent image’, 87; scientists like ‘typical character in Orwell’s 1984’, 166. 
56 Kuhn(1962), 62-5, esp. ‘wonderfully simple…’, 64. 
57 Kuhn(1962), 121. 
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Structure includes a chapter on ‘invisible’ revolutions which stretches credulity.58 
Kuhn’s argument relies on the idea that scientists are more or less deliberately re-writing 
their own history; he says: ‘The depreciation of historical fact is deeply, and probably 
functionally, ingrained in the ideology of the scientific profession’.59 Scientists, 
according to Kuhn, misconstruct history in their textbooks, and these ‘misconstructions 
render revolutions invisible’.60 Kuhn’s excessive language with its suggestion of 
conspiracy obscures the fact that he has encountered a truism: theory building is a process 
of refinement based on hindsight. In Kuhn’s interpretation the developing meaning of, for 
example, the concept ‘element’, must imply there is a revolution each time the meaning 
develops.61 It seems necessary to believe that the science’s conceptual heuristic is 
composed of a series of static ideas which behave like mini-paradigms; these are duly 
destroyed by invisible revolutions, and replaced with a fresh mini-paradigm. It is as if, at 
the micro-structure level, science is locked in some sort of knowledge-neutral stasis. The 
idea of invisible revolutions reduces to absurdity. A much simpler explanation for the 
data Kuhn presents is that scientific ideas undergo a process of development based on 
accumulating experience and knowledge. 
If it is necessary to abandon the search for scientific paradigms, except in loose 
and descriptive terms, then the theoretical claims of The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions are lost. All that remains is induction – the possibility that if there has been a 
scientific revolution with catastrophic knowledge loss at least once, this might indicate 
that it could happen again. Ladyman refers to this theoretical remnant as ‘pessimistic 
                                                 
58 Kuhn(1962), 135-42. 
59 Kuhn(1962), 138. 
60 Kuhn(1962), 139. 
61 This is what his text implies: see Kuhn(1962), 141, see text starting ‘Boyle’s definition…’, and c.f. the 
wider context of the chapter, 141-2. 
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meta-induction’, and discusses the difficulties of this position in the face of any 
reasonable stance on scientific realism.62 Kuhn presents three primary strands of 
evidence: the heuristics of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century physical science, the 
Copernican revolution, and Einstein’s special relativity.63 Possibly Kuhn’s most 
important evidence is the rivalry in the 1770s between Priestley’s theory of phlogiston 
and Lavoisier’s theory of oxygen. Within Structure’s own terms it is necessary to accept 
that phlogiston was an accepted paradigm, not a school of thought in the pre-paradigm 
period.64 Although the distinction seems simply to be a matter of convention, almost 
arbitrary, it serves a good illustration of the outlandishness of paradigm theory’s claims. 
If phlogiston was pre-paradigm, then it can be abandoned without trouble, but if it was a 
paradigm then knowledge must be destroyed. However, even if a Kuhnian revolution is 
granted when the theory of phlogiston was overthrown, it is clear that there was a large 
net creation of knowledge, because Lavoisier paved the way for modern chemistry.  
This highlights another problem with Structure – if knowledge is to be prevented 
from accumulating, then the amount of knowledge destroyed must be greater than or 
equal to the new knowledge gained. But Lavoisier’s superior theory had the capacity for 
expansion and generalisation, so even if a Kuhnian scientific revolution occurred it still 
looks like scientific knowledge went on accumulating.65 Priestly was one of the many 
dedicated researchers who helped bring into being science’s great canon of discovery – 
Newton’s laws, Carnot’s thermodynamics, Maxwell’s equations, the theory of Oxygen, 
                                                 
62 Ladyman(2014), 4; also Ladyman(2002), 230-1, 236-43. 
63 Kuhn(1962): emphasis on these strands, 6; assertion of Copernican paradigm change, 68. 
64 Kuhn(1962): admission of uncertainty, xliii; evidence of rival schools ignored, see ‘hints from Priestly’, 
54; mechanistic discussion of period, 53-6; deterministic assignment of paradigms, 56. 
65 Kuhn(1962): denial of this, ‘non-cumulative’, 92; comment on Priestley’s lost knowledge, 147-8; both 
acceptance and rejection of accumulation, 96. 
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and others – as often as not by being wrong. The heuristic approach, guided trial and 
error, is part of the scientific method, so abandoned theories are a necessary part of the 
development of correct ones. If induction is any guide, then the scientific heuristic, 
including the need to eliminate unproductive areas of research, tends towards the 
development of robust theories of great longevity. Theory change did clearly take place, 
especially during science’s formative era, but any ‘Kuhn-losses’, if they exist at all when 
mathematical structure is taken into account, are dwarfed by knowledge gains.66 In this 
light, science is restored as a conscious process, not one guided by unseen historical 
forces and unknown epistemological laws. 
The Copernican revolution is surely a matter of knowledge foundation. Kuhn 
himself says that ‘factors external to science played a particularly large role’ in 
preserving the geocentric model of the universe.67 It’s worth noting that, in any case, 
structure is preserved to a first approximation across even the Copernican revolution.68 
Copernicus’s discovery and also Darwin’s were highly significant of course in 
ontological terms, but in both cases their impact was due to the challenge to non-
scientific knowledge; the new theories were not, to anything like the same extent, 
revolutionary within science, even if science can be said to have existed within 
astronomy prior to Copernicus or in theoretical biology prior to Darwin. 
Finally, there is the case of Einstein’s special relativity. Consider the following 
two quotations. The first is from Kuhn:  
 
                                                 
66 ‘Kuhn-losses’, see Ladyman(2014), 19. 
67 Kuhn(1962), 75. 
68 Kuhn(1962), 68; Ladyman(2014), 6. 
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The need to change the meaning of established and familiar concepts is central to the 
revolutionary impact of Einstein’s theory 69 
 
The second is from Einstein’s Relativity, a work which was in its fifteenth edition at the 
time Kuhn was writing.70 Einstein’s first mention of relativity in the following quotation 
refers specifically to the longstanding classical principle of relativity, which states, put 
loosely, that the laws of physics are the same irrespective of the speed and direction of 
travel. 
 
in reality there is not the least incompatibility between the principle of relativity and 
the law of the propagation of light, and that by systematically holding fast to both these 
laws a logically rigid theory could be arrived at. This theory has been called the special 
theory of relativity 71 
 
Kuhn is caught red handed in the act of imposing his theory’s incommensurability 
requirement onto the evidence: in the first of the two quotes, the word ‘generalise’ would 
be more accurate than ‘change’, but would not imply knowledge loss. Einstein by 
contrast, with a striking voyage of discovery metaphor, is ‘holding fast’ to established 
principles of physics.72 This is no quibble over wording – Kuhn is unambiguous that 
Newton’s and Einstein’s theories are incompatible.73 He says in a related passage: 
‘Einstein’s theory can accepted only with the recognition that Newton’s was wrong’.74 
No-one doubts that some things changed with special relativity, but it is an edge 
correction (of course an important one), and Einstein was right about continuity. The 
earth didn’t have to change its orbit around the sun. What actually happened was theory 
                                                 
69 Kuhn(1962), 102. 
70 Albert Einstein, Relativity, following 15th edn., (London: Folio, 2004), 25; Einstein(1920). 
71 Einstein(1920), 25, italics original; precise statement of the principle, 17-20. 
72 Metaphor, as translated. 
73 Kuhn(1962): Kuhn’s defence of incompatibility, 94-9; dismissal of scientists’ view, ‘But, the objection 
continues…’, 99. 
74 Kuhn(1962), 98-9; discussion of objections to this, 98-102. 
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expansion, not a Kuhnian paradigm shift.75 Both old and new theories are mathematically 
united and Einstein’s relativity is a securely established part of classical mechanics.76 
Any attempt to rescue paradigm theory would need to demonstrate that Newtonian 
knowledge had been irrevocably destroyed, and not simply built on, with the advent of 
special relativity. Even when the strange abstract forces are removed from The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions, the argument for the pure relativism of scientific knowledge 
remains difficult to make by pessimistic meta-induction. It is more likely that once a 
scientific theory is established, we are stuck with it. Science does not process, as if on 
one of M. C. Escher’s endless staircases, through a series of abstract structures which 
force it to destroy what it creates.  
This argument is put forward to show that the case for the cultural relativism, or 
the social construction, of scientific knowledge is far from closed. There is no 
philosophical consensus on the arguments for and against scientific realism: Ladyman 
provides a concise summary in Understanding the Philosophy of Science.77 Ironically, 
Kuhn’s theory seems vulnerable to many of the arguments put forward by anti-realist 
philosophers. The theory seems underdetermined in that there is an alternative, and much 
simpler, explanation of the same evidence: the operation of the scientific method.78 It is 
possible to argue that Kuhn’s observations are theory-laden, and also that there is a need 
to believe in invisible entities.79 The aim here, however, has been to make an evidence-
based, rather than a philosophical argument to establish the materialist outlook of the 
thesis; the fact that there is no philosophical agreement on these matters means that in 
                                                 
75 Kuhn(1962): denial of theory expansion, 7; more generally, 96-9. 
76 See e.g. Leonard Susskind and George Hrabovsky, Classical Mechanics, (London: Penguin, 2014), 1. 
77 Ladyman(2002). 
78 General discussion, e.g. Ladyman(2002), 162-95, esp. 162. 
79 General discussion, e.g. Ladyman(2002), 110-2, 185, 231. 
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interdisciplinary studies the texture of the arguments should be accepted, and the 
possibility of alternatives acknowledged. Ladyman comments: ‘In later work, Kuhn 
sought to distance himself from extreme views which give no role to rationality in the 
progress of science’.80 Retreat from philosophical disagreement is a sufficient basis for 
an interdisciplinary consensus within literature and science; individual positions can be 
taken without re-igniting the controversy which has done so much damage to the  subject. 
 
 
Wordsworth, the Democratic Intellect, and the Two Cultures 
 
The foregoing discussion on The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has established, as 
noted, a basis on which this thesis can assert the materialism of science. Moving in this 
section to the discursive aspect of poetry and science, it is worthwhile, in order to 
develop a long view of the two cultures dispute, to start with a brief consideration of one 
of earliest and most open statements on poetry and science, that of William Wordsworth 
in the second version of the Preface to Lyrical Ballads, probably written between 1801 
and 1802.81 Wordsworth’s reflection on poetry and science seeks harmony while 
maintaining the distinction between the subjects, although the distinction is cast in terms 
which could be seen as unequal. The passage opens with the statement that poetry and 
science are both pleasurable forms of knowledge.82 Elaborating, Wordsworth writes that 
the knowledge of poetry, ‘cleaves to us as a necessary part of our existence’, while the 
knowledge of science is ‘personal and individual’, and lacks the ‘habitual and direct 
sympathy’, which connects us with our ‘fellow-beings’.83 Wordsworth seems to be 
                                                 
80 Ladyman(2002), 121. 
81 Owen&Smyser(1974), 112. 
82 Owen&Smyser(1974), 140-1. 
83 Owen&Smyser(1974), 141. 
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saying that science is not, at least yet, a suitable subject for poetry; but he also accepts 
that this might change.84 Shifting to a conditional future tense, Wordsworth writes: ‘If the 
labours of Men of science should ever create any material revolution, direct or indirect, in 
our condition’, then the poet ‘will be at his side, carrying sensation into the midst of the 
objects of science itself’.85 Then, he continues: ‘The remotest discoveries of the Chemist, 
the Botanist, or Mineralogist, will be as proper objects of the Poet’s art as any on which it 
can be employed’.86 Wordsworth rounds to his subject with heady emotion: if science 
‘shall be ready to put on, as it were, a form of flesh and blood, the Poet will lend his 
divine spirit to aid the transfiguration’, and ‘the Being thus produced’, will be welcome, 
‘as a dear and genuine inmate of the household of man’.87 Wordsworth’s  unambiguous, 
yet also somewhat inconclusive, passage is the outcome of a productive discourse on 
poetry and science. As Owen and Smyser say, Wordsworth ‘seems to be aware of the 
arguments of Humphry Davey in his Introductory Discourse’, which was initially 
delivered as a lecture to the Royal Institution in January 1802.88 The intellectual 
dynamics of Davey’s Discourse and the way in which it impacted Wordsworth’s thinking 
are discussed in a 1962 article by Roger Sharrock, ‘The Chemist and the Poet’.89 
Wordsworth, and more especially his friend and collaborator Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, had become acquainted with Humphrey Davey in Bristol in the early years of 
the nineteenth century. According to Sharrock, ‘the young chemist seemed to his new 
poet-friends a fascinating figure who could talk their language, but who, because of his 
                                                 
84 See also Owen&Smyser(1974), 181. 
85 Owen&Smyser(1974), 141. 
86 Owen&Smyser(1974), 141. 
87 Owen&Smyser(1974), 141. 
88 Owen&Smyser(1974), 112. 
89 Sharrock(1962). 
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chosen career, seemed to them in a certain fashion on the wrong side’.90 Davey became a 
collaborator on the Lyrical Ballads project, for example, ‘correcting Wordsworth’s 
punctuation and proofs’, prior to publication.91 Coleridge was present at Davey’s 
presentation of the Introductory Discourse in 1802, reportedly commenting that the talk 
was ‘full of poetry’.92 In his lecture, according to Sharrock, Davey both echoes the 
phraseology of the first edition of the Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, and, from within this 
framework, challenges his poet-friends’ views on his own subject.93 He argues that the 
study of chemistry is ‘in no way divorced from the possibility of aesthetic satisfaction’, 
and that chemistry may also ‘solace the spirit and stimulate the imagination’.94 Sharrock 
writes that ‘Davey is prepared to defend chemistry on its own terms, not those laid down 
by Coleridge’.95 By careful comparison of texts, Sharrock shows that the inclusion of the 
passage on science in Wordsworth’s revised Preface was a response to the Introductory 
Discourse; Sharrock says, with the publication of the Preface, ‘The debate continues, 
with the difference that now Wordsworth is replying to Davey’.96 
The Wordsworth-Davey debate on poetry and science, not only remained 
fraternal, but established positions were modified; this would have been impossible 
without political consensus between the participants. Wordsworth, Sharrock writes, 
‘could have felt nothing but whole-hearted agreement with the social attitude of the 
Discourse’.97 Davey convinced Wordsworth that science could, ‘knit together the classes 
                                                 
90 Sharrock(1962), 63. 
91 Sharrock(1962), 64. 
92 Sharrock(1962), 65. 
93 Sharrock(1962), 67. 
94 Sharrock(1962), 66. 
95 Sharrock(1962), 67. 
96 Sharrock(1962), 69. 
97 Sharrock(1962), 72. 
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that compose society’, and could facilitate ‘social usefulness for all’.98 Additional colour 
and support for this argument can be found in Mike Jay’s review of James Secord’s 
Visions of Science in the LRB, 20 November 2014.99 It was a notable but brief moment of 
harmony. Richard Holmes, in his book The Age of Wonder (2008), charts the rise of 
‘Romantic science’ through the nineteenth century, and the increasing sense that 
‘discovery and invention brought new dread as well as new hope’.100 In the 1880s, 
Matthew Arnold and T. H. Huxley, formally debated their quite opposed positions, 
though in ‘genteel’ terms which signify a still extant common fabric of belief.101 
Attitudes hardened in the twentieth century, as seen, for example, in the early writing of 
the belief-bashing J. B. S. Haldane.102 I. A. Richards’s temperate response to Haldane’s 
Daedalus, with his acceptance that science could be a force for good, was an attempt to 
establish harmony in the hope of a liberal consensus.103 That hope was subsequently 
smashed to pieces, famously, by F. R. Leavis. But a liberal consensus is not the only 
fabric of belief which can hold together a potentially divisive debate – a commitment to a 
philosophical outlook can do the same and is perhaps more secure. 
In the Scottish academic tradition, as described in two works by the Scottish 
philosopher G. E. Davie, The Democratic Intellect (1961), and The Crisis of the 
Democratic Intellect (1986), the debate between the arts and sciences was more 
concerned with unity than division.104 During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
                                                 
98 Sharrock(1962), 72. 
99 Mike Jay, ‘Like Cooking a Dumpling’, LRB, 20/11/2014; James Secord, Visions of Science, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014). 
100 Richard Holmes, The Age of Wonder, (London: Harper Press, 2009), xv, xix. 
101 Ortolano(2009), 6. 
102 E.g. J. B. S. Haldane, Callinicus, A Defence of Chemical Warfare, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
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Davie argues, there was a ‘prolonged spiritual resistance’ in Scotland to the assimilation 
of its cherished generalist education system into the more specialist system dominant in 
England.105 The generalist system meant that in Scotland there was a ‘tripartite alliance 
between philosophy, language and science’, where ‘philosophy was given the role of 
primus inter pares’.106 The strength of this system is thrown into relief by those who 
criticised it. The Scottish critic John Campbell Shairp (1819 – 1885), according to Davie, 
feared that philosophy encouraged ‘a dangerous freedom of thought’, and advocated that 
‘philosophy, if it was not to be excluded from the curriculum altogether, was to be 
converted into a mechanical, bookish drill’.107 Central to the Scottish tradition was the 
Common Sense school of philosophy. Its leader Thomas Reid (1710 – 1796) thought, 
Davie comments, the great mistake of his contemporary Hume, ‘was a doctrinaire 
atomism which failed to see that knowledge from the start involves comparison, or, as he 
called it, judgment’.108 A French admirer of Scottish philosophy, Theodore Jouffroy, said 
common sense is ‘obscurely implicit in all human beings’, and may be ‘presupposed as a 
point of agreement behind their philosophical and political differences’, which is ‘capable 
of being appealed to as a check on extremism’.109  
The freedom of the democratic intellect encouraged interdisciplinary thinking. 
John Burnet, Professor of Greek at St Andrews from 1892 to 1926, said that ‘if you are to 
locate disinterested general knowledge anywhere, you are to locate it in poetry’, and 
poetry ‘provides a kind of starting point for science’.110 This is far sighted. In 2002 
                                                 
105 Davie(1961), xiii. 
106 Davie(1961), 17, 14; first among equals. 
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Ladyman wrote: ‘If there is one thing which has been learned from the twentieth-century 
debates about scientific method it is that the generation of scientific theories is not, in 
general, a mechanical procedure, but a creative act’.111 The Scottish tradition also 
encouraged self-awareness among scientists. The St Andrews’s geo-scientist J. D. Forbes 
(1809-1868), according to the mid-twentieth-century philosopher Davie, argued that 
‘Bacon’s account of the relation of experience to science was seriously misleading’, and 
represented a ‘superficial sort of empiricism’.112 Forbes warned against ‘Bacon and his 
projects for foolproof methods’, and held that ‘increasing scientific progress is 
inseparable from an increasing danger to science’.113 On similar ground, the physicist 
James Clerk Maxwell (1831-1879), argued for ‘an abstractionist principle of knowledge 
involving comparison’, which meant the ‘union of the mathematical and the 
experimental’, as opposed to ‘single minded empiricism’.114 
While interdisciplinary arguments were embedded in a common philosophical 
fabric which prevented breakdown, Davie charts the much more bitter disputes between 
the defenders of the tradition and those who wanted to assimilate the Scottish education 
system within the specialist system prevalent in England. James Hannay, editor of the 
Edinburgh Courant from 1860 to1864, according to Davie, ‘set himself to oppose the 
Northern ideal of democratic intellectualism’; Hannay advocated the principle of ‘Blood 
and Culture’, ‘according to which a system of racial exclusiveness was presented as 
preferable to the anarchism of Scottish democracy’, and held that ‘the scheme of detailed 
classical scholarship’, was ‘incomparably superior to generalities of premature 
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intellectualism’.115 The roots of the catastrophic breakdown in intellectual fraternity 
known as the two cultures dispute can be found in Davie’s characterisation of the English 
education system, where the common intellectual fabric was steadily eroded by 
specialisation. 
The productive, although edgy, discourse on poetry and science in the Romantic 
era and nineteenth-century Scotland contrasts with the spectacular collapse of 
interdisciplinary discourse in the second half of the twentieth century. In his famous ‘two 
cultures’ lecture in 1959, C. P. Snow was calling for a new and science-led industrial 
revolution, for the benefit of Britain and the world.116 He claimed that science could 
overcome poverty and hunger. 117 This is a play for a liberal consensus, but Snow felt it 
necessary to open his polemic by insulting literary academics. When he delivered his 
Rede Lecture, he was piqued by the fact that, for all their prowess and esteem, scientists 
were not seen as ‘intellectual’; this word, Snow claimed, ‘doesn’t include Rutherford or 
Eddington or Dirac’.118 Speaking of Rutherford’s comparison of himself to Shakespeare, 
Snow says: ‘What is hard for the literary intellectuals to understand, imaginatively or 
intellectually, is that he was absolutely right’.119 Snow then becomes incendiary: naming 
‘Yeats, Pound, Wyndham Lewis’, he asks ‘Didn’t the influence of all they represent bring 
Auschwitz that much closer?’.120 He qualifies a little, saying ‘literary persons were 
culpably slow to see’ the connection between their views and what was to happen.121 
Whatever one thinks of the politics of the named individuals, this is unconscionably 
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selective; as if there were no Nazi scientists, or no Manhattan Project.122 Nearly three 
years later, Leavis responded furiously in a Richmond Lecture entitled: Two Cultures? 
The Significance of C. P. Snow.123 In vitriolic tones, Leavis made sure the division would 
be a lasting one. Snow ‘is as intellectually undistinguished as it is possible to be’, and he 
is ‘in himself negligible’.124 Snow, in turn, reconsidered the meaning of ‘two cultures’, in 
a 1963 article The Two Cultures, A Second Look.125 He says ‘in plain truth, either of our 
cultures, whether literary or scientific, only deserves the name of sub-culture’.126 But the 
damage was done. 
The centrality of politics to the terms of the debate is demonstrated in detail in a 
comprehensive 2009 study: The Two Cultures Controversy, by the historian Guy 
Ortolano.127 Ortolano’s study brings fresh perspective to an old issue: he analyses over-
interpretations of the ‘two cultures’ saying that the ‘arts-versus-science dichotomy does 
not begin to bear the explanatory burden that has been placed on it’.128 He notes, for 
example, that the invective in Leavis’s Richmond Lecture ‘was not against Snow’s 
proposals for science but his stature as a novelist’.129 The ‘two cultures’ controversy has 
been an argument to which commentators have brought their pre-existing concerns, often 
taking licence from the strength of the original invective. Ortolano’s analysis, and his 
portrayal of the cultural complexity of postwar Britain, is based on a ‘revisionist 
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historiography’.130 He rejects the idea that Britain was in economic decline in the 1950s 
and 1960s, though, of course, it was in imperial retreat.131 While many commentators 
‘believed Britain to be enduring a painful economic decline’ Ortolano shifts attention to 
‘the indisputable phenomenon of cultural declinism – that is, to the emergence, workings, 
and manipulation of anxieties about decline’.132 This analytical strategy removes 
potential confusion about the protagonists’ imprecise, changing, and sometimes 
contradictory positions, and shows instead the influences and pressures to which they 
responded. In the final section of the book Ortolano considers the respective fates and 
legacies of Snow and Leavis. He notes the fact that the two men had much belief in 
common. As regards their literary tastes, both reviled the Bloomsbury Group and 
Kingsley Amis.133 In the Cold War politics of the day, ‘they viewed the United States and 
the Soviet Union as essentially similar’; in other words, both were still attached to an 
older view of England. Both disliked the main political parties and the British New 
Left.134 Both were against the ‘permissive society’, egalitarianism, and comprehensive 
education; and both defended elites – it was simply that their definition of the elite 
differed.135 For all its symbolism in literature and science, the two cultures dispute 
presents a wholly inadequate view of British society. This was a bitter dispute between 
constituencies of the ruling class, a right-wing argument about whether traditional elites 
or forward-looking elites were preferred. The two cultures could be represented today by 
bitterness between the Tory back bench and the party’s whigish leadership. It is most 
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unfortunate that so much energy has been wasted on a petty argument over two equally 
unattractive political visons. 
 
 
From I. A. Richards to Cognitive Poetics 
 
An open interdisciplinary tradition, if short lived, can be identified in a work that stands, 
arguably, as the modern foundation of the subject of this thesis: I. A. Richards’s Science 
and Poetry (1926).136 Richards’s eighty-three page essay provides many views of 
science, and also has the nature of a psychological investigation. Science and Poetry’s 
most significant achievement was to popularise Richards earlier ground-breaking 
introduction of psychology into literary study in Principles of Literary Criticism (1924). 
Science and Poetry is also known for its classification of science into ‘statements’ which 
were verifiable, and poetry into ‘pseudo-statements’ which were not.137 The idea, 
however, is fatally broken by Miroslav Holub in his poem ‘Žito the magician’, which 
contains a mathematical thus verifiable truth.138 Nor do pseudo-statements withstand 
Louis MacNeice’s mathematical precision in his poem ‘Reflections’.139 Another aspect of 
Science and Poetry is the fear of the advance of science, expressed in terms of ‘Ages’ and 
historical forces. In the opening remarks, Richards sees a watershed occurring in human 
affairs: much will be lost and the ‘loss may be great without our knowing anything about 
it’.140 Richards says humanity’s place in the universe is precarious, our chances 
problematical, but science ‘can enormously increase our chances if we make wise use of 
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it’.141 It is distressing that similarly ambiguous and vaguely hopeful sentiments, without 
any analysis of power, are still being voiced. The astronomer Martin Rees, in his 2010 
Reith Lecture, said: ‘science, optimally applied, could offer immense benefits … but it 
will present new threats’.142  
If Richards’s hope was wishful, his fear was real. A crucial influence on Science 
and Poetry was Richards’s fellow Cambridge Heretic, the pioneering biological scientist 
J. B. S. Haldane. Richards had noted earlier in Principles of Literary Criticism, in words 
which seem to underlie the introductory remarks in Science and Poetry, that ‘as Mr 
Haldane supposes’ an ‘Age of Biology’ will be introduced ‘by a recognition on the part 
of many minds of their own nature’ and this ‘is certain to change their behaviour and 
outlook considerably’.143  Science and Poetry was published in the wake of Haldane’s 
successful Daedalus which expands on what an Age of Biology might look like.144 
Haldane’s original lecture on the subject to the Heretics on 4th February 1923 was 
attended by C. K. Ogden, Richards’s long-term friend and collaborator.145 It was Ogden 
who urged the publication of Daedalus; it sold 15,000 copies in its first year and was in 
its seventh impression by 1926.146 Most likely prefiguring Aldous Huxley’s Brave New 
World (1932), Daedalus is a book of prophecies, and Richards’s fear of an impending 
biological crisis is explained as eugenics via ‘ectogenesis’, or test-tube birth, becomes 
established. In one prophecy, Haldane, in a tone of mock promotion, describes some of 
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the unexpected benefits of eugenics: the ‘increase in first-class music’ will be startling.147 
Haldane sums up: ‘no beliefs, no values, no institutions are safe’ from the advance of 
science.148 
Science and Poetry is probably a response to Daedalus. Richards’s quip about 
scientists ‘caught young and brought up in the laboratory’, and his comment that ‘men 
who might in other times have been poets are today in bio-chemical laboratories’, are 
likely to refer to Haldane.149 Parts of the text of Science and Poetry are steeped in barely 
specified fears which can be traced to Haldane’s view of biology, such as the statement, 
when discussing the ‘neutralisation of nature’, that the result will be ‘a biological 
crisis’.150 Again, Richards’s introductory remarks, for example: ‘the fairly near future is 
likely to see an almost complete reorganisation of our lives’, ‘Man is changing’, with a 
‘suddenness that threatens us’, seem to refer to Haldane’s Age of Biology.151 Richards 
wanted to be saved from Haldane’s biological nightmare, but he had painted himself into 
a corner. He rejected the ‘Magical View’, ‘the belief in a world of Spirits and Powers 
which control events’, and, although he fears Haldane’s vision, he is compromised by 
accepting it; only poetry is left.152 To be fair, Daedalus is nuanced and the title is ironic 
in the context of the text, and no doubt Richards was aware of the boyish playful element, 
the shock tactics, and not least Haldane’s competitive brilliance. The significant issue for 
poetry and science is that Richards reacted but did not over-react, and he could put 
biology aside to explore psychology. 
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Principles of Literary Criticism is an ambitious and complex book which seeks to 
present a theory of poetry in thirty-five short chapters. Its purpose is to re-found 
aesthetics on the basis of psychology. Richards seeks to answer the questions: ‘What 
gives the reading of a poem its value?’ and ‘How is this experience better than 
another?’153 He is trying to find a basis in the mind for aesthetic values such as Truth, 
Beauty, Good, and morality. He says ‘What is good or valuable’ is the ‘exercise of 
impulses and the satisfaction of their appetencies’; a good experience is when the 
impulses are ‘fulfilled and successful’; he talks of ‘organisation’ and ‘adjustment’, 
without which ‘value vanishes’ since ‘in a state of chaos important and trivial impulses 
alike are frustrated’.154 A model is developed for impulses in terms of the psychological 
experience of reading a poem. Impulses are the ‘weft of experience’, interacting with the 
warp or ‘the pre-existing systematic structure of the mind’ which is itself an ‘organised 
system of possible impulses’.155 The impulses ‘modify one another’, and the ways in 
which this happens ‘are the essential and fundamental things in any experience’.156 
Principles of Literary Criticism, however, really only contains the germs of ideas, as well 
as interesting though unrefined and undeveloped speculations.  
In Science and Poetry Richards re-rendered his psychological model in the 
memorable ‘compass needles’ thought experiment. Suppose, Richards says, we carry a 
magnetic compass in the neighbourhood of a powerful magnet.157 The needle waggles 
and comes to rest in a new direction depending on where we stand. Then suppose we 
carry an arrangement of many magnetic needles, and they can influence each other. Some 
                                                 
153 Richards(1924), 1. 
154 Richards(1924), 44. 
155 Richards(1924), 95. 
156 Richards(1924), 95. 
157 Richards(1926), 15-16; paraphrase of Richards up to ‘This new balanced position…’. 
Critical Background  59 
 
may swing horizontally, some vertically, and some freely. As we move the perturbations 
will be very complicated due to action of the needles upon each other, and even more so 
under the influence of the powerful external magnet. For every position in which we rest, 
however, there will be a final position in which the needles also come to rest, although 
even the slightest movement will set the needles waggling again. This is the mind under 
the influence of a complex disturbance  – the mind re-arranges itself, and finally, perhaps 
much later, regains equilibrium. This new balanced position of the needles, this response 
to stimulus, I take to represent a mental imprint, the final experience resulting from a 
poem entering one’s mind. The stronger the engagement with the poem, the greater the 
disturbance, the more our internal machinery is altered, the more one learns. The return to 
equilibrium is crucial to Richards’s thinking and represents satisfaction. The compass 
needle metaphor is an analogue model of poetic affect: the disturbance and the quality of 
the resulting experience are proportional to the perceived complexity or intensity, and 
how fully one absorbs the material being read. Richards’s mental model is both simple 
and intricate, and also surprisingly free of abstractions; it is a rare example of successful 
theoretical poetry and science, and serves to hold open for further development 
Richards’s idea of psychological poetic affect. 
Richards, however, did not develop his ideas; he seemed unsure how to respond 
to criticism, or even to his own innovations. In the Introduction to the 1970 third edition 
of his popular work, now re-titled Poetries and Sciences, Richards says of his first 
edition: ‘Soon after its appearance I took a dislike to it without being very sure why’.158 
He continues: ‘What seemed to me its best and most clearly stated points were, I found, 
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understood in ways which turned them into indefensible nonsense’.159 But as John Paul 
Russo, Richards’s biographer, comments in his earlier Introduction to Richards’s essays, 
Richards’s psychology is ‘something like a heuristic model rather than a belief rigidly 
adhered to’ – and as is evident in the notes to Poetries and Sciences, Richards was 
frustrated at being boxed into dogmatic positions.160 The critical domain was not 
comfortable with the open style of argument which Richards had found: he paid the price 
for the audacity of introducing scientific ideas into literary criticism. His friend T. S. 
Eliot said of Principles of Literary Criticism that it was a ‘milestone, though not 
altogether a satisfactory one’.161 Eliot mocked Richards’s idea of Good as ‘Efficiency – a 
perfectly working mental Roneo Steel Cabinet System’.162 And of the Arnoldian idea in 
Science and Poetry that poetry can save us, Eliot said it was like saying ‘the wall-paper 
will save us when the walls have crumbled’.163 In 1935 Richards was castigated by F. R. 
Leavis for his ‘pseudo scientific pseudo-psychological ambiance and Benthamite 
approach to Coleridge’.164 Later the New Critics W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley 
introduced the ‘iron law’ of the ‘affective fallacy’ in direct reaction to Richards’s view 
that a poem can be judged by the intensity of its psychological effect.165 M. H. Abrams 
describes the affective fallacy: the result is that the poem, as an object of critical 
judgement, tends to disappear, and this ends in impressionism and relativism.166 Abrams 
adds that Beardsley later modified his claim because critical evaluation cannot be done at 
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all if perceived effects are ruled out.167 Richards’s ideas were hardly given a chance. 
Russo says ‘After the 1930s Richards came to bear two reputations: one for scientism and 
another for its repudiation’.168  
I believe it is now possible to see Richards’s work as foundational, even though it 
was both over-ambitious and unfinished. His legacy is surely cognitive poetics. The 
theorist Ruven Tsur draws a careful line between what is doable and what is not in in his 
2008 Towards a Theory of Cognitive Poetics. His approach is measured: he says ‘the 
theories and models of Cognitive Poetics are related to specific texts via extensive 
analyses in terms of more traditional approaches.169 In a strikingly Richards-like 
formulation he says ‘poetic processes’ need to be described in three respects: ‘the normal 
cognitive process; some kind of modification or disturbance of these processes; and their 
reorganisation’.170 He characterises poetry as attempting to overcome the limitations of 
human cognition, such as the difficulty of thinking of things we don’t have names for.171 
He develops a mental model of high and low categorisation of information, arguing that 
‘intuition relies on information that escapes categorisation’, and in this way ‘poetry 
capitalises on disturbance or delay’ in our cognitive processes.172 One of Tsur’s 
frameworks is a multi-level view of speechmaking, credited to Michael Polanyi, with 
voice production at the lowest level, moving through levels which ‘manage’ vocabulary 
and grammar.173 This type of layers-of-abstraction model allows consideration of 
different kinds of delay within the cognitive process, as in the familiar tip-of-the-tongue 
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phenomenon, when our brain refuses to provide the word we know we want to say. As 
long as cognitive processes work they remain unnoticed, but when they fail, ‘the failure 
itself may have a unique conscious quality’, ‘which may be exploited for aesthetic 
purposes’.174 He characterises the tip-of-the-tongue effect as an ‘intensely active gap’ in 
our consciousness, which is vague and formless but definite – a state of ‘unfulfilled 
perceptual readiness’ the inner aspect of which is an affect.175 Thus reading a text which 
manipulates a ‘fluid mass’ of low or uncategorised information renders, due to delay, into 
our consciousness a specific cognitive process, or retrieval device, which can be 
interpreted as a feeling.176 Interpreting Tsur: when we read a poetic text, in addition to 
perception of meaning, certain literary devices can introduce cognitive delay. This in 
effect foregrounds a cognitive process, placing the process, as well as the perceived 
meaning in our consciousness, thus adding dimensions to our cognition. Tsur continues, 
with Richards-like terms, to discuss manipulation of ‘attitudes’, ‘feelings’, and ‘affects’; 
these he relates, via cognitive process or devices, to ‘values’.177 Tsur justifies the link to 
‘values’ by saying that ‘Values have been defined as devices that direct human activities, 
in the form of attitudes and affects’, (supporting this with an anthropological study): 
‘values are a complex association of symbol and affect – that is, of representation of 
states of affairs associated with feelings and emotions’.178 Thus Tsur claims for cognitive 
poetics ‘that it can bridge the apparently hopeless gap between human values and the 
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stylistic and poetic devices that otherwise would be considered trivial from the human 
point of view’.179  
The fingerprint of Richards is evident, and a significant advance is made by the 
addition of cognitive process to the older theory. However, it should be asked if Tsur’s 
theory suffers from the same objection – that these ‘attitudes’ and ‘processes’ remain 
notional, and are somehow without roots in a more concrete view of the mind. It feels 
like something is missing. The inclusion of a theory such as conceptual semantics, 
popularised by Stephen Pinker, might provide foundation.180 Pinker argues that the 
concepts behind language seem to be organised into ‘basic conceptual distinctions which 
assemble themselves into a scaffolding of meaning, which has hooks here and there on 
which to hang images, sounds, emotions, mental movies, and the other contents of 
consciousness’.181 Pinker’s model is more static, at first sight, than Richards’s compass 
needles, but there is a suggestive resemblance. Pinker enriches the theory by inclusion of 
Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphors.182 (Note that Michael Whitworth 
discusses certain limitations of Lakoff and Johnston’s theory in Einstein’s Wake).183 
Conceptual metaphors seem to loosen any rigidity in conceptual semantics, allowing a 
sort of slippage of meaning between what might otherwise be seen as fixed semantic 
entities, and offer an explanation of the immense variety of ways in which we construe 
the world. Cognitive poetics research is divided, however, according to Peter Stockwell, 
over how to address Chomsky’s theory of innate syntax, which underwrites the work of 
                                                 
179 Tsur(2008), 19. 
180 Stephen Pinker, The Stuff of Thought, (London: Penguin, 2008); Pinker(2007). 
181 Pinker(2007), 82. 
182 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors we Live By, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2003). 
183 Whitworth(2001), 10-15. 
Critical Background  64 
 
Pinker and others in his field.184 It’s worth noting briefly that Chomsky’s and Pinker’s 
work is being challenged by a mounting body of linguistic evidence, according to 
Vyvyan Evans’s 2014, The Language Myth.185 Evan’s alternative hypothesis though, 
which also seems to include conceptual metaphors, is not yet articulated fully enough for 
it to be a replacement for Chomsky’s universal grammar and Pinker’s 
psycholinguistics.186  
Richards was speculating in Principles of Literary Criticism, and left his work 
unfinished: but there are reasonable intuitive grounds for believing that our emotional 
response to poetry, the ‘truth effect’, may arise in some way from innate responses. And 
cognitive poetics, perhaps with the addition of semantic structure, might help to develop 
an understanding of poetic knowledge, a concept which Robert Crawford has suggested 
as a means to discuss science in the work of Hugh MacDiarmid and other poets.187 It can 
be reasonably claimed that Richards’s ideas have lasting value, and given Science and 
Poetry’s pioneering interdisciplinary approach, his work should also be seen as 
pedagogically relevant for literature and science. 
 
 
The Creative Misreading of Science 
 
A position with respect to the interdisciplinary study of poetry and science has now been 
put forward. The firm challenge to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has established 
the scientific materialist outlook in this thesis; this is complemented by the desire to 
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proceed within the confines of a balanced position where idealist views of science are 
seen to have been challenged. The interdiscipline has also been characterised in terms of 
three well-known discourses, and there has been a focus on still-active efforts to discover 
a common theoretical approach to poetry and science. The thesis now turns to the 
detailed study of science in poetry, in particular four case studies; as a prelude to this, the 
chapter ends with a brief overview of aspects of the mysterious process whereby 
materialist science is transformed into poetry. It should be said at the outset that the 
appropriation of science is risky for a poet – success is by no means guaranteed. Perhaps 
if science in poetry achieves the same level of conceptualisation as the other elements of 
a poem, the result is likely to be on the successful side of the scale; if the science seems 
dis-harmonious in the poem or appears to be misunderstood, failure might be more likely, 
though there is a fine line between putative failure and a potential poetic exploration of 
disharmony or misunderstanding. Such is the diversity of the means by which successful 
science in poetry may be achieved that there can be no universal theory. One might 
expect at first sight, for example, the transformation from science to poetry to be a one-
way process: it should not be possible to regain the original science by reverse-
engineering a poem – but this wouldn’t necessarily hold for Hugh MacDiarmid’s poetry 
of fact. 
 If a range of ways of thinking about science in poetry is necessary, one approach 
is quite helpful, especially for Judith Wright’s poetic science, but also at times for that of 
MacDiarmid and Morgan: the creative misreading of science. To arrive at this I have 
cherry-picked, and changed, a central idea behind Harold Bloom’s The Anxiety of 
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Influence (1973).188 It is understood that within literary criticism, Bloom’s theory is far 
from widely accepted, even strongly rejected; however, surely within the highly restricted 
domain of poetry and science (which Bloom did not address), a bare-bones extraction 
from his work can be justified. The idea, in brief, is that the successful poet of science 
must overthrow the materialist discipline in a similar manner to a poet overthrowing their 
influential precursor. The creative misreading of science thus insists on the distinction 
between poetry and science, and at the same time suggests that one successful approach 
for the poet of science is to abolish the distinction. In this situation there can be no 
reverse-engineering: the science has been stripped of its theoretical power, it has become 
the poet’s idea, a mythological presence in a poem, vying for attention with other poetic 
tropes. 
Briefly looking into The Anxiety of Influence, to give a sense of the tone of this 
work, Bloom identifies poetic influence as a branch of pataphysics, a term invented by 
the French absurdist Alfred Jarry, to mean the science of imaginary solutions.189 The 
poet’s creative revisionism necessarily involves the ‘hapless re-creation of errors’ as the 
original’s ‘stationing context … is reseen, and shaped into the visionary’.190 This is ‘an 
act of vision [which] determines a particular law’; apparent absurdity must be accepted – 
poetic influence is ‘absurdity of the highest mode, the apocalyptic absurdity of Jarry, or 
of Blake’s entire enterprise’.191 Bloom’s ‘splendidly horrible paradox’ of influence is 
secured on this basis: ‘the new poet himself determines the precursor’s particular law’.192 
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This remarkable transition of ideas is about the struggle for power and the attendant risk. 
In terms relevant to this thesis, the poet of science must shift from real to imaginary 
solutions; the poet risks absurdity – the price of ownership – but absurdity can equate to 
high poetic vision. The poet re-visions science and makes it subservient to poet’s own 
laws, and in doing so the poet declares the laws of science in the poem. 
 It’s worth a short discussion of a poem where the poet appears to declare a law of 
science, J. H. Prynne’s ‘The Plant Time Manifold Transcripts’ (PTM).193 This poem, with 
its notable opening line: ‘1st April 1972’, creates imaginary science and risks outright 
absurdity.194 PTM is the putative transcript of a scientific conference where the 
protagonists engage at cross purposes: the reader is teased by swings between apparently 
cogent science, and what looks like a barrage of meaningless jargon. The phrase: ‘Sleep 
movements in the common bean seedling (leaf folding) are in phase with diurnal light-
dark rhythms…’, for example, is meaningful; whereas: ‘The genetic epoch G(t) = 0 
initiates a determined cytochronology, because almost at once the swarm of positive 
velocities branch by means of differential acceleration’, is not.195 At times the PTM 
appears to be discussing a genuine scientific hypothesis, a sort of fusion between 
relativity and botany. This reading is given by Justin Katko (supported by research in the 
Ed Dorn archive); Katko says: ‘The basic proposition of the plant time hypothesis is that 
there exists a form of temporality specific to all plants, wherein the plant’s upper half  
                                                 
193 J. H. Prynne, Poems, (Tarset: Bloodaxe, 2005), 233-42; Prynne(2005). 
194 Prynne(2005); 234. 
195 Prynne(2005), 234. 
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(the stem) moves forward in time, and the plant’s lower half (the root) moves backward 
in time’.196  
 The PTM can be classed as creative misreading because of what seems like a 
semi-serious attempt to fold two scientific theories together for an entirely poetic 
purpose. But regarding its success as a poem, a number of objections could be made. The 
poem is clearly playful, and scientific obfuscation is a fair target for parody; but 
regarding obfuscation, there is no sense in the poem of reflexive irony in the context of 
Prynne’s wider work. The likely presence of in-jokes, obscure to the reader, indicated by 
phrases such as ‘vernal interbeen’, and the general impenetrability of the discourse 
presented, discourages the reader from attempting to distinguish any serious science from 
the gibberish.197 And because the majority of the scientific material in the poem reads 
like gibberish (at least in the poem’s context), the poem does not sit on the tantalising 
interface between the serious and the ridiculous, fatally undermining (for me) any claim 
to parody the poem might have. Indeed, the parody backfires: one is left with the 
uncomfortable feeling that the PTM is simply frivolous, an un-self-aware and failed 
attempt to poke fun at science. 
The creative misreading of science works best when the appropriated material is 
stripped of its original theoretical power, then re-imagined so that the original remains 
recognisable; theoretical power remains, but is transformed to poetic power. A good 
example, discussed in detail later, is Edwin Morgan’s careful folding together of two 
interpretations of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle (Schrödinger’s and Heisenberg’s 
                                                 
196 Justin Katko, ‘Relativistic Phytosophy: Towards a Commentary on “The Plant Time Manifold 
Transcripts”’, http://solutioperfecta.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/g2-katko.pdf, printed, 02/02/2011, 
checked 22/06/2014; italics original. 
197 Prynne(2005), 241. 
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own) to poetic effect in ‘Memories of Earth’.198  Creative misreading is not like cherry 
picking, or transposition into imagery, or metaphor (not that any of these techniques are 
necessarily wrong or inferior, they are simply different) in that creative misreading must 
involve a struggle for power which in turn requires a detailed level of comprehension of 
the original. Creative misreading thus focusses attention firmly on the strength of the 
artistic creation – if successful, the poet using appropriated science is only subject to 
aesthetic judgement – and to a reasonable extent this renders the poet’s art immune to the 
changing relevance or even minor errors in the alien material they have appropriated. 
 
 
 
                                                 
198 CPEM, 330-40. 
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II: HUGH MACDIARMID’S RADICAL INTEGRATION OF 
POETRY AND SCIENCE 
 
 
Now that a shape to the subject of poetry and science has been outlined, the remainder of 
the thesis focuses on science in the oeuvres of four twentieth-century poets. Hugh 
MacDiarmid (1892 – 1978), the first of the four chosen poets, was one of the founders of 
the National Party of Scotland, a forerunner of the Scottish National Party, as well as a 
member of the Communist Party.1 MacDiarmid was also an important figure in the 
Scottish literary revival. His enormous poetic canon falls broadly into two parts: the early 
lyrical verse in Scots, and the later epic poetry in English. For a non-Scot, a good 
introduction to his Scots verse is to listen to one of the extant recordings of 
MacDiarmid’s poetry readings.2 There is a cassette in the National Library of Scotland 
(NLS) of an electrifying performance in Greenwich Village, New York, in 1969, where 
Norman MacCaig introduced an evening of poetry and Scottish nationalism. It is 
MacDiarmid’s late work in English, which has its roots in the time he lived on the 
Shetland island of Whalsay (1933 – 1941), which is the subject of this chapter.  
 MacDiarmid’s late work must be considered as a single, potentially endless, text. 
Robert Crawford notes that reading ‘MacDiarmid’s late poetry of knowledge’ is like 
‘surfing on the Internet or moving on impulse through a vast database or hypertext 
system’.3 MacDiarmid writes in his autobiography Lucky Poet: ‘The kind of poetry I 
want / Is poems de longue haleine – far too long / To be practicable for any existing 
                                                 
1 Alan Bold, MacDiarmid, A Critical Biography, (London: John Murray, 1988), 231; Bold(1988). 
2 NLS item number 4166145, shelfmark Tur.1139; cassette recording: The Scotland of Hugh MacDiarmid, 
live recordings from Apr. 1967 and Feb. 1968. NLS item number 3445067, shelfmark Cas.75(30); cassette 
recording labelled: MacDiarmid Poetry Scots English, live recordings of two performances at the YMCA 
New York on 4 May 1969, introduced by Norman MacCaig. 
3 Crawford(1995), 182. 
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medium’.4 Individual poems do sometimes emerge from the vast assembly of 
fragmented, overlapping, and apparently unstructured text. The appearance of strongly 
defined poems, such as ‘On a Raised Beach’, can be visualised as a sculpted mountain 
range rising from a surrounding plane on which are scattered the abandoned and surplus 
boulders of thought.5 More generally, the text sometimes feels like uncoalesced pre-
poetry, and MacDiarmid’s late work can quite genuinely be read with pleasure by 
selecting one’s favourite passages and gathering them into a reader-defined poem, a 
property which resonates with Crawford’s observation. If MacDiarmid had had a trusted 
editor, as Eliot had Pound, a more conventionally structured late corpus might have 
emerged; this giant text stands, however, as a never-ending work in progress, a record of 
thoughts as they happened, held in place and given literary substance by the force of 
MacDiarmid’s very considerable personality.  
Before engaging with MacDiarmid’s poetic science in detail, it is useful to outline 
the arguments which are to be made, and then to look briefly at a number of early, pre-
mature, references to science in the poet’s work. MacDiarmid’s late work, it is argued, is 
radically integrated in the sense that the apparently discrete poems which comprise it are, 
with some exceptions, almost arbitrary physical constructions, or to a fair approximation, 
labels which mark divisions in the greater text. It is possible, however, to find structure at 
more abstract levels – The Kind of Poetry I Want is one such abstract structure, a sort of 
formula for bringing together sections of text. Within MacDiarmid’s text assembly there 
is also a radical integration of poetry and science. The amount of science in 
                                                 
4 Hugh MacDiarmid, Lucky Poet, (Manchester: Carcanet, 1994), 130; LP; de longue haleine, of long 
breath; see also W. N. Herbert, To Circumjack MacDiarmid, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 158; 
Herbert(1992). 
5 CPHMD, 422-33. 
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MacDiarmid’s late poetry is considerable, and varies from reportage of scientific theories 
or facts through allegorised science to creative misreading. It is also possible to associate 
certain modes of thought, such as the collection and classification of literature in In 
Memoriam James Joyce, with science. However, science retains its individuality in 
MacDiarmid’s integration, and poetry and science do not become indistinct or collapse 
into one another. As Michael Whitworth says in his essay ‘Science in MacDiarmid’s 
Later Poetry’, ‘MacDiarmid’s achievement is to create striking poems from scientific 
materials while allowing the scientific text a degree of autonomy’.6 The science in 
MacDiarmid’s late poetry is constantly probed, worked through, and sometimes turned 
on its head, and the actual degree of autonomy of any instance of science varies. The 
individuality of science, as Whitworth suggests, remains; but the science is under 
MacDiarmid’s poetic control as it is pressed to service in so many different ways that the 
entire late work is unthinkable without it.  
MacDiarmid famously called, in Lucky Poet, for ‘a poetry of fact’.7 It is best to 
start by abandoning any association of ‘facts’ with Gradgrindian crassness. Miroslav 
Holub’s scrutiny of material statements, and their interaction with language, power, and 
ideology, discussed in Chapter V, is a far richer perspective. It is useful to consider Lucky 
Poet, MacDiarmid’s poetry-filled, optimistic, frustrating, self-aggrandising though 
passionately honest autobiography, as an integral part of the late corpus. MacDiarmid 
writes in Lucky Poet: ‘The programme for poetry I advocate is, in Walt Whitman’s 
words: “To conform with and build on the concrete realities of the universe furnished by 
                                                 
6 Michael Whitworth, ‘Science in MacDiarmid’s Later Poetry’ in Scott Lyall and Margery Palmer 
McCulloch, (eds.), The Edinburgh Companion to Hugh MacDiarmid, (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University 
Press, 2011), 97-110, 106; Whitworth(2011). 
7 LP, xxxii. 
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science, and henceforth the only irrefragable basis for anything, verse included”’.8 Grand 
sentiments aside, it is not difficult to find more nuanced thinking. The late work contains 
a repeated contra-Keatsian theme that science enhances the appreciation of nature, but 
MacDiarmid’s response to Keats is always open. MacDiarmid additionally, creatively 
engaging with the work of the idealist philosopher Lev Shestov, subjected facts to poetic 
scrutiny. MacDiarmid writes of ‘Chestov, my master’.9 Shestov says: ‘The “facts” 
themselves are no use to us. If we have remarked that a stone is warmed by the sun, that a 
piece of wood floats on water, that a mouthful of water quenches thirst, what can we do 
with such observations?’.10 This is a great distance from MacDiarmid’s ‘anti-God, anti-
all supernaturalism’ materialist stance.11 The way in which this apparent gap is 
transformed into a poetic unity of thought is discussed in the first sub-section of this 
chapter, ‘Materialism and Idealism in “On a Raised Beach”’. The second sub-section of 
the chapter examines the role of science, the role of socialism, and their mutual 
embedding in a Finnegans Wake-like marshalling of language and literature in one of the 
monuments of the late corpus, In Memoriam James Joyce. The third and final sub-section 
brings the argument for radical integration of poetry and science together with a 
structural analysis of MacDiarmid’s late work. 
MacDiarmid’s use of science in ‘On a Raised Beach’ and In Memoriam James 
Joyce is confident and mature. But several earlier poems, predominantly in Scots, show 
MacDiarmid introducing science in a much more tentative manner. The development of 
                                                 
8 LP, 187; from Preface to November Boughs, 1888, see Walt Whitman, The Leaves of Grass, Deathbed 
Edition, (New York: Quality Paperback Book Club, 1992), 413. 
9 LP, 163. 
10 Lev Shestov, In Job’s Balances, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1975); Shestov(1932), 24. 
11 Alan Bold, (ed.), The Letters of Hugh MacDiarmid, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1984), 487; letter to the 
composer F. G. Scott (1880 – 1958) dated 15/10/41; Bold(1984). 
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MacDiarmid’s use of science begins (roughly) in the collection Scots Unbound, published 
in 1932.12 ‘Depth and the Chthonian Image’ uses scientific imagery in lines such as, ‘the 
lang / Process o’ metamorphosis in rock’, and ‘Brownian movements swarmin’ to his 
een’; MacDiarmid seems to shift between awe and critical commentary on science: ‘The 
curve of sae-ca’d knowledge science has made […]’, is tempered a little with the phrase 
‘heidstrang science’; and there is also what seems to be a warning against the rise of 
science: ‘Portentous prison-hooses o’ fause thocht we see / “Science” big heicher 
daily’.13 ‘The Oon Olympian’ simply comments: ‘The quantum theory’s dung to blauds / 
The classic picture o’ the world’.14 In ‘Tam o’ the Wilds and the Many-Faced Mystery’ 
MacDiarmid, edging towards later themes, says ironically ‘Tho’ botany, ichthyology, and 
a’ the rest / Are no’ for the workin’ man ye ken’.15 In ‘One Thing Sure’ the poet, who 
might have been talking too much about science, is able to set it aside : 
 
No matter how science develops, my dear, 
 One thing is perfectly sure 
Most joy will still come from forgetting it all, 
 Sweet nothings will always endure. 16 
 
The potential liberating power of science is a theme in ‘The Belly-Grip’, but in 
general the use of science is peripheral until ‘Thalamus’, published in 1934.17 ‘Thalamus’ 
is a quintessentially science poem which doesn’t celebrate science but incorporates the 
fact of science in dialectic tension with the poet’s other concerns. One aspect of that 
tension is between old and new. The poem opens: 
 
                                                 
12 CPHMD, 331-62. 
13 CPHMD, 346-53, 348, 349, 352. 
14 CPHMD, 354-61, 360. 
15 CPHMD, 368-79, 372. 
16 CPHMD, 379. 
17 CPHMD, 394-6, 411-13. 
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Busy as any man in those centres of the brain 
Where consciousness flourishes I yet cherish more 
The older, darker, less studied regions 
Of cranial anatomy […] 18 
 
There is a declarative part of the poem: ‘Let fools think science has supplanted poetry’.19 
The final three stanzas effect a remarkable transition of ideas. Almost appearing to 
celebrate the scientific knowledge of the thalamus, this is quickly diminished: ‘As the 
corpora geniculata [knotty bodies] before any star’.20 The transition continues: ‘O 
misguided science pursuing / All tasks but the greatest of all’; there is an image of poetry, 
‘a glorious unseen waterfall’, but water drives the ‘mills of Satan’, the ‘treadmills of 
rationalising’; and the poem ends with an image of internal thought, all too easily 
dismissed ‘As naught but vain dreams’.21 ‘Thalamus’ seems to move part way towards 
Shestov’s ideal, expressed in In Job’s Balances: ‘We have our science, and science has 
given us a great deal; we should rest content with what we have’ and ‘lull to sleep the 
restless inquirer within us’.22 From ‘Thalamus’ onwards, very roughly, a more sure-
footed approach to science assumes its central position in MacDiarmid’s late work.  
The 1993 and 1994 two-volume edition of MacDiarmid’s Complete Poems, and 
the 1994 edition of Lucky Poet, are used here as the definitive reference to the text under 
study. A new scholarly edition, the annotated and systematically glossed four-volume 
Complete Collected Poems of Hugh MacDiarmid, is being prepared. In an email of 30 
March 2015, Patrick Crotty of Aberdeen University informed me that work on the first 
volume is nearing completion.23 
                                                 
18 CPHMD, 411. 
19 CPHMD, 412. 
20 CPHMD, 413. 
21 CPHMD, 413. 
22 Shestov(1932), xxxiv-xxxv. 
23 Private email, 30/03/2015. 
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Materialism and Idealism in ‘On a Raised Beach’ 
 
‘On a Raised Beach’ is a complex poem built with numerous unfamiliar words and a 
wide range of allusions, and set within a framework of direct and declarative statements. 
The parameters of the poem are defined in the opening line: ‘All is lithogenesis – or 
lochia’.24 The scope of ‘On a Raised Beach’ encompasses everything between the 
formation of stone and afterbirth; this develops into a multi-facetted mediation on life and 
non-life, with literal and metaphorical shifts between the material and the ideal. The 
poem’s apparently antithetical themes have frustrated attempts to find a philosophical 
reading consistent with the clear Shestovian background in ‘On a Raised Beach’. Also, 
rapidly switching directions of thought make ‘On a Raised Beach’ highly resistant to 
summing up; remarkably, however, the dominant sense is not of fragmentation but of 
gathering coherence. In this section of the chapter I will engage with the detail of the 
poem and try to characterise the way its thoughts and emotions contrast and cohere; 
towards the end of the chapter, once the computational model has been developed, I will 
suggest, in the context of the late text as a whole, that there exists a simple abstract 
structure for ‘On a Raised Beach’ which overcomes the difficulty of finding an effective 
concrete description of the poem. 
In ‘On a Raised Beach’ MacDiarmid is imagining isolation on the Shetland Island 
of Linga.25 The poem opens with a crescendo of poetry and science, building power with 
descriptive and obscure technical words, some from science: ‘Celadon and corbeau, 
                                                 
24 CPHMD, 422. 
25 Laurence Graham and Brian Smith, (eds.), MacDiarmid in Shetland, (Lerwick: Shetland Library, 1992), 
13-15; Graham&Smith(1992). 
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bistre and beige, / Glaucous hoar, enfouldered, cyathiform’.26 The sense of mystery 
leaves the mind free to focus on the building aural affect; then MacDiarmid begins to 
question the stones: ‘What bricole piled you here, stupendous cairn?’; ‘What eburnation 
augments you with men’s bones’; ‘But where is the Christophanic rock that moved?’.27 
The passage communicates before it is understood, as Nancy Gish observes.28 Gish 
writes evocatively about the crescendo, noting: ‘The combination of rare and technical 
words with a strong cadence and musical effects creates an unusual fusion of uncertainty 
and ease’.29 In part I would agree with Gish, but would prefer to describe the opening of 
‘On a Raised Beach’ in terms of certainty and unease: the solidity of the descriptions of 
the stones contrasts with the repeated questioning. The scientific terms denote certainty – 
it is certain that cyathiform is a botanical term for a shape which is narrow at the bottom 
and wider at the top (OED). There’s a secondary effect of poetic science here too 
(whatever accident of dictionary searching was involved) – the image of a flower-shaped 
stone.  
The tension between poles of thought is maintained as the poem progresses: the 
poem develops from the opening into a series of reflections most of which seem to 
include a dualism of some kind. The couplet ‘So these stones have dismissed / All but all 
of evolution, unmoved by it’, contrasts, through the word ‘unmoved’, science with the 
Christophanic rock.30 ‘We are so easily baffled by appearances’, MacDiarmid writes, it 
makes no difference to the stones ‘whether they are high or low’, whether they inhabit 
‘palace or pigsty’; the stones endure: ‘There are plenty of ruined buildings in the world 
                                                 
26 CPHMD, 422. 
27 CPHMD, 423. 
28 Nancy Gish, Hugh MacDiarmid, The Man and his Work, (London: MacMillan, 1984), 161; Gish(1984). 
29 Gish(1984), 168. 
30 CPHMD, 424. 
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but no ruined stones’.31 The poet is perhaps recovering from depression, when there was 
no dualism, only uncertainty: ‘an emotion chilled is an emotion controlled; / This is road 
leading to certainty’.32 He seems to be re-building his political commitment, re-finding 
the ‘battle between opposing ideas’; and activism: ‘Reasoned planning for the time when 
reason can no longer avail’.33  
Here and in In Memoriam James Joyce, MacDiarmid’s model for the socialist end 
state (where ‘reason can no longer avail’) seems to be William Morris’s Nowhere.34  In 
News from Nowhere, an inhabitant of the Epoch of Rest (as the book is sub-titled) makes 
the Shestov-like comment: ‘this is not an age of inventions’, ‘The last epoch did that for 
us’.35 Returning to ‘On a Raised Beach’, the expression of doubt reinforces the idea of 
rebuilding, and the necessity of struggle for socialism: ‘But, not indifferent to the struggle 
yet / nor to the ataraxia I might get / By fatalism’.36 The battleground is defined: it is 
‘reality that is at stake’, and ‘Being and non-being with equal weapons here / Confront 
each other’, and while non-being is invisible, it is said to be ‘on the point of showing 
clear’.37 The doubt works both ways: ‘These stones go through Man, straight to God, if 
there is one’.38 Yet both parts of the argument are left open: ‘My disposition is towards 
spiritual issues / Made inhumanly clear’.39 The various senses developed, from 
confrontational struggle though to idealist socialism, from a disposition towards spiritual 
issues to doubt, seem to mix freely and cohere, rather than conflict. 
                                                 
31 CPHMD, 425. 
32 CPHMD, 426. 
33 CPHMD, 426. 
34 William Morris, News from Nowhere, (London: Penguin, 2004); Morris(1890). 
35 Morris(1890), 192. 
36 CPHMD, 428. 
37 CPHMD, 428. 
38 CPHMD, 427. 
39 CPHMD, 431. 
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The last major section of the poem opens with an address, compellingly to an 
imagined Shestov: 
 
“Ah!”, you say, “if only the stones would move 
– Were it only by an inch – of its own accord. 
This is the resurrection we await 40 
 
A little later MacDiarmid writes that for ‘Detached intellectuals, not one stone will 
move’.41 Opposites remain, but the poet starts to accept this with equanimity: ‘I am 
enamoured of the desert at last’; ‘It is not / the reality of life which is hard to know’, ‘But 
you must participate in it to proclaim it’; ‘I lift a stone; it is the meaning of life I clasp’; 
‘Though slow as the stones the powers develop / To rise from the grave’.42 The final line 
of the poem draws a circle both with the poem, and the world: ‘Earth’s vast 
epanadiplosis’.43 The sense is not of fatalism, but of completion, and though the reference 
is literary, referring to the repetition of a word at the beginning and end of a sentence, it 
suggests the roundness and repetition of the stones. 
Gish sees the opening passage as an endorsement of MacDiarmid’s ‘poetry of 
fact’; surprisingly she regards Kenneth Buthlay as dismissing the passage, but Buthlay 
remarks, ‘He may begin with limbering-up exercises for the brain’, ‘but then he will 
settle down to his line of thought, and it is well worth following him’.44 MacDiarmid’s 
use of geological science is initially descriptive and generates both sound and imagery, 
before developing rapidly into a proxy for the materialist stance. The science in the poem 
is reinforced by injections of facts, such as ‘The mole has a rich sexual colouring in due 
                                                 
40 CPHMD, 432. 
41 CPHMD, 432. 
42 CPHMD, 431, 432, 433. 
43 CPHMD, 433. 
44 Gish(1984), 169; Kenneth Buthlay, Hugh MacDiarmid, (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1964), 87; 
Buthlay(1964). 
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season’.45 It is difficult not to see such interjections, which appear throughout the late 
work, as a tongue-in-cheek lightening of the mood; here the poetic justification unfolds in 
emotional terms: ‘every beast keeps / Brighter colours inside it than outside’.46 Gish sees 
the opening passage as setting up ‘the central theme of the hidden meaning of stone 
countering religious tradition’.47 She seems to agree that the poem is framed by contrasts, 
but concludes: ‘On a Raised Beach’, ‘is a grave and sombre indictment of human 
stoniness and cultural failure, and the death these represent’.48 But the poem seems more 
to be about leaving ‘grave and sombre’ (or worse) feelings behind, and ‘human stoniness’ 
doesn’t begin to catch the way the stones represent solidity, firmness, and other qualities 
with a positive sense in the poem. ‘On a Raised Beach’ is best explained as a process of 
recovery: strong emotions find analogous expression in the outer world, the solidity of 
which seems to heal. It is difficult, however, to see how the poem stretches beyond the 
representation of mental states into culture, or where Gish’s ‘cultural failure’ is to be 
found. Nor does the poem move towards death (although it is present), it is more like the 
poet seems to emerge from the threat of ‘suicide, here confronting me’, ‘to get a life 
worth having’.49  
Briefly, on the subject of scientific accuracy, Edwin Morgan noted in a footnote 
to his essay, ‘Poetry and Knowledge in MacDiarmid’s Later Work’ (1962), two minor 
geological inaccuracies in the poems of Stony Limits.50 Drew Milne references this in his 
entry in Contemporary Poetry and Contemporary Science, ‘Wit and the Cambridge 
                                                 
45 CPHMD, 424; source identified in Whitworth(2011), 100. 
46 CPHMD, 425. 
47 Gish(1984), 169. 
48 Gish(1984), 172. 
49 CPHMD, 428, 433. 
50 Edwin Morgan, Essays, (Cheadle: Carcanet, 1974), 201-13, 207(n); Morgan(1974); CPHMD, 385-512. 
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Science Park’; citing Veronica Forrest-Thompson’s scepticism regarding MacDiarmid’s 
use of science, he writes: ‘Poems such as “On a Raised Beach”, with its scientific 
inaccuracies, exemplify the failure to develop metaphorical transformation within poetic 
form’.51 The idea of the creative misreading of science overcomes this type of pedantic 
thinking: the mistakes are minor and do not diminish the poetry. In any case Morgan 
wrote of MacDiarmid’s technical errors, ‘Such inadequacies seem, however, fewer or less 
damaging than one might suppose’; earlier in his essay Morgan also said, ‘we are apt to 
forget how unhelpfully and unhealthily anti-scientific the dominant literary atmosphere 
has been’.52 
Peter McCarey discusses the extent of Shestov’s influence on MacDiarmid in his 
book Hugh MacDiarmid and the Russians.53 The English translation of Shestov’s In 
Job’s Balances was published in 1932 – MacDiarmid was reading it when he first arrived 
in Whalsay.54 It is, McCarey says, ‘central to Stony Limits and Other Poems’, the 
collection which includes ‘On a Raised Beach’, and also ‘Ode to All Rebels’, a poem 
which it’s worth including in this discussion.55 In Job’s Balances is an engaging, lively, 
and polemical read. Shestov’s Christian mysticism seeks to restore the ‘impossible which 
our forefathers plucked from the tree in Paradise’, be open again to ‘universally valid 
judgements’, and forget our ‘self-sufficient piety’ – only then ‘will free inquiry begin’.56 
Shestov mocks science: if scientists prove ‘that you are descended from monkeys’, ‘you 
have to accept it’ – ‘What an absurdity of absurdities!’, ‘I shall not become reconciled to 
                                                 
51 Drew Milne, ‘Wit and the Cambridge Science Park’, in Crawford(2006), 170-87, 181; Veronica Forrest-
Thomson, unpublished PhD thesis, 1971, University of Cambridge; see also Whitworth(2011), 105-6. 
52 Morgan(1974), 207, 204. 
53 Peter McCarey, Hugh MacDiarmid and the Russians, (Edinburgh: Scottish University Press, 1987); 
McCarey(1987). 
54 Shestov(1932); Graham&Smith(1992), 15-16. 
55 McCarey(1987), 162; CPHMD, 487-512. 
56 Shestov(1932), 1; italics original. 
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it simply because it is built on twice two is four!’.57 Shestov says materialism has been 
‘utterly defeated’, and ‘ranks as the philosophy of the stupid and the commonplace’.58  
Hugh MacDiarmid’s commitment to socialism was visceral. He believed in the 
moral rightness of socialism in the manner of the protagonist in Robert Tressell’s The 
Ragged Trousered Philanthropists or in the way presented in one of communism’s 
founding documents, Friedrich Engels’s The Condition of the Working Class in 
England.59 All belief involves trial: the Grieves faced in Whalsay conditions of isolation 
and poverty which would test anyone. In ‘Ode to All Rebels’ MacDiarmid writes: ‘I’ve 
bent nae knee to Reason /  – except in mockery’. 60 McCarey notes Shestov’s remark: ‘do 
not forget that it is impossible to argue with reason’, and ‘There is only one weapon: 
mockery’.61 It is tempting to read the mockery of reason as only referring to science, but 
in MacDiarmid’s work reason is also associated with capitalism, as in the ‘treadmills of 
rationalising’ from ‘Thalamus’.62 The ‘Ode’ is a poem of despair; its ethic is more 
nihilistic than Shestovian, though Shestov’s philosophy seems to provide solace. 
Wherever the mockery of reason is directed, science is scrutinised through negation: ‘A’ 
the men o’ science, the enemies o’ truth’.63  
In ‘On a Raised Beach’, by contrast, MacDiarmid depicts his own vision, not 
Shestov’s. McCarey notes the ‘atheist ontology’ in ‘On a Raised Beach’, and asks: ‘what 
has Shestov’s “Eternal God”’ to do with atheism, and what has the poem’s “‘the road 
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leading to certainty, / Reasoned planning for a time when reason can no longer avail”, ‘to 
do with the Shestovian defiance of reason in “An Ode to All Rebels”?’64 McCarey 
regards this departure from Shestov as poetic failure: ‘MacDiarmid’s use of philosophical 
concepts in “On a Raised Beach” presents greater, if less obvious, difficulties than his use 
of technical terms’.65 He concludes: ‘There is an ontological difference between Shestov 
and MacDiarmid’.66 McCarey asks how MacDiarmid faced up to ‘the inconsistency of 
his politics’, and ‘the irrationality of his philosophy’.67 However, in a later article with a 
slightly different focus, ‘Lev Shestov and Hugh MacDiarmid’, McCarey’s position seems 
to shift.68 Considering some of MacDiarmid’s Glasgow poems such as the Hymns to 
Lenin and ‘The Glass of Pure Water’, McCarey writes: ‘Here we are faced not with a 
hopeless inconsistency but with a daunting integration of the metaphysical abyss with the 
economic depths of poverty’, and in view of this, ‘This alignment of [MacDiarmid’s] 
metaphysics with his politics might persuade some readers that there is, after all, a 
seriousness and consistency to MacDiarmid’s thought’.69 
Rather than poetic and philosophical failure, W. N. Herbert sees a measured 
response to Shestov in ‘On a Raised Beach’. He quotes Shestov: ‘“Everything in nature is 
quite indifferent towards its fate”’, a stone does not know or care whether it ‘“lies on the 
floor of the sea or on a high mountain”’, it is invariant to such contrasts.70 Herbert 
identifies the following passage (paraphrased above) as MacDiarmid’s response.  
 
                                                 
64 McCarey(1987), 187. 
65 McCarey(1987), 189. 
66 McCarey(1987), 187, emphasis original. 
67 McCarey(1987), 192. 
68 Peter McCarey, ‘Lev Shestov and Hugh MacDiarmid’ in Nancy Gish, (ed.), Hugh MacDiarmid: Man 
and Poet, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 109-121; McCarey(1992). 
69 McCarey(1992), 121. 
70 Herbert(1992), 155; Shestov(1932), 189. 
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 We must be humble. We are so easily baffled by appearances 
 And do not realise that these stones are one with the stars. 
 It makes no difference to them if they are high or low, 
 Mountain peak or ocean floor, palace, or pigsty. 
 There are plenty of ruined buildings in the world but no ruined  
   stones. 71 
 
MacDiarmid uses many of Shestov’s words, but changes the sentiment: indifference 
becomes transcendence  – ‘these stones are one with the stars’.72 MacDiarmid is absorbed 
in Shestov, but he is not prepared to be intellectually imprisoned by the Christian mystic 
he has called his ‘master’.73 This sense of self-release – establishing his own creative 
freedom – is almost explicit at the end of ‘Ode to all Rebels’. This is the final stanza.  
 
 Your song, O God, that none dare hear 
 Save the insane and such as I 
 Apostates from humanity 
 Sings out in me with no more fear 
 Than one who thinks he has the world’s ear 
  From his padded cell  
 – Insane enough, with you so near,  
  To want, like you, the world as well! 74 
 
The closeness to God, the song of God within, as described in these lines, is what Shestov 
seeks. But in the final line this sense is broken. Rebels, who can be taken to include the 
poet, are insane enough to want ‘the world as well!’ – this is lifted with the closing 
exclamation mark and is perhaps the only moment in the poem where the poet’s spirit 
rises.75 Shestov is not negated, but MacDiarmid wants more. Shestov’s sense remains, 
but the intent becomes MacDiarmid’s. Shestov is overthrown, as MacDiarmid takes 
ownership of Shestov’s philosophy, to put it to his own use. Given the background of 
despair in the poem, the words ‘like you’ in the final line probably do not represent an 
                                                 
71 Herbert(1992), 155; CPHMD, 425. 
72 CPHMD, 425. 
73 E.g., LP, 163. 
74 CPHMD, 512. 
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arrogant assertion of God-like status; rather ‘To want, like you, the world as well’ is a 
firm statement of the rebels’ cause founded on the underlying moral claim of Marxism: 
equality. 
Shestov’s defiance of reason found deep emotional resonance in MacDiarmid. 
Here is a refuge from academic Marxism, and from capitalism with its iron laws of ‘no 
alternative’. Shestov’s somehow gentle and teasing deconstruction of what is often taken 
for granted gave MacDiarmid the strength to defy the logic of generally accepted truths, 
in other words the strength to be a Marxist. The situation for Marxists is the same or 
worse today, as market forces and even perpetual war are generally accepted truths; 
counter-arguments, if they are admitted at all, are ridiculed and their proponents, if they 
attain any prominence, are demonised. Terry Eagleton’s Why Marx Was Right illustrates 
the situation by directly challenging commonplace beliefs about Marxism, such as: 
Marxism is deterministic, Marxism advocates violence, it is authoritarian, and so on.76 
MacDiarmid was demonised for his Marxism, and undermined in almost unbelievable 
terms. Alan Riach sums up the majority position: ‘It is a commonplace of MacDiarmid 
criticism that contradiction and paradox are at the heart of his vision’.77 Herbert is honest 
about his distaste for MacDiarmid’s politics: he says MacDiarmid’s communism ‘is 
adhered to with the fanaticism of a psychological dependency’, and that his 
‘pronouncements have a fanatic naivety’ which is ‘socially unacceptable to a middle-
class audience’.78 Critical opprobrium persists in the 2011 Edinburgh Companion to 
                                                 
76 Terry Eagleton, Why Marx Was Right, (Yale: Yale University Press, 2011), ch. 3, 30, ch. 8, 179, ch. 9, 
196. 
77 Alan Riach, Hugh MacDiarmid’s Epic Poetry, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991), 12; 
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Hugh MacDiarmid in the essay ‘The Impossible Persona’.79 MacDiarmid was supposed 
to be a terrible Marxist, and also, strangely, not a Marxist at all. Alan Riach says for 
example: ‘He was a party member, but he did not subscribe’; and from the supposed left, 
the critic David Craig trivialises MacDiarmid’s politics accusing him of having ‘only the 
attitude of seriousness and militancy’.80  
The critical opprobrium must represent only a fraction of what MacDiarmid 
faced. The attractive ideas of Shestov both compounded his struggle with conventional 
belief, and showed the way out of it. ‘On a Raised Beach’ represents this struggle in 
mercilessly honest terms. I do not want to suggest that MacDiarmid thought in terms of 
‘scientific socialism’ – I know of no evidence that he did, and ‘On a Raised Beach’ is 
strong evidence that he did not confuse or conflate science and socialism. This does not 
mean, however, that science and socialism do not sometimes act as proxies for one 
another in MacDiarmid’s poetry. In ‘On a Raised Beach’ science and socialism seem to 
be analogues – the certainty of science lends heft to the re-building of his political 
commitment. The stones themselves are metaphors for both science and socialism: 
 
These bare stones bring me back to reality. 
 I grasp one of them and I have in my grip 
The beginning and end of the world 81 
 
Science and socialism confer the power to act, the power to describe, and the 
power to hold a totalising view of the world. As ‘On a Raised Beach’ shows so clearly, 
this power does not reside in a materialist vacuum. Science and socialism, like individual 
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stones – only one is grasped – may be isolatable, but like the stones in general, they are 
not isolated. In different ways, both science and socialism derive their power from the 
vivifying energy of ideology and belief; material forces seem to be constantly locked in 
struggle with life-giving abstractions, as they try to moderate and control idealism’s 
endless flexibility. In ‘On a Raised Beach’ the poet’s struggle resolves into a working, if 
restless, compromise of stability. 
 
 
Science and Socialism in In Memoriam James Joyce 
 
MacDiarmid’s 151 page poem In Memoriam James Joyce, whose sub-title From A Vision 
of World Language suggests it is only an extract, opens with an address, probably to the 
poet’s wife Valda:  
 
I remember how you laughed like Hell 
When I read you from Pape’s ‘Politics of the Aryan Road’: 
‘English is destined to become the Universal Language! 
The vibratory effect of English correctly spoken 
(Which has somewhat of a nasal intonation) 
On the Pineal Gland is unique 
And a necessary factor in the evolution of humanity[’] 82 
 
In a much later passage, which could be called ‘Fishing with Norman MacCaig’, 
MacDiarmid mocks his own pomposity as well, but most of In Memoriam James Joyce is 
a serious effort to establish the polar opposite point of view to Pape’s.83 Like Pape, 
though in a much more sophisticated manner involving allegory and creative misreading, 
MacDiarmid uses science to support his argument. MacDiarmid identifies his explicit 
purpose: he is amongst those who are concerned with ‘“the living whole / of all the 
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poetry that has ever been written”’.84 This intent translates in In Memoriam James Joyce 
into a vast marshalling of poetry, prose, and language, sometimes discussed at length, 
sometimes recorded in lists. The relationship between ‘language and literature’ and 
‘socialism’ in In Memoriam James Joyce is close. MacDiarmid confirms this in an 
Author’s Note: he says that he believes the unification of language he seeks ‘will be 
achieved ultimately “in a society in which the participant aspect of action attains its 
maximum expression” – a society which I naturally visualise as Marxist’.85 Alan Riach, 
whose Hugh MacDiarmid’s Epic Poetry includes a lengthy discussion of In Memoriam 
James Joyce, is clear on this point: ‘MacDiarmid understood the idea of world literature 
to be in alignment with the development of communism’, and that his ‘vision of world 
language is a communist one’.86 More generally, MacDiarmid makes the connection 
between socialism and learning explicit when he quotes, in Lucky Poet, apparently from 
Lenin’s final speech in November 1922 the injunction that communists must work over 
‘the whole inheritance of human knowledge’ – though I have not been able to trace the 
provenience of this citation.87 
In Memoriam James Joyce is thus an allegorical vision of socialism, though it 
often appears in explicit passages in its own right. The science in In Memoriam James 
Joyce also exhibits an explicit and allegorical dual role. At times science is part and 
parcel of the language gathering, for example an early passage reminiscent of the 
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crescendo in ‘On a Raised Beach’, has lines such as ‘Argute, deurate, investite, lucktifick, 
excandescence’.88 The physical structure of In Memoriam James Joyce is open. There are 
many well-defined passages, especially at the beginning and end, but also many passages 
which seem separable from or overlap substantially with the larger late text. There is at 
least one passage, for example, which seems to have escaped from The Kind of Poetry I 
Want.89 The poem’s section divisions, while not entirely arbitrary, do not provide an 
intuitively accessible structure. Alan Riach discusses what is known about the origin of 
the work, and its overlap with other large conceptual pieces, mostly abandoned; Riach 
says: ‘the problem we have as textual critics is not only the instability of the content of 
the work but the changeability of the work’s title’.90  In Memoriam James Joyce is a 
monument of MacDiarmid’s late work, but it is extremely difficult to find a useful 
description in physical structure terms. Nevertheless, as Riach cautiously says, there is a 
‘complex, provisional but pragmatic notion of the unitary’ in In Memoriam James Joyce, 
which is ‘sustained by the possibility of the purposive development of all the discrete 
parts’.91 To put it another way (and less cautiously), the purposive development of the 
parts of In Memoriam James Joyce can be interpreted as a simple and elegant abstract 
structure which provides coherence, and even tension. The abstract description 
‘impending breakthrough’ seems to condition the work from end to end, as well as 
providing metaphors for the socialist revolution and scientific advance. Under this 
description the poem’s porous borders and its position as part of a wider text become 
virtues. The abstract description provides a sense of universality essential to the vision, 
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and it is almost as if the tension of the impending breakthrough is a vacuum-agent for 
drawing together the work. It is an exaggeration, but also an important way to consider In 
Memoriam James Joyce, to say that, under the idea of abstract structure, the actual text 
becomes a representative text. The same poem could have been written in a different 
way. If these ideas are right, then a virtual theme of ‘science and socialism’, while 
obviously not complete, should provide a reasonable insight into In Memoriam James 
Joyce as a whole. 
The science in In Memoriam James Joyce is diverse in terms of scientific field, 
but a common factor is that, the more it is examined, the more it appears an essential part 
of the poem’s infrastructure. An early reference to science capitalises the subject and 
casts it as a non-mystical seer: MacDiarmid writes, ‘things not yet discovered are 
foreknown to Science / – As Meldelyev predicted scandium, germanium and polonium’; 
the theme repeats with astronomers who ‘have foretold where a planet should be’.92 
MacDiarmid uses a scientific metaphor to set the limits to his marshalling of language: 
‘We know that total speech is impossible of course / Like a too big star that therefore 
could transmit no light’.93 The laws of classical physics seem to bound the poem, 
providing a secure future outlook, as well as a physical limit. MacDiarmid, however, 
draws a veil over the explicit poem, suggesting that any physical limit will be breached: 
‘And all this here, everything I write, of course / Is an extended metaphor for something I 
never mention’.94 A few pages on MacDiarmid uses science as a metaphor for something 
he does mention. Quoting from an unnamed source, he writes how ‘probably through the 
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comparatively small group of optic fibres’, ‘The eyes can pull the whole body about’.95 
He is unable to resist the comparison that Scotland ‘is hypnotically controlled from 
London’.96 One finds science entering the substrate of the poem: MacDiarmid admires 
‘mathematical exactitude’, and ‘Calculating stresses and strains / In the manner of an 
engineer’.97 Scientific vocabulary and ways of thinking may arise in almost any passage. 
Considering the natural world, MacDiarmid is ‘by no means weary yet of my 
concentration / On phyllotaxis’.98 In a comment which extends scientific thinking across 
domains, the poet wants ‘Grammar regarded as we should regard the natural sciences’.99 
Michael Whitworth, in ‘Science in MacDiarmid’s Later Poetry’, says 
MacDiarmid drew his science from ‘scientific papers, and non-technical scientific 
books’, and also from ‘more specialist works such as Erwin Schrodinger’s Statistical 
Thermodynamics’.100 Whitworth weighs the issue of poetic and scientific authority, and 
how the poet’s understanding of science might differ from the scientist’s.101 From close 
reading of the original scientific texts he suggests, ‘MacDiarmid’s art is, at least in part, 
an art of elimination, of knowing what to remove in order to allow the source materials to 
achieve their full potential’.102 The editing of science sources is accompanied by 
engagement with the scientific content. MacDiarmid writes, for example: ‘My concern is 
not to be more Darwinian than Darwin’.103 A little later MacDiarmid is developing his 
own theory: ‘As speech flows / As it is time’; he includes the ideas of Cassirer, that 
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‘speech actually develops and extends our experience’; and ends the passage by 
suggesting that language is ‘“The supreme organ of the mind’s self-governing 
growth”’.104 The quote, a footnote relates, is from I. A. Richards’s essay ‘Notes Towards 
an Agreement Between Literary Criticism and Some of the Sciences’.105 Science is 
integral to the poem’s form of enquiry which is entirely on MacDiarmid’s terms, not 
science’s. The passage just quoted is a full-blooded creative misreading of science. The 
status of the theories employed, such as Cassirer’s and Richards’s, hardly matters: 
MacDiarmid presses them to poetic purpose, and only on that basis is any judgement 
secure. The use of science as the mode of enquiry seems to be made explicit at one point. 
MacDiarmid is thinking about how, if Schopenhauer is right, ‘all previous philosophy / 
Revolves around certain ideas which will always return’.106 Regarding ‘how they return’, 
MacDiarmid writes, involving the reader: ‘To determine this requires an ever more 
precise / Scientific instrument – the object of our quest, my friend’.107 
There are two passages which include quantum mechanics, and have slightly 
different poetic purposes. The first of these passages opens with MacDiarmid adopting 
the meta-poetic tone of The Kind of Poetry I Want: he calls for ‘A language, a poetry, in 
keeping with the new quantum mechanics’.108 This follows directly: 
 
 The non-intuitive handling of data introduced by Heisenberg; 
 The translation of the matrix calculus 
 Into operational and ‘Poisson brackets’ methods; 
 And, finally, the new ‘wave mechanics’ of de Broglie, Schrodinger, 
       and others 
 Giving a perfect translation into intuitive methods 109 
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‘Non-intuitive handling of data’ refers to Heisenberg’s struggle with non-commutative 
algebra, that is, algebra where the order of multiplication cannot be reversed.110 The 
resulting formalism is known as matrix mechanics or matrix calculus. ‘Poisson brackets’ 
describe an operation in classical mechanics, which, in the words of Roger Penrose 
provides ‘a fundamental general procedure that encompasses the dynamics of classical 
physics and supplies the link to quantum mechanics’.111 The next breakthrough in 
quantum theory was the wave mechanics of de Broglie and Schrodinger. The advantage 
of their approach was that it allowed some degree of conceptualisation of the quantum 
world in terms of the wave function, hence the ‘translation into intuitive methods’ at the 
end of the passage. MacDiarmid follows the above passage with an un-referenced quote 
which reflects on quantum mechanics: ‘With the newer quantum mechanics / the old 
“discontinuity” resolves itself / Into an essential individuality’.112 A discontinuity or 
singularity in mathematics represents an infinity, or a division by zero. The science here 
is obsolete: quantum mechanics has nothing  to do with ‘essential individuality’, or 
‘absolute individuals’.113 Ladyman comments that the ‘relations implied by quantum 
entanglement undermine the ontological priority conferred on individuals in most 
traditional metaphysics’.114 MacDiarmid has picked a quote which suits his purpose, and 
is presumably thinking that ‘quantum’ implies individuality; though this might have 
seemed reasonable in the wake of the discovery of the particulate nature of black body 
radiation.  
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There is a clear parallel, on the theme of science and socialism, between the 
charting of scientific progress in this quantum mechanics passage, and the hoped-for 
progress towards socialism in In Memoriam James Joyce; perhaps too there is a 
resonance of heady excitement between the domains, both of which seemed to be moving 
towards their goals at the time MacDiarmid was writing. A deeper parallel emerges, I 
think, by considering the nature of quantum mechanics. Whatever lies ‘inside’ quantum 
mechanics is tangled up in well-known paradoxes which seem to denote the limit of 
physical reality. It is not difficult to see why quantum mechanics has so troubled 
physicists, notably Einstein, and on the same basis has inspired religious thinkers.115 
Quantum mechanics seems to indicate the existence of an unknown world, a different 
place, which is related to, but fundamentally different from, our own – one which can be 
associated, in the context of In Memoriam James Joyce, with the socialist heaven. 
MacDiarmid seems to be well aware of this possibility; he writes in The Kind of Poetry I 
Want: ‘So here, in this poetry of one who knows / An ontological system behind 
physics’.116 Riach notes that ‘in a late but revealing interview with Walter Perrie’, 
MacDiarmid expressed a ‘view of matter’ which owed ‘much to modern physics’ and 
asserted ‘the simultaneity of spirit and matter’.117 Also, Davie notes that the paradoxes of 
quantum mechanics ‘are what first attracted Grieve to it’.118 And as Morgan noted, in 
MacDiarmid’s ‘“poems of knowledge”’, ‘the method of analogy is widely used’.119  
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If quantum mechanics is understood in this way, then the passage under 
discussion can be seen to appeal, in a similar manner, to the quasi-spiritual socialist hope 
expressed in the ‘Ballad of the Crucified Rose’ (or ‘The Ballad of the General Strike’) 
section of A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle.120 In the following stanza, prior to bitter 
stanzas of betrayal, the fulfilment of socialist hope is allegorised as the earth resuming its 
original place in the mind of God.  
The waeful’ clay was fire aince mair 
As Earth had been resumes 
Into God’s mind, fae which sae lang 
To grugous state ’twas doomed. 121 
 
In In Memoriam James Joyce, the place of unreality, the socialist utopia which is the 
object of the struggle in the poem, is compellingly represented by William Morris’s 
Nowhere. MacDiarmid says in The Kind of Poetry I Want:  
 
 A poetry, therefore, that like William Morris 
 in his News From Nowhere will constantly show 
 “How the Change Came” 122 
 
There are numerous lines in In Memoriam James Joyce which seem to echo the serene 
conditions in Nowhere, and there is other evidence that MacDiarmid admired Morris’s 
vision of what all socialists are ultimately fighting for: heaven on Earth.123 MacDiarmid 
talks of socialism in In Memoriam James Joyce in two distinct ways. There is the familiar 
and explicit necessity for socialism, typically expressed in terms of moral rightness or 
struggle. For example, the following couplet recalls the traditional cry ‘Socialism or 
Barbarism!’ – ‘Either we take hold of our destiny or, failing that, / We are driven towards 
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our fate’; if the struggle is lost, the fate will be barbaric.124 The second way MacDiarmid 
speaks about socialism is in terms of utopia. MacDiarmid says: ‘I know that in the final 
artistic / –  The highest human – vision / There is neither good nor evil’, and follows this 
Morrisian sentiment with a passage reminiscent of the Epoch of Rest: 
 
 There is neither good nor evil,  
 Better nor worse,  
 But only the harmony 
 Of that which is,  
 The pure phenomenon  
 Abiding in the eternal radiance. 125 
 
Like MacDiarmid, Morris was not an academic Marxist; he was an activist who 
believed in the moral superiority of socialism. An archetypal story is that socialist 
families in hard times, even though they had pawned or sold or burnt for warmth all their 
possessions, would never be separated from their copy of News from Nowhere.126 The 
feel of Nowhere is strongly recalled in the following selection of lines: ‘clear-headedness 
of an illuminated race’; ‘we can override and fuse / all our individual divergences’; 
‘Vanish all the complications of human life / Before the exultant note of universal joy’; 
dispense with ‘the elaborate / Apparatus our Western tradition provides’; ‘the simple 
constitutes the very climax’; the ‘inexhaustible riches in the life of everyday’; ‘Variation 
must be encouraged’; ‘Tranquillity that seems no product of inertia’; and ‘Infinite 
activities, infinite repose’.127 Another passage which recalls News from Nowhere 
envisions the individual ‘In proper balance with a society / Itself in proper ecological 
balance’.128 The environment, as we would say today, is at the heart of Morris’s paradise. 
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An inhabitant of Nowhere says: ‘The spirit of the new days, of our days, was to delight in 
the life of the world; intense and overweening love of the very skin and surface of the 
earth on which man dwells’.129 In Memoriam James Joyce in several places reflects a 
mood of despair and doubt. One passage suggests that, if the masses were given ample 
incomes and freed for ‘higher things’, ‘They could no more live than fish out of 
water’.130 A little later he says: ‘Culture is slowly declining / Mankind is returning to 
barbarism / And will finally become extinct’.131 This goes on: ‘Do not talk to me about 
likemindedness, / Brotherhood of man, democracy, or any such rot’.132 However, 
suggesting another parallel to Morris’s thinking, MacDiarmid finds a bucolic redemption. 
MacDiarmid writes: ‘An ecological change is recreative’; ‘We must look at the harebell 
as if / We had never seen it before’, and ‘Come. Climb with me. Even the sheep are 
different’.133  
The first passage on quantum mechanics suggests an analogy to the other-
worldness of the Morrisian passages; it is as if quantum mechanics offers physical proof 
of the existence of another place. There is structural continuity (‘Poisson brackets’) 
between here and there, and there is also the possibility of transition, through resolving a 
singularity (perhaps standing for the socialist revolution or in Morris’s terms, ‘the 
Change’), into a future, and presumably better, individuality. The second passage on 
quantum mechanics also signifies both progress and mathematical continuity, and ends 
by making another metaphorical appeal to a socialist future, though in a slightly different 
way. The stanza starts by ‘delighting in “hohlraum” oscillators’, ‘Veiled allelomorphic 
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transitions such as liquid helium’, and the ‘Reimannian ζ [zeta] function’, the latter being 
part of the mathematical underpinning of relativity and quantum mechanics.134 The list 
continues through major parts of physical theory – MacDiarmid’s point as the passage 
closes is explicit: there should be ‘one unified standard method / Capable of dealing, 
without changing the fundamental attitude, / With all cases’, ‘And with every new 
problem that may arise’.135 This is a slightly edited version of the first sentence of 
Schrodinger’s Statistical Thermodynamics, but the purpose is MacDiarmid’s as he 
recruits physics to his cause and focusses its analogous senses on the interior of the 
poem.136 
In the next stanza MacDiarmid takes the reader into the world of mathematics: 
‘On towards the calculus of ideas then’.137 The maths passage, concerning which Michael 
Whitworth reported at a postgraduate seminar as-yet unpublished discoveries, seems to 
prefigure the couplet which opens the final set of passages of In Memoriam James Joyce: 
‘Come follow me into the realm of music. Here is the gate / Which separates the earthly 
from the eternal’.138 MacDiarmid asks, at least half seriously: ‘how can one write or think 
of writing even / Without a set of all the known 49 hypothetical curves’?139 He knew 
about the structural relationship between mathematics and nature: 
 Recalling that when young ferns unfold in springtime 
 They are seen as logarithmic spirals, 
 When light is reflected under a teacup 
 A catacaustic curve is spotted, 
 And so on 
         Through all creation’s forms forever. 140 
                                                 
134 CPHMD, 802; see Penrose(1994), 274-5, Penrose(2004), 48-9. 
135 CPHMD, 802. 
136 Reference explicit in the poem; see http://www-history.mcs.st-
andrews.ac.uk/Extras/Schrodinger_Thermodynamics.html, 16/04/2015. 
137 CPHMD, 802. 
138 CPHMD, 871; seminar by Michael Whitworth, Salford University, 14/01/2011. 
139 CPHMD, 803. 
140 CPHMD, 803. 
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A teacup is lifted and a reflected curve is spotted, revealing a secret opening to the world 
of mathematics. The curve will change form as the teacup is moved, like a spontaneous 
geometry summoned to life, elemental and accidental, playfully creating variations on the 
fixed shapes of cup and saucer, deconstructing these shapes without limit. The surface on 
which a reflected curve falls is warmed, catching a shade of the main sense of caustic.141 
This may become intense heat if the curve is able to collapse to a focal point, as in the 
reflection from parabolic mirror – a catacaustic curve in the extreme case creates fire, 
destroying its host surface.142 Mathematical structure is found under a teacup, it is alive 
in the logarithmic growth of the fern, it may self-destruct. Mathematics is God’s bricks 
and mortar, and His power, ‘Through all creation’s forms forever’.143 The passage reads 
like an incantation, a structural realist’s prayer, and seems to require a closing ‘Amen’.  
In Memoriam James Joyce includes a disturbing though ambiguous passage from 
the field of human biology. MacDiarmid is writing about human evolution: ‘Through 
some overcoming of inertia, / A loosening of connections in the nervous centre / There 
was a gradual development / Of the power of conscious reflection’.144 The new species 
created (us) was marked ‘by the loss or degeneration / Of many important instincts / Such 
as nutrition and reproduction. / These now require intelligent guidance’.145 The idea of 
intelligent guidance becomes suggestive of eugenics several lines on: ‘We must aim at 
producing / The most intensely organised individual’.146 A few lines earlier, a couplet 
suggesting there is ‘ample room’ for further development has a footnote crediting H. J. 
                                                 
141 OED. 
142 OED. 
143 CPHMD, 803. 
144 CPHMD, 837. 
145 CPHMD, 837. 
146 CPHMD, 837. 
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Muller’s Out of the Night (1935).147 The footnote quotes Muller (1890 – 1967), (who 
influenced J. B. S. Haldane), as saying that we now have the scientific means to create a 
society where ‘the great philosophers, poets, and scientists’ will no longer be ‘very rare 
exceptions, but the rule’.148 Also in the footnote, MacDiarmid undermines this a little: 
‘Of course there are things the biologists don’t know yet’. Joseph Graves’s The 
Emperor’s New Clothes (2001), is a detailed analysis of, and fierce attack on, scientific 
racism.149 Graves writes that Muller, as a Marxist, ‘originally felt that eugenics could 
produce the type of human being suitable for the dictatorship of the proletariat’; but then, 
also quoting from Out of the Night, Graves says that later, ‘Muller would describe 
eugenics as “lending a false appearance of scientific basis to advocates of race and class 
prejudice”’.150 (Graves also notes Haldane’s rejection of eugenics in 1938).151  
It is possible that MacDiarmid’s forthright expression of the improvability of 
‘man’ is a response to G. E. Davie. The Crisis of the Democratic Intellect wasn’t 
published until 1986, but Davie had visited MacDiarmid in Shetland, and forms of 
Davie’s ideas were probably aired at the time.152 Davie casts MacDiarmid’s change from 
a lyrical poet in Scots to an epic poet in English as ‘the poet’s tortuous journey from 
metaphysics to positivism’.153 He contrasts ‘the poetic expression in the Drunk Man, and 
also in Cencrastus, of the necessary truths which deny the possibility of progress’, with 
                                                 
147 MacDiarmid gives date as 1936. 
148 CPHMD, 837. 
149 Joseph Graves, The Emperor’s New Clothes, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2001); 
Graves(2001). 
150 Graves(2001), 126-7. 
151 Graves(2001), 126-7. 
152 See LP, <9>, 24, 285; Bold(1984), 572-4; John Manson, Dear Grieve, (Glasgow: Kennedy and Boyd, 
2011), 180-2; Manson(2011). 
153 Davie(1986), 100.  
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‘the progressivist idea in Lucky Poet’.154 Davie had earlier framed his work in terms of 
the contradistinction between ‘Pelagianism on the one hand and the doctrine of original 
sin one the other’; in other words, the human nature argument against socialism.155 
MacDiarmid seems to approach, but not unambiguously support, eugenics as a means of 
addressing the human nature argument; were it not for the footnote, MacDiarmid could 
simply be suggesting that improvement can take place through education. This latter 
sense is clear in the lines: ‘We must put all our reliance in the intellect / And develop it in 
everybody’.156 The difficulty in reading this passage may reflect Muller’s changing 
attitude towards eugenics, or MacDiarmid’s genuine uncertainty over how to position his 
argument; it seems more like work in progress than a completed thought. Other lines 
quoted earlier in the context of News from Nowhere, concern the individual in balance 
with society, in turn, in balance with the environment. MacDiarmid seems to resist 
Stalinism in the closing couplet of the passage: ‘Variation must be encouraged / Rather 
than suppressed’.157  
In the final phase of In Memoriam James Joyce, the poet enters utopia: 
 Come, follow me into the realm of music. Here is the gate 
 Which separates the earthly from the eternal. 
 It is not like stepping into a strange country 
 As we once did. We soon learn to know everything there 
 And nothing surprises us any more. Here 
 Our wonderment will have no end, and yet 
 From the very beginning we feel at home. 
 
 At first you hear nothing, because everything sounds. 
 But now you begin to distinguish between them. Listen. 
 Each star has its rhythm and each world its beat. 
 And each separate living thing 
 Beats differently, according to its needs, 
 and all the beats are in harmony. 158 
                                                 
154 Davie(1986), 154. 
155 Davie(1986), vi. 
156 CPHMD, 838. 
157 CPHMD, 838. 
158 CPHMD, 871. 
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Alan Riach has identified that this passage is re-written from an article by the Italian-
Austrian composer Ferruccio Busoni (1866-1924).159 Referring to Busconi’s original, a 
letter to his wife dated 3 March 1910, it can be seen that MacDiarmid has tuned Busoni, 
stamping his poetic intent on the appropriated text: he has added the socialist maxim 
‘according to its needs’.160 The theme of evolutionary destiny is woven into this 
transition into utopia, this time without human intervention, in an ecstatic passage as the 
poem moves towards its conclusion.  
 
 Even as nerves before they function 
 Grow where they will be wanted; levers laid down in gristle  
 Become bone when wanted for the heavier pull 
 Of muscles which will clothe them; lungs, solid glands, 
 Yet arranged to hollow out at a few minutes’ notice 
 When the necessary air shall enter; limb-buds 
 Futile at their appearing, yet deliberately appearing 
 In order to become limbs in readiness 
 For an existence where they will be all important; 
 A pseudo-aquatic paradise, voiceless as a fish, 
 Yet containing within itself an instrument of voice 
 Against the time when it will talk; 161 
 
This passage, from Charles Sherrington’s Man on His Nature (1938), is compelling in its 
detail and commanding in tone.162  MacDiarmid has appropriated Sherrington’s flourish 
on ontogeny in what amounts to a creative misreading of science which concretises his 
theme: the passage, de-contextualised, is no longer science, though it’s the words and 
even the theory of science; it is science orchestrated to serve a poetic purpose, which in 
this case is also a political purpose. MacDiarmid is knee deep in a deterministic form of 
the Pelagian heresy – progress towards perfection is programmed into life itself.  
                                                 
159 Riach(1991), 133. 
160 See http://www.rodoni.ch/busoni/bibliotechina/letteregerdaEN/gerdaEN2.html; also Riach(1991), 133-4. 
161 CPHMD, 886; italics original. 
162 Charles Sherrington, Man on His Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), 98. 
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On the next page of the poem, MacDiarmid again seems to flirt with biological 
improvement. A chilling footnote to what might be regarded as descriptive verse, quotes 
from Lajos Zilahy’s, The Angry Angel.163 The footnote opens: ‘Mankind’s improved lot 
will be conceived in the laboratories of research scientists’.164 In Zilahy’s 1953 novel this 
passage is the scientist-protagonist’s imagined Nobel address; it is analogous to the 
novel’s theme of the hoped-for rebirth of Hungary in the pre-war period.165 Zilahy, in the 
context of his novel, does not appear to assign sinister intent to this passage, although if 
the wider sense of the novel is brought into the poem it would introduce the idea of the 
failure of idealism followed by tragedy. It could be read that MacDiarmid is deliberately 
introducing, on the third last page of the poem, a note of realism as a counterpoint to the 
optimistic ending of In Memoriam James Joyce; in addition, a another level, he again 
seems to be approaching, but not endorsing, scientifically-controlled improvement of 
human biology. Also in MacDiarmid’s defence, it can be argued that the fatalism of 
original sin, the idea of the immutability of human nature, bears some responsibility for 
his need to find a resolution. MacDiarmid’s vision is simply of hope for a better world in 
the face of all conventional wisdom to the contrary, raised by Davie to the level of 
philosophical principle. Can MacDiarmid be the only one to blame if he reached out for 
whatever argument was at hand? The poem ends in equanimity with the line: 
‘Everything’s O.K.’ (although not in English), and another footnote commending ‘the 
rightness of the world’, ‘despite all that may seem to enforce the opposite conclusion’.166 
                                                 
163 Lajos Zilahy, The Angry Angel, (New York: Prentice Hall, 1953), 56; Zilahy(1953). 
164 CPHMD, 887; Zilhay(1953), 56. 
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Alan Riach observes the millennialism in In Memoriam James Joyce, though 
unfortunately he sees complexities and contradictions which undermine it.167 Summing 
up Riach says: ‘MacDiarmid’s problem’, was to ‘bring the serenity he had achieved’ onto 
the page ‘while maintaining a Marxist ethic’.168 In this reading socialism is serenity, as 
the sense of the Epoch of Rest merges with the place where ‘From the very beginning we 
feel at home’.169  
Science is deeply embedded in the fabric of In Memoriam James Joyce, and many 
of the poem’s devices and conceits would not work in its absence. Science is essential to 
the universality of the vision at one end of the scale, and at the other, it is often the formal 
mode of enquiry. So whether science is employed in a simple sense to provide texture 
and completeness, or whether it relates allegorically to truth, or transition, or stability of 
underlying structure, without it the poem would be one dimensional. Science is clearly 
made free with on occasion by misreading techniques which shift it to the domain of the 
poet’s concerns. In the final expression of the inevitability of utopia, evolutionary science 
is not just misread, but apparently turned completely on its head, which also signifies a 
transition to unreality. 
 
 
Radical Integration 
 
MacDiarmid’s late text is unsettling in terms of its scale, its overlap, and also its content. 
It challenges traditional views of poetic texts, not least the New Critical idea of the poem 
as a coherent stand-alone object. MacDiarmid’s late text is highly innovative in the way 
science is incorporated into its fabric. The critical reaction to MacDiarmid’s late text is 
                                                 
167 Riach(1991), 90-93. 
168 Riach(1991), 148; Riach’s context is ‘the last major section’ of the poem; emphasis original. 
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almost as complex as the text itself. One of the reasons for this is the fine line between 
MacDiarmid’s life and his work. The difficulty of maintaining a clear distinction between 
biography and poetry is acute in MacDiarmid’s quasi-autobiography Lucky Poet, where 
he completely blurs the distinction himself. Poetry and prose in Lucky Poet, although 
they stand out as different in appearance on the page, run together almost seamlessly, as 
MacDiarmid links passages of poetry with short prose statements to illustrate the 
particular argument he is making. The chapter ‘The Kind of Poetry I Want’ contains 
prose which relates to the poetry, and a version of the poem The Kind of Poetry I Want 
which is different from that in Complete Poems.170 The Kind of Poetry I Want is 
simultaneously meta-poetry, in that it’s poetry about poetry, and declarative prose-like 
statements of intent. There is a sort of multi-level radicalism in MacDiarmid’s late text 
which is expressed in the poetry’s form and content and in a tight bond between poet and 
poetry. From my first reading of MacDiarmid’s late poetry, I was aware of the 
widespread critical position, as Alan Riach puts it, that ‘contradiction and paradox are at 
the heart of his vision’; the implication is that contradiction runs on an axis through both 
his life and his work.171 To be frank, this was confusing – the poetry I was reading 
seemed to me entirely cogent. A still graver charge is put by G. E. Davie in his second 
book, The Crisis of the Democratic Intellect: philosophical confusion. Riach, in his 
introduction to Lucky Poet, writes that Peter McCarey, ‘Picking up from Davie’s 
argument’, ‘describes the essential problem with MacDiarmid’s later work: attempts to 
read coherent philosophical positions from it run into insurmountable contradictions’.172 I 
have become convinced, however, that if one adopts the radical perspective that 
                                                 
170 Excepting that the LP version is collected in CPHMD. 
171 Riach(1991), 12.  
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MacDiarmid’s late poetry seems to demand, then the contradictions disappear, and what 
emerges is a consistent body of work of great integrity. It is possible to define two 
opposing views of MacDiarmid’s late poetry: that it is contradictory, or that it is 
integrated. 
Some of MacDiarmid’s ‘contradictions’ seem to drop away easily, such as the 
persistent charge that being both a communist and a nationalist is paradoxical.173 It’s well 
known that there was tension on the left over this issue; MacDiarmid, adopting a 
theoretical path already set out by John Maclean, engaged with the argument and was 
expelled from the Scottish Nationalists for communism, and subsequently from the 
Communist Party for nationalism.174 This, however, is political struggle, not paradox: 
MacDiarmid re-joined the CPGB in 1957 and was on the winning side of the argument. 
175 In 1954 the CPGB leader Harry Pollitt said ‘the imperialists cannot subdue the mighty 
movement for … national liberation’.176 Kenneth Buthlay’s understanding of the matter 
in 1964, when he wrote that ‘MacDiarmid’s nationalism is not at all narrow but is rather 
conceived as the necessary condition of internationalism’, seems to have been ignored.177 
Another charge against MacDiarmid, that his commitment to Marxism was weak, does 
not stand up to the evidence. Scot Lyall, for example, claims that ‘the extent of Marx’s 
influence on MacDiarmid is debatable’.178 There is nothing debatable about 
MacDiarmid’s commitment to political activism in his letters to Barbara Niven, the 
                                                 
173 E.g. Lyall&McCulloch(2011), 1. 
174 Maclean, see e.g. LP, 145-7; Riach(1991), 83; Bold(1988), 343-4, 377. 
175 There is no criticism of the CPGB in LP, which was written post-expulsion in 1939-40; only one letter 
has been found which criticises the CPGB directly: letter to the independent communist Guy Aldred 
addressed ‘Dear Comrade’ dated 28/8/39, Grieve, Dorian, O.D. Edwards, and Alan Riach, (eds.), Hugh 
MacDiarmid: New Selected Letters, (Manchester: Carcanet, 2001), 166. 
176 Quoted from Raphael Samuel, The Lost World of British Communism, (London: Verso, 2006), 49 
(ellipsis in Samuel); Samuel(1985). 
177 Buthlay(1964), 10; see also LP, 143-5. 
178 Lyall(2007), 8. 
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widely admired financial organiser for the Daily Worker who is credited as almost the life 
force behind this remarkably professional but shoestring operation.179  
There is a folder in the NLS of 119 letters from MacDiarmid to Niven covering 
the period 1955 to 1972, and Niven’s extant letters to MacDiarmid, of which seven are 
published in John Manson’s volume Dear Grieve, extend to circa 500 folios, beginning in 
1938.180 The MacDiarmid persona which appears in this set of letters is emotionally 
seamless between the personal reports of illnesses and holidays, and discussion of his 
writing, poetry readings, and frenetic political activity. Every letter contains word about 
Valda – although she was not a party member, by one account ‘Valda was, if anything, 
more of a rebel than Grieve’.181 The letters report on Niven’s comments on 
MacDiarmid’s writing, tell of a lecture to the CPGB about Scottish poetry, discuss his 
televised interview with Malcolm Muggeridge, a platform shared with Malcolm X, and 
report his delight that the Party gave him six bottles of Glenfiddich for his 75th 
birthday.182 Whilst considering a book on Communism and Poetry he says ‘I am 
completely opposed to the CPGB with regard to the “invasion” of Czecho-Slovakia’.183 
An interesting detail is MacDiarmid looking forward to a visit from ‘Miroslav Holub, the 
Czech poet and distinguished pathologist’.184 Beth Junor puts the position in material 
terms in her introduction to her volume of Valda’s letters to MacDiarmid.185 Writing 
sensitively about the couple’s poverty, Junor says: ‘Poets whose work is infused with 
                                                 
179 See MS.27185, folio 118. 
180 Letters to Barbara Niven, NLS shelfmark MS.27158; John Manson, private correspondence, 11/6/11 and 
21/12/11; Manson(2011). 
181 Graham&Smith(1992), 64. 
182 Folio 5, 5/11/56; folio 25, 11/8/61; folio 31, 3/3/62; folio 80, 30/12/64; folio 111, 17/8/67; Malcolm X, 
see also Bold(1988), 422. 
183 Folio 138, 7/8/69; see also Samuel(1985), 205-6. 
184 Folio 119, 30/7/68. 
185 Beth Junor (ed.), Scarcely Ever Out of My Thoughts, The Letters of Valda Trevlyn Grieve to Christopher 
Murray Grieve, (Edinburgh: Word Power Books, 2007), Junor(2007). 
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political thought or observation have usually had to live lives made more difficult’ by 
social conditions with which we are unfamiliar today.186 MacDiarmid’s niece, Morag 
Enticknap, notes the emotional strength necessary to maintain lifelong commitment to a 
cause: ‘He had faced life always with great courage, and he was indomitable to the 
end’.187 
Many of the charges related to MacDiarmid’s politics simply seem misplaced. 
The supposed contradiction, however, between idealism and materialism in 
MacDiarmid’s life and work is important because, as in ‘On a Raised Beach’, the tension 
between these domains is central to MacDiarmid’s poetry. Herbert puts the matter 
succinctly in relation to MacDiarmid’s long poem To Circumjack Cencrastus; Herbert 
notes ‘the manner in which MacDiarmid’s self-vaunted materialism is underpinned by a 
contradictory note of ecstatic spirituality’.188 The only issue I take with Herbert’s 
description is the word ‘contradictory’. MacDiarmid similarly associates, as noted, in A 
Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle, socialism with divine providence. The historian Raphael 
Samuel in his book The Lost World of British Communism provides insight, some of it 
personal, into the mentality of communists in MacDiarmid’s time.189 There was a shared 
morality and vision in the communist world; communism, Samuel says, ‘had affinities to 
a crusading order, a union of novices and initiates under a vow […] to be true to a cause’, 
communists were ‘soldiers in partibus infidelium waging temporal warfare for the sake of 
a spiritual end’.190 Samuel continues: ‘Communism rested on a promise of redemption’, 
‘Socialism was a sublime essence’, it ‘represented the highest form of human 
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187 Morag Enticknap, ‘A Memoir’, in Gish(1992), 37. 
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development’, and as the state withered away, the vision corresponded to the 
‘eschatological terminals of the Christian cycle’, and ‘in the confident hypothesis of 
everlasting peace, to Christian prophecies of the after-life’.191 Being a Communist was a 
heady, emotionally consuming state of affairs. Communists believed in the ‘transforming 
power of knowledge, and the emancipatory potential of science’, and were in their 
idealised self-conception ‘ambassadors of hope’, convinced that ‘mankind is advancing 
out of the darkness’.192  
Marx and Engels wrote in the Communist Manifesto that, in the face of the 
advancing bourgeoisie, ‘All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned’.193 
MacDiarmid associated, implicitly and explicitly, the moral rightness of socialism with 
the moral rightness of religion; for example, in The Battle Continues, MacDiarmid says 
rhetorically to the pro-Franco poet, Roy Campbell: ‘You have sinned against the 
Light’.194 In ‘The Skeleton of the Future’, the connection is next to explicit.195 This is the 
complete poem, starting with the subtitle. 
At Lenin’s Tomb 
 
Red granite and black diorite, with the blue 
Of the labradorite crystals gleaming like precious stones 
In the light reflected from the snow; and behind them 
The eternal lightning of Lenin’s bones. 196 
 
                                                 
191 Samuel(1985), 51-2. 
192 Samuel(1985), 50. 
193 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, (Oxford: Oxford World’s Classics, 1998), 
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Figure 1. ‘At Lenin’s Tomb’. Moscow postcard 2012 197 
 
MacDiarmid folds together stone, light, lightning, and veneration. The symbolism 
is powerful and confers the confidence to make strong, but grounded, remarks; for 
example, in The Battle Continues, MacDiarmid writes: ‘There is nothing the Nazis and 
Fascists have done / That the English haven’t done again and again’.198 But 
MacDiarmid’s fervour sometimes took a darker turn, which has repelled many people. 
This is a verse from the ‘First Hymn to Lenin’: 
 
As necessary, and insignificant, as death 
Wi’ a’ its agonies in the cosmos still 
The Cheka’s horrors are in their degree; 
And’ll end suner! What matters ‘t wha we kill 
To lessen the foulest murder that deprives 
 Maist men o’ real lives? 199 
 
This is cold-blooded support for violence – but as a Marxist, MacDiarmid would have 
seen the Cheka’s violence as countering the bourgeoisie’s ‘foulest murder’. It is not only 
communists who have argued that the end justifies the means. At the risk of deepening 
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the controversy, and even approaching the narrowing legal limit of free speech, it seems 
obvious that support for violence is politically mainstream in Britain in 2015. It is valid to 
make a comparison: unprovoked major invasions, bombing of unprotected populations, 
drones, death squads, helicopter gunships terrorising villagers, and torture, do not seem to 
cause any moral qualms amongst politicians or in the media. From imperialism’s 
manifest destiny to contemporary war, one’s own state’s violence is assumed to come 
with impunity, the people one’s state kills remain uncounted, and support for one’s own 
state’s acts of occupation and war, however terrible, is never described as cold-blooded 
support for violence. MacDiarmid, as a Marxist, saw through this propaganda veil, but to 
be clear, what MacDiarmid wrote is reprehensible. MacDiarmid lowers himself to the 
same severely-compromised moral level as the Empire builders and today’s warmongers. 
He lowers himself to the same level as Roy Campbell, to a place where what one is 
fighting for is irredeemably corrupted. In more distant terms, MacDiarmid’s outbursts, 
which do not show him in a good light, nevertheless underline the warts-and-all honesty 
to be found in his texts. 
With the consistency of MacDiarmid’s thinking established, the way is paved for 
a wider consideration of the late text itself. Surely the conditions of its production are not 
irrelevant. A close up account of MacDiarmid’s Shetland period (1933 – 1941), when the 
late text originated, can be found in the Whalsay History Group’s MacDiarmid in 
Shetland.200 MacDiarmid’s creativity at this time was intense.201 Riach comments that 
Lucky Poet, which also originates from the same period, was probably ‘written at high 
                                                 
200 Graham&Smith(1992). 
201 Graham&Smith(1992), 5, 7, 16. 
Hugh MacDiarmid 112 
velocity’.202 MacDiarmid was writing incessantly, on any paper he could get hold of, 
including ‘huge unmanageable pages of grocery paper’ and partly used school exercise 
books.203 MacDiarmid’s son Michael recalled pages ‘scrunched so hard into a ball of 
desperate irritation’ and thrown into the fire.204 Valda ‘burned her fingers’ and defied 
MacDiarmid’s ‘angry torment’, to rescue these papers from the flames.205 In this way, 
Valda’s reverse editing made a contribution to the extant text. Some of this material was 
typed on the island and preserved, but on leaving Shetland, portions of the In Memoriam 
James Joyce manuscripts ‘being transported in leaky tea-chests’, ‘were soaked’ and 
lost.206 Later much needed to be written to ‘fill out’ the resulting gaps.207 A large archive 
of manuscript and typescript, which may not yet have been fully explored, remains in the 
National Library of Scotland. 
MacDiarmid’s technique was to collect massive numbers of text samples.208 The 
Shetland period poems, Ruth McQuillan suggests, run from pages 385 to 1035 of 
Complete Poems.209 Naming schemes for parts, or all, of what is essentially the same 
body of material have come and gone. Buthlay refers to ‘two colossal poems’: Cornish 
Heroic Song for Valda Trevlyn and Mature Art, as underlying many of the fragments of 
poetry which were appearing up to the early sixties.210 In 1939 Cornish Heroic Song was 
reported to be ‘some 60,000 lines’.211 Buthlay comments: ‘one boggles at being given a 
few pages of a poem said to be 60,000 lines long and then discovering that part of what 
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one has been given is also attributed to another poem’.212 The ‘Cornish Heroic Song for 
Valda Trevlyn’ in Complete Poems is only about 230 lines.213 The most thorough 
engagement with MacDiarmid’s text complex is Herbert’s study, To Circumjack 
MacDiarmid.214 Herbert gives particular attention to ‘purported “failures”, incomplete 
works, and those aspects of his canon which can only be described as neglected’, in order 
to establish ‘the coherency of MacDiarmid’s achievement’.215 Herbert refers generally to 
the ‘confused critical response to MacDiarmid’s late work’.216 The establishment of the 
Complete Poems canon, Herbert says, due to its chronological order, supports ‘a reading 
of this epic as irremediably fragmented’, leading to the ‘classifying of its internal 
structure as rudimentary’.217 Morgan questions: is this ‘non-poetry or anti-poetry?’, but is 
far sighted – ‘it is only an anti-poetry in the dialectical sense that it opposes one 
conception of poetry’, a conception which, the poet believed, is unequal to the task 
history places before it.218  
If MacDiarmid’s late work is not exactly typical literary poetry, then perhaps 
there is some relationship to oral poetry. Repeated phrases, such as ‘Ah Lenin’, ‘Ah 
Joyce’, and ‘A poetry like’, are reminiscent of oral poetry, and so is the multiplicity of 
content for a specific form such as The Kind of Poetry I Want. There is in fact a striking 
resemblance between MacDiarmid’s late text and some post-Milman Parry insights into 
                                                 
212 Buthlay(1964), 99. 
213 CPHMD, 704-12. 
214 Herbert(1992).  
215 Herbert(1992), xiv. 
216 Herbert(1992), 163. 
217 Herbert(1992), 163. 
218 Morgan(1974), 195. 
Hugh MacDiarmid 114 
oral poetry, as described in Alfred Lord’s exposition of his own and Parry’s work, The 
Singer of Tales (1960).219 Lord writes:  
 
The poet was sorcerer and seer before he became an “artist”. His structures 
were not abstract art, or art for its own sake. The roots of oral traditional 
narrative are not artistic but religious in the broadest sense. 220 
 
Suspending disbelief – because The Kind of Poetry I Want, for example, is very strange 
and jarring when read aloud, even by MacDiarmid – it is just possible to imagine that the 
particular circumstances of composition led MacDiarmid to produce a text with 
something of the fluidity, the formulaic nature, and the redundancy, of oral poetry.221 
MacDiarmid’s late work can be seen as ‘religious in the broadest sense’, and it is not 
structured as abstract art or philosophy. Perhaps the late poetry can be thought of as 
something like an oral poetry of the mind. Lord says, ‘our neatly categorising minds work 
differently from the singer’s’, the oral form is ‘ever changing in the singer’s mind, 
because the theme is in reality protean’; the oral form is a ‘living, changing, adaptable 
artistic creation’, and the ‘result is that characteristic of oral poetry which literary 
scholars have found it hardest to understand and accept, namely, an occasional 
inconsistency’.222 The analogy can be pressed further. Lord writes of the ‘supra-meaning’ 
which develops in an oral performance, and notes that ‘the communication of this supra-
meaning is possible because of the community of experience of poet and audience’.223 
Perhaps the sense of a ‘supra-meaning’ developing between singer and audience, or poet 
and reader, is a useful way to interpret Crawford’s idea of MacDiarmid’s oeuvre being a 
‘poetry of knowledge’. In this way the feeling of knowledge in MacDiarmid’s late work 
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arises when the reader’s own knowledge, almost unconsciously, amplifies a particular 
passage.  
A defining factor of the late text is MacDiarmid’s technique of sampling. The 
process of sampling, or decontextualizing a fragment of (someone else’s) text, confers on 
the sample a particular frozen status. Text samples are in a way like photographs, a 
snapshot record of their momento mori.224 The samples are statements of truth because 
they truly represent a moment of human thought, a property which persists in various 
degrees even after the sample has been re-contextualised by a poet in a poem. The 
process of selection and preservation could be said, in a thoroughly degradgrindised way, 
to factualise the text samples. If so, then poetry constructed in this manner could 
genuinely be called a poetry of facts. Another feature of the samples, at this level of 
abstraction, is that they are all are identical in status. In this view the idea of knowledge 
seems to disappear: the samples are data. Perhaps this reinforces the idea that the sense of 
knowledge in MacDiarmid’s poetry arises from the reader’s cognition. In the abstract 
view, no one sample is more privileged than any other: the samples are in their raw 
database state. Introducing the idea of a computational model of MacDiarmid’s late 
poetry, Crawford suggests that the late corpus is ‘literature and language on the edge of 
the computational’ which resembles the ‘textures and forms of the modern computer’.225 
To build on Crawford’s idea, two types of computational model are put forward. 
The first is crude, and serves to illuminate the observable chaos of MacDiarmid’s late 
text. The second, drawn from the sub-field of information processing, postulates an 
abstract model of the late text comprising three conceptual entities, poetry, science, and 
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politics; it is here, I believe, a measure of text-wide coherence begins to emerge. In both 
cases the idea of ‘computation’ must be lost if the model is to be meaningful – the 
purpose of the model is to signify a shift from poetry to the abstract world of software 
structures and forms. Very roughly, in the first scheme, MacDiarmid’s samples are the 
database of a computer system, the narratives and themes are equivalent to software 
processes, and the user interface or presentation layer is the actual poetry. Regarding the 
idea of software processes, in the model this is suggested as equivalent to something like 
compositional intent – there is no implication of algorithmic transformation. Using such a 
‘computational’ model as a structural window on MacDiarmid’s late work introduces a 
measure of clarity as to how the late text came about; it is the start of an analytical 
framework within which further steps can be taken. It’s possible to see how the text can 
emerge as poetry in many different shapes and forms, and due to this almost unlimited 
flexibility, one can also appreciate the difficulty MacDiarmid had in creating particular 
edits of his text. Normally, with poetry, one thinks of the actual poem on the page as the 
work’s most concrete expression. However, with MacDiarmid’s late text, under this 
model, the physical presentation, as in Complete Poems and Lucky Poet, is the least 
concrete, or most abstract expression of the poetry. The software model turns the 
traditional view of a poem as a static, unique entity, on its head. It is as if MacDiarmid 
created, not poetry in the traditional sense, but a poetry system, which he was only partly 
able to control. The computational model explains the difficulties of both poet and reader 
with regard to the text. If there is no unique edit of the late text, and ontological 
uniqueness does not reside (typically) at the level of a particular poem, then this explains 
why any piece of text could reasonably be, and often actually is, placed more or less 
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anywhere. In this way it is valid and legitimate to make comparisons between poems, in 
the way, for example, I use passages of The Kind of Poetry I Want to support arguments 
in In Memoriam James Joyce. 
The computational analogy can be made more concrete by comparing the poetry 
in Lucky Poet with that in Complete Poems. In Lucky Poet, the passage ‘Come, follow me 
into the realm of music …’ from the final section of In Memoriam James Joyce, is 
repeated at length, and then linked with the phrase ‘I am always stressing the importance 
of fact – of thorough documentation’ to another poem altogether.226 MacDiarmid is using 
a different edit of his text to create a different poetic structure, and actually making this 
explicit with the prose link. The version of The Kind of Poetry I Want in Lucky Poet 
opens with the memorable image ‘I dream of poetry like a bread-knife / Which cuts three 
slices at once’.227 The same lines occur in the Complete Poems version about two and a 
half pages in.228 The poems remain synchronised for about nine Complete Poems pages, 
up to the poker reference: ‘A poetry that is – to use the terms of Red Dog – / High, low, 
jack, and the goddam game’.229 In Lucky Poet, MacDiarmid then draws other passages 
into the poem, typically with short prose links. The first such passage is a poem called 
‘The Puffin’ which opens: ‘In my dealings with facts I resemble / One of the puffins we 
see in the Shetlands here’.230 There’s a passage from ‘Third Hymn to Lenin’, and, a little 
later, with the linking phrase ‘Again I say’, MacDiarmid picks up briefly from where he 
left off in the Complete Poems version.231 The poems then diverge again with, in the 
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Lucky Poet version, MacDiarmid making the linking process explicit with phrases like 
‘And again’, or breaking the sections more completely with long passages of prose.232 
The quote I used about MacDiarmid’s desire for long poems to be ‘far too long / To be 
practicable for any existing medium’ is only in the Lucky Poet version, while the quote 
relating to News from Nowhere is only in the Complete Poems version.233 
The difference between the two versions of The Kind of Poetry I Want is not like 
poetic revision in the way that the crescendo-less text labelled ‘On a Raised Beach [first 
version]’ is certainly a staging post towards the final poetic achievement.234 It’s more like 
the label The Kind of Poetry I Want represents not a poem, but a virtual theme which can 
be realised by different edits of the underlying text. In this way much that initially 
appears chaotic about MacDiarmid’s late work becomes coherent. The potential 
endlessness of The Kind of Poetry I Want now seems to be analytical; I suggest that the 
same types of principles could be brought to bear on the whole of the late text.  
An archived folder is described in the NLS catalogue as ‘including typescripts 
closely related to In Memoriam James Joyce, but addressed to the sixteenth century 
Italian poet Teofilo Folengo’.235 Two typescripts in this folder vie for attention, one blue, 
one black: the heavily marked blue typescript is possibly the more complete version of a 
poem entitled ‘Mature Art’, subtitled ‘In Memoriam Teofilo Folengo’, and said to be in a 
note one of the shorter separable lyrics of Cornish Heroic Song For Valda Trevlyn.236 
This typescript of ‘In Memoriam Teofilo Folengo’ contains some familiar science, such 
as ‘things not yet discovered are foreknown to Science’ from In Memoriam James Joyce 
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and the ‘glow-worm’ and ‘bread-knife’ passages from The Kind of Poetry I Want, as well 
as themes of language gathering and politics; there is also some material I don’t recall 
from elsewhere.237 It could be argued that ‘In Memoriam Teofilo Folengo’ is alternative, 
and at circa sixteen typescript pages, a satisfyingly compact, version of In Memoriam 
James Joyce; albeit that the lack of scale in the former poem means that the greatness of 
the latter is not replicated. ‘In Memoriam Teofilo Folengo’ can be seen as an independent 
product of MacDiarmid’s poetry system, a poem – I believe a satisfactory one – 
constructed from his database of poetry materials, and finding coherent expression in its 
own right.  
If these arguments are true even to a reasonable extent, then the late text can be 
productively viewed as a radical adding together, or even a system for adding together, 
parts to make a whole. The whole as such, the complete text, flatly and literally, is near-
undefinable and probably not comprehensible as a single entity; nevertheless it can be 
understood as componentised, and by considering MacDiarmid’s late work as a database 
of samples combined with a process of poem construction, an analytical method starts to 
appear, and a form of comprehension of the whole text becomes possible.  
This is an argument about how to read MacDiarmid’s late text, not how to edit it: 
there would seem to be little possibility of arriving at a more definitive editing of 
MacDiarmid’s late work than that which already exists, nor is it likely scholars will 
discover a compelling narrative for the history of the text. It is necessary to abandon any 
hope of organising the poems by composition date; the concept is almost irrelevant – as 
Herbert has pointed out, even the publication date sequence in Complete Poems leads to a 
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fragmented reading.238  My proposal allows one to see clearly how this state of affairs has 
come about. The database/compositional process/variable window on the poetry is in fact 
unified: thus on this basis one could suggest that MacDiarmid’s late work is neither 
fragmented nor unstable – there is an abstract whole or reference framework, or in other 
words a system-level view. It could, however, be countered that this scheme is so 
abstract, so general, that it could apply to an arbitrary, random text. I think there is only 
one defence against this charge, and it is necessarily subjective – a random text, except in 
conditions of infinite trial and error, could not produce poetry.  
The statement that MacDiarmid’s late work is neither fragmented nor unstable 
does not imply individual poetic completeness: MacDiarmid’s late poems can never be 
considered complete in the traditional sense. I would argue too that the first 
computational model allows unanswerable editorial questions to be set aside, perhaps 
allowing a critical refocussing on the late text: for example,  it could be asked if the 
loosening of formal control finds a parallel in MacDiarmid’s politics in areas such as the 
withering away of the state, and to worlds like Nowhere, with its sense of benign 
anarchy. A notion of equality can be found, quite concretely in the case of science and 
literature, where there is no sense of relative status or privilege.239  
If the first ‘computational’ model helps explain the observed late text, while on 
the one hand holding on to the idea of compositional intent, and on the other illustrating, 
by means of the unlimited flexibility of MacDiarmid’s scheme, the difficulties of the 
situation the poet had got himself into, the second model tries to push further.  The 
purpose of abstraction in information processing is to discover levels at which 
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representative simplifications of the underlying data appear, so that the detail may be 
added back around an orderly structure. Suppose at an abstract level MacDiarmid’s late 
corpus comprises three conceptual entities: poetry, science, and politics. The entities are 
protean, as with oral themes, and they also stand for, or represent, a wider set of 
meanings. Poetry is the world of imagination, the spiritual domain, the non-material 
world, but also literally poetry, pushing in the extreme to collections of language and 
literature, as in In Memoriam James Joyce. Science and politics are related but separate, 
though they can both stand for materialism, and both overlap the realm of ideas. Science 
obviously stands for facts, and vice versa. MacDiarmid’s late poetry both holds this 
triumvirate together, and tests how far they can be pulled apart. It is in this abstract 
domain where reasonably simple and coherent aesthetic order finally starts to emerge on 
a text-wide basis. One way to support this view is to argue, based on observation, that at 
this abstract conceptual level, as opposed to the more concrete compositional view of the 
earlier computational model, MacDiarmid’s composition is unique. Further, the text 
under consideration is individually and emotionally meaningful in terms of the reader’s 
ability to discover and engage with a poetic mind; this experience has been memorably 
described by Andrew Marr in a 2014 TV broadcast: ‘MacDiarmid crawled up my nostrils 
and into my brain’.240 If one is poetically moved by MacDiarmid’s incessant and insistent 
repetition, and his endlessly variable manipulation of just three simple concepts, poetry, 
science, and politics, then it is surely possible to claim that MacDiarmid’s late text is 
coherent, integrated, of impressive poetic scope, and has integrity as an outstanding, and 
outstandingly radical, poem. 
                                                 
240 Andrew Marr, Great Scots, Episode 3: Hugh MacDiarmid, Broadcast, BBC2, 30/08/2014. 
Hugh MacDiarmid 122 
As an illustration, the poetic time and place in ‘On a Raised Beach’ is where the 
three entities, and their proxies and analogues, exist. There is opposition, ‘the battle 
between opposing ideas’, and ‘psychological warfare’ and a place where materialism and 
idealism, or ‘Being and non-being with equal weapons here / Confront each other’.241 
There is also resolution: ‘We must be humble. We are so easily baffled by appearances’, 
and ‘I am enamoured of the desert at last’.242 The tension between materialism and 
idealism, between science and poetry, does not collapse – on the contrary, maintenance 
and preservation of difference is the means by which the poet becomes reconciled with 
reality.  
The philosophy in ‘On a Raised Beach’ is a philosophy of difference. The unity is 
eclectic, as it must be, because there is no philosophy of everything. An attempt to create 
philosophical unity in ‘On a Raised Beach’ would risk totalitarianism. MacDiarmid in 
‘On a Raised Beach’ avoids totalising; elsewhere he is constantly moderating and 
qualifying his own extremes. The ‘Cheka’s horrors’, for example, are moderated by the 
‘resolution of the C. C. of the R. C. P.’ passage in Lucky Poet, by the ‘Zamyatin’ passage 
in ‘Talking with Five Thousand People in Edinburgh’, by Shestov, and by the aesthetic 
socialism of William Morris.243 An analogous argument could be made for ‘poetry’ 
which tends from extreme compilationism to bucolic lyricism. Science gets the contrarian 
treatment in ‘Ode to all Rebels’. In view of the preceding structural analysis, such text-
wide arguments can be made – no single statement has precedence. MacDiarmid’s late 
work is not, then, ‘whaur extremes meet’, but where extremes are kept apart and 
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constantly re-worked.244 This is the poetic justification for the presentation of extremism. 
MacDiarmid’s late poetry is about containing extremism, by channelling it, controlling it, 
and testing it by placing extremism in moderating and aesthetic contexts. In ‘On a Raised 
Beach’, the poet constructs reality as a sum of, and balance between, poetry, science, and 
politics, or their analogues.  
Finally, the argument can be brought together, starting by briefly considering 
MacDiarmid’s famous poetry of facts: the phrase surely means poetry and facts, or poetry 
and science. MacDiarmid never negates poetry, no matter how far he pushes it, so the 
phrase ‘poetry of facts’ cannot mean a poetry containing only facts, which wouldn’t in 
any case be poetry. He does not synthesise poetry and science, or pretend that they are 
two aspects of the same thing. Taken as a whole, MacDiarmid’s late text is more like the 
‘living, changing, adaptable artistic creation’ of oral poetry.245 MacDiarmid’s poetry 
changes and adapts, not through repeat performances, but because change and adaptation 
is inherent in the text’s vast scale. A quote from Lucky Poet shows the dynamic and 
flexible way in which MacDiarmid thought of poetry and science. MacDiarmid 
introduces a passage with the remark: ‘The best instance of the complementary and 
mutually corrective development of poetry and science is perhaps that cited in the 
following stanzas’.246 MacDiarmid argues in these stanzas that ‘one of the great triumphs 
/ Of poetic insight’, was to prepare many minds ‘For the conception of evolution’.247 This 
is so, he claims, because poetry sensitized the popular mind to the ‘appeal of Nature’, and 
thereby prepared the way for science’s more detailed observations. In this conception, 
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poetry and science are quite distinct, and they interact freely. Davie’s response to 
MacDiarmid’s late work seems not to catch this nuance, and to take too fixed a view of 
poetry and science. Writing in Crisis of the Democratic Intellect, Davie claims, ‘the 
limitations of human nature’, ‘have completely disappeared as a result of his conversion 
to the point of view of modern science’.248 Davie experiences not a poetry of knowledge, 
but cogitative dissonance.  
MacDiarmid did not ‘convert to science’, he added it to his poetry. MacDiarmid 
thought not in terms of synthesis, but in terms of integration of parts. Moreover, the 
integration is both physical, at the level of samples, and conceptual, as in poetry and 
science. MacDiarmid left behind metaphysics for a poetic model of reality based on the 
mutual co-existence of distinct and independent forces: science and poetry, politics and 
poetry, the material and the ideal. Perhaps as he saw it, by leaving behind A Drunk Man 
Looks at the Thistle, he at least isolated a tendency towards fatalism. In ‘On a Raised 
Beach’, the poet is ‘not indifferent to the struggle yet / Nor to the ataraxia I might get / 
By fatalism’.249 The class struggle and the tranquillity of fatalism are both carried 
forward, sometimes leading to doubt and internal conflict, but this is reality not 
contradiction. Also in ‘On a Raised Beach’ he writes, ‘Deep conviction of preference can 
seldom / Find direct terms in which to express itself’.250 MacDiarmid found direct terms, 
and also indirection: ‘everything I write, of course / Is an extended metaphor for 
something I never mention’.251 As one allows the extended metaphors, proxies, and 
analogies arising from MacDiarmid’s trinity of poetry, science, and politics, to develop, 
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the subtleties of his poetry emerge on a text-wide scale. The multi-dimensional 
radicalism of this integration is the source of MacDiarmid’s creative freedom to present 
evolution in a future-perfect tense, to say an incantatory prayer to mathematics, and to 
associate the unknown ontology of quantum mechanics with Nowhere.  
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III: THE HYBRID WORLDVIEW OF JUDITH WRIGHT 
 
 
An Introduction to Judith Wright 
 
From the point of view of the formal qualities of their verse, Hugh MacDiarmid’s late 
corpus could hardly be more different from the lyrical and structured work of the 
Australian poet Judith Wright (1915 – 2000). The similarities between the writers, 
however, in other ways is quite strong: the poetry of both is driven by an equally intense 
passion and by moral outrage at the state of the world. In place of the Marxist philosophy 
which underwrites MacDiarmid’s writing, Wright’s poetry is conditioned by an 
intellectual synthesis which she developed with her husband, the philosopher J. P. 
McKinney, during the 1940s and 1950s, and which is recorded in McKinney’s two 
published books.1 Wright’s moral causes were Aboriginal rights and conservation; these 
themes and others in her poetry are given remarkable heft by the hybridisation of the 
couple’s synthesis of idealist philosophy and psychologised science, with the objective 
reality of the land and its people. There is a surprising range and amount of science to 
discuss in this chapter; surprising because explicit references to science generally only 
emerge in Wright’s later poetry, though when it appears it is often thoroughly wound into 
the fabric of the poem. In general she deprecated scientific materialism for its value-free 
modes of enquiry, though in particular she appreciated the emergence of what she saw as 
the value-based science of ecology. Her use of physics is almost invisible, even several 
poems about nuclear devastation are allegorised. However, one of the most striking 
features of Wright’s poetry is her use of a ‘liberated’ concept of time to intermediate 
historical episodes, particularly in relation to the land and the phases of Australian 
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history. There is sufficient background evidence related to her intellectual development to 
argue that she is both reading and creatively misreading Einstein’s relativity – it is as if 
Wright is manipulating poetic form in terms of the relativistic frames of reference on 
which Einstein’s theory is based.  
Biology in Wright’s poetry is more explicit than physics at least in terms of the 
observational precision of her nature poems; the same poems (and others) are given 
weight by a theoretical understanding of both Bergson’s and Darwin’s theories of 
evolution, as John Holmes shows in his pioneering essay, ‘From Bergson to Darwin: 
Evolutionary Biology in the Poetry of Judith Wright’.2 Relativity perhaps inspired an 
important mechanism (as befits the subject of mechanics) in Wright’s poetry, and 
theoretical biology provides a foil to material reality, but there is also the presence of 
Jung and the wider ideas of her husband; this complex intellectual matrix is, however, by 
no means eclectic or random or haphazard in its poetic expression. Wright’s diversified 
intellectualism is unified by a lifelong and unwavering morality based on her struggle for 
recognition of the compound colonial tragedy of Australia: displacement of aboriginal 
peoples from the land, the enforced introduction of equally displaced people to England’s 
Gulag, and the subsequent scale and crassness of the destruction of the original 
landscape.3 Of these, Wright’s defence of the Aboriginal peoples is by far the most 
‘controversial’; Wright’s political and poetic struggles were, I believe it is secure to 
argue, based on the moral outrage caused by violent change, a lack of enduring values, 
and refusal to acknowledge the manifest truth.4 
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This Introduction seeks to develop an overview Wright’s work, describing major 
aspects of her poetry and background, and ending with her writing about science. The 
considerations in this opening part of the chapter provide important contexts for the two 
sub-sections which follow; these put forward poetry and science arguments related to 
physics and biology. A useful way to begin is to trace a line of Australian poetic 
development through Les Murray’s anthology The New Oxford Book of Australian Verse, 
which places, as I read it, Wright in a pivotal position.5 In this regard, A. D. Hope 
comments that Wright’s first collection ‘was an immediate success and marked an 
important dividing line and an important change in Australian poetry’.6 The organisation 
of Murray’s anthology, by birth date of the poet (if known) and no more than three poems 
per writer, encourages a developmental view of Australian poetry. Murray’s anthology 
also includes a substantial Aboriginal contribution, and this draws attention to the scant 
focus on native peoples in the work of Australia’s white poets.7 In an essay, ‘Aboriginals 
in Australian Poetry’, Wright says, ‘Poetry reflects social attitudes as much in what it 
leaves out as what it puts in’ and noting this absence in her study, Preoccupations in 
Australian Poetry (1965), Wright refers to ‘the silent war with the blacks’.8 In Murray’s 
anthology, before the entry on Wright, the handful of white poets who mention 
Aborigines really only note their presence in passing, as for example in W. E. Harney’s 
‘West of Alice’.9 Other examples are a mild lament for clearing the land in E. G. Moll’s 
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‘Clearing for the Plough’, and an Aboriginal presence is again simply noted in Roland 
Robinson’s ‘The Deep Well’.10 
Wright says in ‘Aboriginals in Australian Poetry’, ‘the process of “civilising” 
Australia was a process of slaughtering, in more or less overt ways, the original 
inhabitants’, and that ‘Most people, in the nineteenth century, knew of matters best kept 
under wraps’.11 Some examples she gives in this essay of poems in which the Aboriginals 
are actually the subject would pollute any anthology and show the soundness of Murray’s 
editorial strategy. Murray includes two poems from the Jindyworobak movement leader, 
Rex Ingamells (1913 – 1955). The first, ‘Unknown Land’, is a somewhat bitter poem 
which acknowledges the appropriation of the land: ‘Australia is a land that has no people, 
/ for those that were hers we have torn away’; the second contains a text which purports 
to be a ‘Corroboree about Banka Banka’.12 The name refers to Joseph Banks, and while 
the Aboriginals’, possibly authentic, mockery of the scientist’s obsession with blades of 
grass is amusing, the piece quickly seems patronising. Wright distanced herself from the 
Jindys: ‘Remembering what we had done to [the Aboriginal] culture, it was hard to feel 
that the Jindy tenets were in the best of taste’.13 Directly before his entry on Wright, 
Murray includes a poem by Joan Aronsten (1914 – 2013), ‘Ad Infinitum’.14 This poem 
seems to be about the destruction of the Aborigines: ‘The walls close in / and the 
bereaved shout within their walls of grief’.15 There is an implication that the land itself is 
overwhelming them: ‘but there is no end to the sand / that is moving towards them’; 
                                                 
10 Murray(1986), 136, 173-4. 
11 Wright(1975), 138. 
12 Murray(1986), 183-5. 
13 Wright(1975), 146. 
14 Murray(1986), 195. 
15 Murray(1986), 195. 
Judith Wright 130 
Aronsten was unable to express her depth of feeling, and the result is vague and 
confused.16 
Murray’s next choice, Wright’s ‘Nigger’s Leap, New England’ (1946) is a 
watershed in the anthology.17 The title of the poem aggressively re-names the location of 
a massacre – the driving of a group of Aborigines over a cliff – at a place which later 
became Wright family land. The actual place name, Darkie Head, deliberately 
obfuscates.18 Wright mocks the silence of the whites: ‘Night runs an obscure tide’, ‘and 
beats with boats of cloud’, ‘against this sheer and limelit granite head’, as if the very air 
was guilty.19 The darkness and air must hide the deed, and ‘Make a cold quilt across the 
bone and skull / that screamed falling in flesh from the lipped cliff / and then were 
silent’.20 She continues, knowing the massacre of Aboriginals was far from unique: ‘Here 
is the symbol’.21 There is also imagery of a shipwreck: ‘night buoys no warning’, and ‘no 
bells / sound for her mariners’; Wright is perhaps mocking the idea, and likely white 
excuse, that the events were merely a tragic accident.22 This is the opening of the third 
stanza:  
 
Did we not know their blood channelled our rivers, 
and the black dust our crops ate was their dust? 
O all men are one man at last. 23 
 
                                                 
16 Murray(1986), 195. 
17 Murray(1986), 195-6; CPJW, 15-16. 
18 See Veronica Brady, South of My Days; A Biography of Judith Wright, (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 
1998), 93; Brady(1998); Clarke, Patricia and Meredith McKinney, (eds.), With Love and Fury; Selected 
Letters of Judith Wright, (Canberra: National Library of Australia, 2006), 278; Clarke&McKinney(2006). 
19 CPJW, 15. 
20 CPJW, 15. 
21 CPJW, 15; far from unique, see e.g. Judith Wright, The Cry for the Dead, (Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 1982), 124-5, 190; Wright(1981). 
22 CPJW, 15. 
23 CPJW, 16. 
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Blood and grain: the first two lines seem to represent a distorted Eucharist. When we 
drink and eat, though we do not know it, the land itself becomes the body and the blood 
of the victims. The bitterly ironic ‘O all men are one man at last’ substitutes for ‘do this 
in remembrance of me’; we do not remember, even though we partake of their bodies. 
The blasphemy at the heart of ‘Nigger’s Leap’, which is amongst the angriest sentiments 
in Wright’s poetry, remains, as far as I can tell, like the plight of the Aborigines, 
unnoticed. In an early book of critical essays on Wright’s poetry, two writers pretend 
‘Nigger’s Leap’ refers to suicide, though the editor A. K. Thomson, in his introductory 
essay, authenticates Wright’s story; dating the event in 1844 and quoting Thomas 
Keating, a later station master in the area. Thompson writes, ‘“A lot of the blacks got 
killed and a lot more crippled”’.24 The third stanza of ‘Nigger’s Leap’ continues: 
 
…We should have known 
the night that tided up the cliffs and hid them 
had the same question on its tongue for us. 
And there they lie that were ourselves writ strange. 25 
 
The poem says that we too will be swept away by ‘the night that tided up the cliffs’; but 
this does not suggest, as the critic Shirley Walker claims, that there is some ‘dark 
undercurrent of pessimism’ in ‘Nigger’s Leap’, or in this and other poems, a ‘pessimistic 
view of human nature’.26 Pessimism would signify a negative teleology, a tendency to 
fear regression, a lack of belief in the possibility of change; pessimism is incompatible 
with activism. Wright may be warning that in time, justice will be done. She may simply 
be saying that all will suffer the fate of death; but it is not pessimistic to face the facts, 
                                                 
24 Suicide: R. F. Brissenden, ‘The Poetry of Judith Wright’, 39-50, 43; T. Inglis Moore, ‘The Quest of 
Judith Wright’, 75-87, 75; authenticates: ‘Judith Wright – an Introductory Essay in Interpretation’, 1-38, 
20-1; all in A. K. Thompson, (ed.), Critical Essays on Judith Wright, (Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1968). 
25 CPJW, 16. 
26 Shirley Walker, Flame and Shadow, (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1991), 29; 
Walker(1991). 
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however difficult – it is realistic. The critic Jennifer Strauss draws attention away from 
the massacre towards the human condition, thus diluting the poem’s political impact. 
Although she acknowledges ‘Nigger’s Leap’ is ‘focussed on the moral condition of the 
aggressors’, these aggressors, ‘have failed to understand that, because “all men are one 
man at last”, any act which obliterates part of life aligns the agent with that aspect of 
time/history which manifests itself as night/death and has the power to obliterate the 
landscape/all humans’.27  
Judith Wright’s forbearers and were amongst the early free settlers in Australia, 
arriving in 1827; she was born into their farming dynasty in New England’s tableland in 
northern New South Wales.28 Well acquainted with the land, Wright was a passionate 
conservationist. She expressed horror of the changes to the Australian landscape caused 
by settler farming in her earliest published poems, notably ‘Dust’ (1946).29 Her support 
for the Aboriginal cause can be traced to her learning from her father in the early 1940s 
the events described in ‘Nigger’s Leap’.30 Wright recalled that this story ‘had sunk more 
deeply into my own life than [my father] would perhaps have liked, and was to influence 
me forever’.31 Wright travelled a long way from the ‘large c’ conservatism of her 
upbringing, but was never involved with extremes of politics. According to her 
biographer Veronica Brady, her contact with the philosopher John Anderson at Sidney 
University during 1934 was important in shaping her views: ‘[Anderson] was always the 
enemy of dogmatism, and his scepticism about the high political passions of the day 
                                                 
27 Jennifer Strauss, Judith Wright, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995), 63; Strauss(1995). 
28 Wright(1999), 3. 
29 CPJW, 23-4. 
30 Wright(1999), 165; Brady(1998), 93. 
31 Wright(1999), 165. 
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seems to have had its effect on her’.32 In 1945, reflecting that she might be seen as ‘The 
Poet Militant’ as a result of an upcoming radio broadcast of ‘Dust’, Wright remarked in a 
letter ‘Did they but know how very unmilitant the poet is!’.33 In 1971 she commented 
irritably: ‘As to my political attitudes, I’m interested to know I have any’.34 This quietist 
aspect of Wright’s thinking, which at first seems at odds with activism, found important 
poetic expression. The final line of the third stanza of ‘Nigger’s Leap’, ‘And there they 
lie that were ourselves writ strange’, though arresting, is more quiescent than the 
blasphemous beginning to the verse; perhaps she was shocked at her own anger, and 
needed to balance it with a more muted tone.35 
Another of Wright’s famous poems, ‘Dust’, like ‘Nigger’s Leap’, is also from her 
first collection The Moving Image, published in 1946.36 The poem is an indictment of 
pioneering farming practice. Dust, a potent symbol in many Wright poems, was created 
by white farming; she relates her grandfather Albert’s experience in a prose work, The 
Generations of Men: 
 
[this was the first of the] great dust storms, whipped up by the rasping wind from the 
bared country of the far west, where the sharp hoofs of millions of sheep had loosened 
the light soil, tearing the thin cover of grass and roots that held it. It had been another 
sign, another wound delivered in the increasing struggle between man and land – the 
struggle whose marks Albert himself bore more deeply year by year. 37 
 
The opening image of the poem is ‘sick dust, spiralling with the wind’, ‘harsh as grief’s 
taste in our mouths’.38 The battle with the land is failing as ‘The remnant earth turns 
                                                 
32 Brady(1998), 51; John Anderson, see also Davie(1986). 
33 Wright(1965), 72-5; Patricia Clarke and Meredith McKinney, (eds.), The Equal Heart and Mind, (St 
Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2004), Clarke&McKinney(2004), 103; letter dated 5/11/1945. 
34 Clarke&McKinney(2006), 217; letter to Chris White, dated 12/03/1971. 
35 CPJW, 16. 
36 CPJW, 23-4, 15-16. 
37 Judith Wright, The Generations of Men, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1959), 124; 
Wright(1959). 
38 CPJW, 23. 
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evil’.39 Once though, ‘Earth was kinder, suffering fire and plough’. There are two images 
here: the Aborigines managed the land with fire, and their long stewardship is contrasted 
with the brief decades of settler farming which turned the land into a dust bowl.40 The 
farmers got carried away, and ‘counted the beautiful money’, and hoped for progress 
such that their child ‘would never break his body / against the plough’.41 But dust 
overtakes their dreams, and worse, ‘war’s eroding gale scatters our sons / with a million 
other grains of dust’.42 The ‘dust accuses’, and ‘we must make a new choice’: 
 
We must prepare the land for a difficult sowing, 
a long and hazardous growth of a strange bread 43 
 
We make a choice to increase our chance of success, but economic growth is hazardous, 
not foreordained. Wright acted on the issues raised in ‘Dust’ – she made her own ‘new 
choice’, and later became an activist.  
Two of Wright’s prose works, with overlapping but different themes, describe the 
settlement of Australia in terms of the displacement of the Aborigines and the rapid 
introduction of farming. The first, The Generations of Men (1959), quoted from above, is 
based on a diary kept by her pioneer grandfather from 1866 to 1890, and the second, The 
Cry for the Dead (1981), further explores this extensive diary, and adds her own research 
into the fate of the Aborigines.44 In the latter work, Wright is frequently appalled by her 
findings, for example, when a member of the Queensland parliament circa 1901 voiced a 
commonly-held opinion: ‘the law of evolution says the nigger shall disappear in the 
                                                 
39 CPJW, 23. 
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41 CPJW, 24. 
42 CPJW, 24. 
43 CPJW, 24. 
44 Wright(1959); Judith Wright, The Cry for the Dead, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1982), 
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onward progress of white Australia’.45 May Wright, the poet’s much-loved grandmother, 
thought, again in common with many in her time, that the Aborigines should be regarded 
not as ‘an inferior race, but as some superior animal’.46 For Wright, the struggle to 
protect the land and the struggle for the rights of the native people were the same 
struggle.47 In a 1987 paper, she advocates listening to and understanding the Aborigines 
as a policy for the conservation movement.48 Noting the scale of the tragedy involved, 
Wright says the Aborigines are ‘now known to have the world’s oldest surviving culture’; 
she finds encouragement in concluding: ‘it was also one so rich in inherited myth, art, 
and ceremony, and traditional wisdom, that after 200 years of almost unremitting attack it 
remains in some places, as alive and supportive as ever’.49 
Across Wright’s poetry, a series of related perspectives on land and people are 
developed. The settler’s battle with the land is lost in ‘Soldier’s Farm’: the ploughland is 
‘vapoured with the dust of dreams’.50 It is lost too in ‘Brothers and Sisters’, where ‘the 
years grew like the grass and leaves / across the half-erased and dubious track / until one 
day they knew the plains were lost’.51 In ‘Country Town’, a poem of displacement and 
alienation, the depiction of re-created England in Australia is bitter with irony.52 Exiles 
sing of ‘chains and whips and soldiers’ in a ‘landscape that the town creeps over; / a 
landscape safe with bitumen and banks’ where ‘The church is built, the bishop is 
                                                 
45 Appalled: e.g., Clarke&McKinney(2006), 233; Wright(1981), 269. 
46 Wright(1959), 88. 
47 See e.g., Strauss(1995), 93, Wright(1999), 284. 
48 ‘Search for a Public Environmental Ethic’ in Judith Wright, Going on Talking, (Butterfly: Springwood, 
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ordained’; the poetic voice cries: ‘this is where we live / where do we live?’.53 The 
displacement of people and land dove-tails with Wright’s multivalent use of ‘time’, 
engendering a sense of slippage, a loss of mental anchor, a lack of control over events. 
The landscape itself is embedded with multiple allusions. In ‘Half-Caste Girl’, the hills 
‘belong to no people’ recalling not just loss, but Cook’s declaration that the land was 
terra nullius.54 The hills ‘my father’s farther stripped’, in the poem ‘Eroded Hills’, are 
‘like shoulders naked and whipped’, the same as, very probably, the shoulders of the 
forced convict labourers who actually stripped the hills.55 Some poems appear, at least at 
first, to celebrate Australian settlement. ‘For New England’, starts this way, but turns on a 
Jungian thought, [I] ‘who am the gazer and the land I stare on’, towards the ‘jealous 
bones’ of the ancient owners, undermining any complacency regarding the colonial 
project.56  
Wright’s poem ‘Bullocky’ from her first collection, The Moving Image, much to 
her frustration, was read as a celebration of settlement. Here is the complete poem: 
 
Beside his heavy-shouldered team, 
thirsty with drought and chilled with rain, 
he weathered all the striding years 
till time ran widdershins in his brain: 
 
Till the long solitary tracks 
etched deeper with each lurching load 
were populous before his eyes, 
and fiends and angels used his road. 
 
All the long straining journey grew 
a mad apocalyptic dream, 
and he old Moses, and the slaves 
his suffering and stubborn team. 
 
Then in his evening camp beneath 
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the half-light pillars of the trees 
he filled the steepled cone of night 
with shouted prayers and prophecies. 
 
While past the campfire’s crimson ring 
the star-struck darkness cupped him round, 
and centuries of cattlebells 
rang with their sweet uneasy sound. 
 
Grass is across the waggon-tracks, 
and plough strikes bone beneath the grass, 
and vineyards cover all the slopes 
where the dead teams were used to pass. 
 
O vine, grow close upon that bone 
and hold it with your rooted hand. 
The prophet Moses feeds the grape, 
and fruitful is the Promised Land. 57 
 
The sense of the bullocky (bull drover) as the suffering pioneer allegorised as Moses 
leading Australians to the Promised Land is superficial. Instead the suffering brings 
madness, suggested in the first stanza by ‘widdershins’, and made explicit by the phrase 
‘mad apocalyptic dream’, and emphasised again at the end of the fourth quatrain: ‘he 
filled the steepled cone of night / with shouted prayers and prophecies’.58 When the 
‘plough strikes bone beneath the grass’, the suggestion of Aboriginal bones is perhaps 
deliberately not mentioned; the poet makes explicit two owners of the bones from the 
settler era: those of the cattle and the bullocky himself. With the reference to the 
Promised Land, the reader is almost invited to participate in the cover up – Canaan was 
not uninhabited. ‘Bullocky’ was widely anthologised until Wright put a stop to it. In a 
letter to her daughter Meredith in 1985, Wright said, ‘I added to the storm of publicity by 
firmly removing ‘Bullocky’ from further use, since the bicentennial celebrations 
threatened to turn it into a sort of secondary national anthem’.59 In a letter in 1986 to 
Stephen Murray-Smith (a publisher), Wright confirms her refusal to allow ‘Bullocky’ to 
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be used in anthologies in the future; she comments, ‘I cannot and do not want to control 
the way in which poems are taught in schools; but the way this one has been interpreted 
is outright bad’.60 She complains that the poem has been abstracted from its close context 
with ‘Nigger’s Leap’ and ‘Bora Ring’ (a poem about the appropriation of Aboriginal 
land), a context which ‘should have given the critics pause in assigning to me much if 
any admiration of the Pioneering Vision’.61  
It is worth noting, in the light of the discussion in the MacDiarmid chapter, the 
way that isolation of parts of a larger text can lead to misunderstanding of the artist’s 
perspectives. Shirley Walker, in her critical study from 1991, Flame and Shadow, 
misinterpreted ‘Bullocky’ in exactly the way which frustrated Wright.62 Walker writes, 
‘The settlers, it seems, are the chosen children of God, and sacrifice and suffering are 
necessary to win the land for them and make it fruitful’.63 A little later, Walker, noting 
the difference between ‘Bullocky’ on the one hand, and ‘Nigger’s Leap’, and ‘Bora Ring’ 
on the other, describes this apparent discrepancy as ‘Wright’s ambivalent attitude towards 
white colonial history’.64 Even in 1991, an honest telling of history must be obfuscated. 
A second book-length critical work, Jennifer Strauss’s 1995 Judith Wright, takes into 
account Wright’s essay ‘Reading and Nationalism’ (first published 1987, and made 
widely available in the 1992 collection Going on Talking).65 In this essay Wright makes 
similar points about the importance of poetic context to those quoted from her letters. 
Strauss writes: ‘It would seem reasonable […] that teachers (and critics) might have a 
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useful role to play in restoring lost contexts’.66 Rose Lucas and Lyn McCredden’s 1996 
collection Bridgings includes an essay on Wright entitled ‘Through a Web of 
Language’.67 The writers comment: Wright’s poetry ‘focuses increasingly on the socio-
historically constructed oppositions of White/Aboriginal and human (especially White) 
society/the natural environment, in a way which renders the dissolution or conflation of 
those differences more politically problematic’; this both acknowledges Wright’s vision 
of history, and undermines it with the phrase ‘socio-historically constructed’.68 An essay 
by John Hawke from 2001, however, concedes that ‘Bullocky’ (and also ‘South of My 
Days’), ‘have too often been decontextualized from her oeuvre as a whole, and praised 
for their superficial conformity to the demands of hegemonic nationalist concerns’.69  
Once a poem is read in a particular way, it is very difficult to read it differently. 
Perhaps Wright in ‘Bullocky’ was unclear, or too quiet about her concerns. On re-reading 
the poem, its power derives from its subtlety: I don’t think this view holds. Wright 
remarks in ‘Reading and Nationalism’: the response to ‘Bullocky’, ‘makes the poem a 
bad one, since I evidently failed to convey my point’; but surely the response to 
‘Bullocky’ says more about the prevailing cultural censorship in Australia, or the 
ignorance (wilful or not) of some critics, than it does about Wright’s poetry.70 As 
Veronica Brady puts it in an essay from 2001, ‘Wright was in fact more sophisticated 
intellectually than many of her critics’; witness Vincent Buckley’s comment, in the 
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context of ‘Bullocky’ and other poems, from 1957: ‘Miss Wright tends to think of nature 
in such terms as savages use – as something to be feared’.71 
The science in Wright’s poetry, the deep and interesting science, is more emergent 
than explicit; however, in presentations, articles, and essays, she writes a considerable 
amount on the subject. A useful collection of Wright’s views on science can be found in a 
series of nine papers which form the ‘About Conservation’ section of the collection 
Because I Was Invited (1975).72 The nine pieces were written between the mid-sixties 
and 1972 and are thematically similar, though tailored for the different audiences she was 
addressing. In the first essay in the sequence, ‘Conservation as a Concept’ (1968), she 
sets out the scale of the challenge for activists: ‘It involves, not only the need to revise 
most radically our exploitative techniques, but to revise a whole attitude of mind and 
feeling that are very deeply rooted in our dealings with the natural world’.73 In part, as 
picked up in ‘Education and the Environmental Crisis’ (1970), she is referring to the 
‘Judeo-Christian inheritance’ with its sense of ‘arrogant domination over nature’ which, 
Wright thinks, needs to be revised ‘very drastically indeed’; though she adds, referring to 
St Francis, ‘there is no need to go outside Christianity’ for such a revision.74 In greater 
part, however, she is calling for what she saw as the value-free scientific way of looking 
at the world to be revised. ‘[T]he whole basis of the scientific and technological 
revolution’, Wright says in ‘Conservation as a Concept’, ‘involved as its first postulate 
the separation of man from nature’.75 This separation involved the objectification of 
                                                 
71 Veronica Brady, ‘The Politics of Poetics’ in Southerly, Vol. 61, No. 1, 2001, 82-8; Vincent Buckley, 
Essays in Poetry, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1957), 163. 
72 Wright(1975), 189-256. 
73 Wright(1975), 189. 
74 Wright(1975), 219-20. 
75 Wright(1975), 190. 
Judith Wright 141 
nature in physics: the incomprehensible ‘flux of waves and/or particles of which nothing 
can be said except mathematically’; and also the habit of the scientist who ‘has excluded, 
and has not needed, any concern with the ideas of value and meaning in his laboratory’.76 
Rounding to her theme, she charges modern physics in particular with allowing 
‘illegitimate inferences’, which ‘contribute their bit to our state of mind’:  
 
the conclusion, for instance, that Relativity Theory implies that the vanishing of the 
concept of the absolute from the procedure of physics applies to the human world as 
well, so that every individual standpoint is merely relative; and the inference from 
quantum theory that imports the notion of ‘chance’ as governing atomic events into 
the human world as well and thinks of it as and thinks of it as invalidating the very 
idea of purposiveness. 77 
 
She argues that the separation of meaning and value from scientific enquiry has become 
manifest ‘on the human level’, and, linking her ideas to those of her husband Jack as she 
often does (this time implicitly), extends her argument to philosophy where ‘ideas of 
meaning and value are seen as meaningless and valueless’.78 
A hallmark of Wright’s more polemical writing is that she will find a way to 
mitigate her stronger claims, without changing her position. In ‘Conservation as a 
Concept’ she is hopeful that a ‘new science has arisen in the new studies of ecology, 
which are moving into the human as well as the biological fields’; this could be ‘a new 
kind of understanding which shall take into account actual living processes and 
interdependencies’, and might represent ‘a new spark’, which can ‘jump across the gap 
which at present separates the arts and sciences’.79 That gap appears in familiar form in 
‘Science, Value and Meaning’ (1969), which was originally a presentation to a 
symposium to commemorate the 70th birthday of Sir Macfarlane Burnet (1899 – 1985), a 
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distinguished medical scientist.80 She begins by quoting C. P. Snow: ‘“Neither the 
scientific system of mental development, nor the traditional (literary), is adequate for our 
potentialities, for the world in which we ought to begin to live”’.81 Wright says: ‘That is 
true enough, and I for one agree with it’; then, ‘But I think Sir Charles over-simplified the 
problem’.82 Wright identifies the real split as not ‘between scientists and literary 
intellectuals’, but between ‘the two sides of our human nature’.83 This position is refined 
by associating the ‘creative and imaginative’ with both scientists and practitioners of the 
arts, and contrasting this with the ‘the manipulative power-hungry side of us which seizes 
on the achievements of science and transforms them into technological machinery for 
uses which scientists themselves, as well as artists, often cannot help but deplore’.84 
Goethe, Wright argues, understood this, and his ‘real fear was not of the intellect, but of 
its triumph at the expense of the other side of us’.85 Wright concludes in Wordsworthian 
tones: ‘the marvellous world of micro-entities, of the atom and its nucleus’, ‘are waiting 
to be realised by the imagination […] The artist should be following every step of the 
scientist, celebrating every new revelation turning it from fact into imaginative 
knowledge’.86  
Wright often criticised science, seeing it as inextricably linked to environmental 
degradation; she deprecated what she saw as its lack of values and its way of thinking.87 
Many of her criticisms of science are well targeted. For example, she reports that the ‘real 
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goodwill of most anthropologists tends to be blotted out, in Aboriginal eyes, by the very 
scientific objectivity of their investigation’, which seems to them ‘cold and inhuman’.88 
Wright had a particular philosophical understanding of science; she saw its worldview as 
problematic and sought to change it. In essays concerned with active campaigns, 
however, she seems to have worked hard to attract scientific interest and was well aware 
of the pivotal role science could play in conservation struggles, as it did, for example, in 
her early and unexpectedly successful campaign to save the Great Barrier Reef in 1966.89 
She returns to Goethe in other essays, but not to Snow or Wordsworth. In several places 
her vocabulary is reminiscent of F. R. Leavis (who is never mentioned), for example, in 
the terms ‘materialist-utilitarian’, and ‘economic and technological Gradgrinds’; but that 
is where any similarity to Leavis ends.90 There is a rare mention of Darwin in ‘Wildlife 
Conservation and the Teacher’, which rounds on the Darwinian insight: ‘man is himself a 
natural being, though he tends to forget it; he is the resultant of millions of years of 
adaptation to this planet’.91  
The interplay between poetry and science finds incisive expression in some of 
Wright’s poems. ‘Swamp Plant’, from her collection Fourth Quarter (1976), includes the 
lines: ‘Only science, then, has noticed you, / not poetry. / It’s that way round in this 
country, / upside-down as ever’.92 In similar fashion, ‘Encounter’ opens: ‘Knowing 
altogether too much about beetles: / Latin names, classifications, numbers – six legs, four 
wings’.93 The poet nearly falls asleep in ‘Geology Lecture’, but counters the lecture by 
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remembering the forces ‘which in the Modern age could melt these stones / so fiercely, 
that time might never start again’.94 In ‘Eve to Her Daughters’, Wright’s Eve teases her 
husband (a bit of a scientist): ‘The earth must be made a new Eden / with central heating, 
domesticated animals, / mechanical harvesters, combustion engines …’.95 This 
investigating Adam also ‘had to unravel everything, / because he believed that 
mechanism / was the whole secret’.96 Particularly in later poems, comments on science 
are wound thoroughly into Wright’s poetry: the lines ‘Too little / diversity / means 
instability / the scientists say. / No fooling’ from ‘Brief Notes from Canberra’ are 
typical.97 The final poem in Collected Poems, ‘Patterns’, recalls Wright’s darker notes.98 
The poem opens with a quote relating to the Bhagavad-Gita, used by the leader of the 
Manhattan Project, Robert Oppenheimer: ‘“Brighter than a thousand suns”’, and is built 
in couplets on the theme of nuclear war: ‘The play of opposites, their interpenetration – / 
there’s the reality, the fission and the fusion’; the poem ends: ‘We are all of us born of 
fire, possessed by darkness’.99 
A late collection of essays, Going on Talking (1992), covers similar ground to 
those in Because I was Invited, though with interesting additional themes. It is worth 
quoting the first paragraph of  ‘Writing in a Nuclear Age’: 
 
One great difficulty about writing in this nuclear age is that the writer has in 
effect to deal with two different kinds of world – or more. One of them is ‘the 
world we think we know’ – the so called solid material world with its linked 
chains of cause and effect, action and reaction, nouns and verbs as it were, with 
which our languages deal and which to an unknown extent those languages 
construct. And language is the writer’s medium and instrument, locking us into 
that macroscopic ‘world we think we know’. It is not designed to deal with the 
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second world, the shadow world in which relativity and quantum theory 
operate and in which matter does not exist, having been now, as Whitehead put 
it, ‘identified with energy, and energy is sheer activity’. Jeans put it in this 
way: ‘the history of physical science in the 20th century is one of progressive 
emancipation from the purely human angle of vision’. And Eddington said: 
‘the stuff of the world is mind-stuff’. 100 
 
Wright adds: ‘How to deal with this double-vision world has been one of my main poetic 
problems’.101 The remainder of the short essay discusses Wright’s poetic responses to the 
threat of nuclear war – the violent proof of the existence of the scientific shadow world. 
‘Writing in a Nuclear Age’ seems to confirm the centrality of science to Wright’s 
thinking. Instead of science appearing explicitly on the surface of her poetry as hard facts, 
Wright’s science (for the most part) is implicit, underlying, a ‘shadow world’ where hard 
science is made soft, where the ineffable resides, where the paradox of existence and non-
existence is enacted. Wright so powerfully creatively misreads science that it can 
sometimes almost represent a spiritual dimension in her poetry. Science in Wright’s 
poetry is the imaginative world of unanswered questions and unknown connections 
which underlies the historical realism of ‘Nigger’s Leap’, or the natural realism of some 
poems in her Birds sequence. Wright has turned science into a paradox of hard facts 
versus unreality, and she has done so by exploiting the edge of science itself, turning 
relativity and quantum mechanics back in on themselves. The apparent subjectivity of 
observation, the dissolution of time, the uncertainty, and the unreality of twentieth 
century physics are the model for the shadow world in Wright’s poetry. Wright has 
turned science on its head, which is why it is mostly invisible. By doing so, she can be 
regarded as a highly accomplished poet of science. 
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Time and Physics 
 
Wright’s intellectual development was stimulated and nourished by her partner (later 
husband), the autodidact philosopher J. P. McKinney (1891 – 1966).102 Patricia Clarke 
notes, in her introduction to a volume of the couple’s early letters, Of Equal Heart and 
Mind, ‘the depth and range of their philosophical reading’.103 McKinney published, 
according to Clarke, what amounted to ‘a joint project in everything but authorship’ in 
The Challenge of Reason (1950); the ideas the pair developed, Clarke adds, ‘had an even 
more profound effect on Judith’s poetry, beginning with “The Moving Image”’, the title 
poem of Wright’s first collection (1946).104 Alongside Jung, who was ‘of immense 
interest to them both’, the couple studied modern physics, which it seemed to them was 
dismantling possibility of belief ‘in a world of solid independent objects’.105 Wright 
combined the spirit of Wordsworth with an awareness that ‘the intellectual side of 
Western man’, dominated at the expense of ‘the feeling-side’.106 With this ever-present 
balance, Wright re-imagined science, most explicitly physics, in the creative hybrid of 
her poetry. A comment in the preface to a book Wright valued, Richard Wilhelm’s 
translation of the Taoist classic, The Secret of the Golden Flower, provides a suggestive 
link: ‘We have to see that the spirit must lean on science in the world of reality, and that 
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science must turn to the spirit for the meaning of life’.107 Wright’s assimilation of ideas 
from physics, particularly in relation to relativistic time, is the subject of this sub-section.  
Time in Australia was suddenly re-defined. Writing of his country’s foundation, the 
art critic and historian Robert Hughes says:  
 
No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on 
the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 
1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command 
of Captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it 
would presently be called, Sydney Harbour. […] One may liken this moment 
to the breaking open of a capsule. 108 
 
Suddenly and (as it turned out) irreversibly, time in the Western sense had begun. The 
first recorded words of the local population to the invaders were ‘Go away!’.109 But 
clearly the British did not, and Western time, in the sense of national and individual 
destiny, was established. This ‘Progress’ would be rationalised in the nineteenth century 
as in accord with Divine law. In 1849 a settler remarked: ‘Nothing can stay the dying 
away of the Aboriginal race, which Providence has only allowed to hold the land until 
replaced by a finer race’.110 Later in the century Social Darwinism, and the racist theories 
of Francis Galton would add the (apparent) sanction of Natural Law to statements of this 
kind.111 The Aboriginal view of time could hardly have been more different from that of 
Europeans. According to the anthropologists Ronald and Catherine Berndt, the 
Aborigines had a ‘spiritual bond linking man with nature in all its aspects’, which has ‘no 
counterpart in our own philosophy’; for them ‘man is not spiritually a being apart, but 
springs from the same source as all other forms of life’, and ‘past, present and future are 
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merged into one “eternal” reality’.112 This sense of compressed time is often loosely 
referred to as the Aboriginal Dreamtime.113 To Western eyes however, the Aborigine was 
‘dismissed as a feckless, improvident simpleton, living for the day with “no thought for 
the morrow”’.114  
The title poem of The Moving Image, gathers together personal reflections with 
images of the Australian tragedy.115 The first line of ‘The Moving Image’ commands in 
the manner of Dylan Thomas: ‘Here is the same clock that walked quietly’.116 This is a 
four dimensional image. The line recalls Einstein’s thought experiments which imagine 
clocks associated with three dimensional frames of reference. Wright has developed 
poetically Einstein’s idea that there are multiple simultaneous times, each one with its 
own physical associations. It is as if Einstein, for Wright, released time from its Western 
bondage of progress and destiny, and allowed her to make it relative, to alter its rate of 
flow, to change its direction, to coil and uncoil it. The notion of time developed by 
modern physics becomes, paradoxically, the palette for her portrayal of the continental-
scale imposition of Western destiny. According to her biographer, Wright, ‘even when 
she wrote about familiar landscapes’, saw them ‘from a double vision, that of 
commonsense, and that of contemporary physics which she was reading with Jack’.117 
Brady writes that ‘This gave her an angle of vision which was no longer human but sub-
linguistic’.118 Wright was not concerned with just the invisible and the inexplicable, but 
also the violent energy which made the invisible manifest. Quoting from a record in the 
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National Library archive, Brady explains that, in order to ‘“visualise the horrors of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki”’ Wright translated the landscape into ‘another frame of 
reference’, citing ‘Night after Bushfire’ as an example.119 Note the close association in 
Brady’s description between the ‘sub-linguistic’ and ‘frame of reference’: physics seems 
to be pushed out of the real world into the primordial mind. This same mode of thought is 
evident in Wright’s comment that regarding the ‘flux of waves and/or particles’, ‘nothing 
can be said except mathematically’, and also the shadow world of science alluded to in 
‘Writing in a Nuclear Age’.120 All this is consistent with the Wright/McKinney 
philosophical synthesis which also incorporates Jung’s idea of the common sub-
consciousness. Consistent again is Jung’s remark that ‘Even physics volatizes our 
material world’.121 In ‘The Moving Image’ time and place are released from fixed 
constraints, but the poem does not become vague or detached, even though it has a 
dreamlike quality – this is possibly because its physics, though internalised, retains a 
certain solidity and rigor.  
This is the beginning of ‘The Moving Image’: 
Here is the same clock that walked quietly 
through those enormous years I half recall, 
when between one blue summer and another 
time seemed as many miles as around the world, 
and a world a day, a moment or a mile 122 
 
The de-personalisation of the self to a clock immediately generalises this reflection on 
childhood. The rhythm of the clock, of the blue summers, swells among ‘enormous years’ 
and seems to subside to infinity as time becomes indistinguishable from space. In the 
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lines which follow the quotation, time suddenly accelerates, and time and the world 
‘faster spin until / mind cannot grasp’.123 The formless pulsing of space and time then 
transitions into form, like collective childhood changing to individual adulthood: 
 
Each of us followed it to a different hour 
that like a bushranger held its guns on us 
and forced our choice. 124 
 
Time moves from subjective to objective. Formlessness becomes destiny at the point of a 
gun – like the disturbance of a quantum system, unreality becomes reality at the time of 
observation. As the poem develops, Wright improvises on time with the freedom and the 
discipline of a jazz musician. The poem is housed in pentameters, echoing the ‘clock that 
walked quietly’. The laws of physics place no constraint on the direction of time: some of 
Wright’s images in ‘The Moving Image’ reverse time:  
 
Does the heart know no better than to pray 
that time unwind its coil, the bone unbuild 
till that lost world sit like a fruit in the hand –  
till the felled trees rise upright where they lay 125 
 
The ethereal feeling in the early part of the poem is brought into contrast with harsher 
images; her repeated symbol ‘dust’ signifies the present: ‘Dust blows harsh from the 
airfield’.126 As seen from an aeroplane, the world is ‘evil and small’, and in entropic 
decay.127 It is ‘brittle and easy to break’, ‘like a dried head from the islands’, and ‘there is 
no end to the / breaking’.128 Like dust, the poem refuses to settle. Australia’s convict past 
is recalled by ‘poor Tom of Bedlam’, ‘whose nights and days were whipmarks on his 
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back’.129 Progress is represented as a kind of cyclic madness: there is ‘nothing but the 
tick of the clock and a world sucked dry: 
 
Till the tide of life come back, till time’s great tide 
Roar from our depths and send us mad again 
With a singing madness, like poor Tom of Bedlam 130 
 
Some poems identify time with consciousness itself. For example, in ‘The World 
and the Child’, a precise, literal image of light is fused with the child’s being: the child ‘is 
a wave / that timeless moves through time, imperishably bright’.131 At the speed of light, 
time does not exist, there is only timelessness. The ideas which inform Wright’s poems 
stand out more clearly if the theoretical background to Wright’s understanding of modern 
physics is explored. Fortunately, there is an expression of these ideas in J. P. McKinney’s 
The Challenge of Reason.132  
McKinney’s argument in this book hinges on a putative pre-Socratic / post-Socratic 
watershed which led from ‘mental-experience analysis to the modern physical-experience 
analysis’.133 McKinney forms a characterisation of relativity which fits into this picture; 
he says: ‘Relativity tells us that the “world” or “nature” is a complex of experiences’.134 
To arrive at this, McKinney seems to extend Einstein’s view that ‘our concepts and 
systems of concepts […] represent the complex of our experiences’.135 Einstein referred 
to a type of common consciousness which he relates to reality: ‘We are accustomed to 
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regard as real those sense perceptions which are common to different individuals’.136 
Using this, McKinney positions relativity as representing the philosophical watershed, as 
if physical experience is the individual, and the world, or the complex of experiences, is 
the common mental experience: he says, ‘Relativity represents the point of contact 
between the individual’s consciousness and the common-consciousness’.137 McKinney is 
transposing Einstein’s reality to the common consciousness, and latching onto the 
‘observer’ as the counterpoised individual; it is compelling to read his work as a synthesis 
of Einstein’s perceptual realism with Jung’s hypothesised relationship between the 
individual consciousness and a common subconscious.138 Einstein’s theory is 
internalised; Jung’s is somewhat externalised: the common subconscious is transposed to 
a common consciousness. 
McKinney’s work, or Jung’s, do not need to be assessed here in terms of 
philosophy – their analytical part is lost, when, in the same manner as the creative 
misreading of science, they are transformed by Wright’s poetry into emotions, feelings, 
or aesthetic concepts. Wright, almost quoting McKinney, said: ‘it is not man, but Man, 
who knows’.139 One can see this idea of common consciousness repeatedly in her poetry. 
For example, ‘Northern River’ ends with an image of ‘the sea that encompasses’, ‘and 
holds the memories / of every stream and river’.140 The sense of the individual merging 
with the general is also in these lines from ‘For New England’: (I) ‘who am the swimmer 
and the mountain river’, ‘who am the gazer and the land I stare on’.141 
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McKinney analyses quantum mechanics in a similar way to relativity, by relating 
physical theory to mental existence. He says quantum mechanics ‘appears as the 
conscious and deliberate formulation of that which was primitively unconscious and 
intuitive; what was originally an unconscious reaction now becomes a conscious mental 
process’.142 Jung talks of the primitive ‘“pre-logical” state of mind’, in a world of 
‘“collective representations”’ and of consciousness as the ‘late born descendent of the 
unconscious’.143 This is resonant imagery if harnessed into McKinney’s phrase. The 
primitive unconsciousness of formless representations catches the immaterial ‘internal’ 
world of quantum mechanics, and McKinney has also caught the quantum transition to 
the ‘conscious and deliberate’. It is useful to probe one step further into the theory of 
relativity using a text from McKinney’s bibliography: Albert Einstein’s Relativity.144 
In order to conceptualise relativity, and Judith Wright’s poems, it is necessary to 
abandon the notion of a single fixed, shared space; instead one must imagine space 
deconstructed into a potentially infinite number of arbitrarily defined individual spaces. 
Einstein calls these sub-spaces ‘reference bodies’, in Wright’s terms they are moving 
images. In his thought experiments, Einstein populates the reference bodies with clocks, 
immediately recalling Wright’s ‘Here is the same clock that walked quietly’, which opens 
‘The Moving Image’.145 In a remarkably simple series of reasoned steps involving the 
relative perception of events and questioning of the notion of simultaneity, Einstein 
concludes that if, as he insists, the laws of physics are to be invariant between reference 
bodies, in particular that the speed of light is a universal constant, then time must be 
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specific to each individual reference body.146 In other words, the price of demanding the 
invariance of the laws of physics is that objective time becomes relative to the observer. 
Einstein concludes the main part of his argument with a memorable statement of the 
general principal of relativity.147 An arbitrarily chosen, non-rigid, non-inertial, four-
dimensional curvilinear co-ordinate system, or reference body, ‘might appropriately be 
termed a “reference-mollusc”’.148 One must imagine space as comprising an infinite 
number of such molluscs, all in relative motion with regard to each other, then: ‘The 
general principle of relativity requires that all these molluscs can be used as reference-
bodies with equal right and equal success in the formulation of the general laws of nature; 
the laws themselves must be quite independent of the choice of mollusc’.149 
To a physicist, this is a principle of unspeakable beauty; unspeakable, but thinkable 
in terms of mathematics. Irrespective of an arbitrarily complex deconstruction of space, 
the loss of Euclidian geometry, and absolute time, the universe remains lawful. Einstein’s 
molluscs are suggestive of the way Wright’s moving images interact and collide, each 
bearing their own unique time. Einstein’s deconstructed time-bearing spaces, and his 
insistence on universal lawfulness, may also have appealed to Wright because of an 
alignment with her wider reading. In his preface to The Secret of the Golden Flower, 
Wilhelm comments: ‘[Chinese philosophy] is built on the premise that the cosmos and 
man in the last analysis obey common laws; that man is a cosmos in miniature and is not 
divided from the great cosmos by any fixed limits’.150 Joseph Needham observed the 
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connection between Taoism and modern physics: ‘in spite of the mysticism, it is clear 
from all we know of the Taoists’, that there is ‘an affirmation of the unity of Nature, a 
unity that now, in the twentieth century, lies, we know, like universal gravitation, at the 
very foundation of post-Newtonian natural science’.151  
Wright and McKinney ‘would read and discuss works about contemporary 
physics’.152 They called their first shared house ‘Quantum’.153 In a letter of 1945 Wright 
reminded McKinney, ‘don’t let the connection between the time-theories from Newton 
onwards slip out of your mind’.154 Wright seems to have been inspired by physics to 
encapsulate her poetic world as four dimensional images in space-time. In the ‘Half-
Caste Girl’ the voice of a dead child yearns for the ‘hills that belong to no people’.155 In 
‘The Blind Man’, hills ‘naked as a whipped back’ bear the scars of the convict era.156 In 
‘Dust’ the earth is ‘steel-shocked’ by settler farming.157 The most prominent word in 
‘Bullocky’, ‘widdershins’, or anti-clockwise, is a direct challenge to Progress.158 As 
‘Bullocky’ develops different space-times, real and imagined, interact and collide: 
Biblical time, a time of ‘fiends and angels’, the dream time of the future, the times of the 
bones, and the poetic present time. ‘Bullocky’’s inability to settle in time works with the 
overt theme of madness to create a poetically controlled sense of confusion which 
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gradually eats away at the poem’s superficial sense of celebration, and shifts the sense 
towards historical realism.159  
This is the opening of ‘Night after Bushfire’, an allegory of nuclear devastation:  
 
There is no more silence on the plains of the moon 
and time is no more alien there, than here. 160 
 
Time is transported to an alien space, raising an observer paradox: time in the scene of 
devastation is as meaningless as sound when there’s no listener; there is no point to time 
when there are no living beings. This recalls the disappearance of time after nuclear war 
at the  end of ‘Geology Lecture’: ‘time might never start again’.161 In ‘Letter to a Friend’ 
Wright contemplates the entropic dissipation of time: ‘The small waves vanish on the 
shore’, as the poet lives an ‘eternal speech / with the dead’; then: 
 
The small waves grow, 
gather strength and run forward. 
Having come out of Nothing, they desire All. 
Like the waves you are broken. 
You who were all are made nothing, 
returned to the river. 162 
 
In one reading of these lines, the rush of colonialism washes away the older peoples, but 
the invaders are a wave – implicitly suggesting, in time’s cycles, they too will fade. This 
sense of time resonates with ‘Nigger’s Leap’: ‘the night that tided up the cliffs and hid 
them / had the same question on its tongue for us’.163 In a poem dedicated to Wright’s 
late husband, ‘The Vision’ contains the couplet: ‘There is a single source to which all 
time’s returned. / That was the single truth your learning learned’.164 This is not quite the 
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same as the cyclic time suggested by the tidal images, but nevertheless is related. The 
protagonist in the ‘The Blind Man’ is named Jimmy Delany, for whom ‘time is a cracked 
mask’.165 The gold rush is over; half demented, ‘he sits and sings / where the wind raises 
dry fountains of faded gold’.166 The poem switches to a song of lament, a yearning for the 
reversal of entropy, a re-creation of structure, as the earth is remade from dust: 
 
Who will gather the dust to a sphere, who will build us a world? 
Who will join atom to atom, the waiting seed to seed? 
Who will give the heat of the sun to death’s great grave of cold 
and deliver the countries of the heart, in the womb of a dust-grain furled? 167 
 
Time contains the potential for evolutionary progress, related to suffering, on ‘the 
road from protoplasm to man’ in ‘Pain’.168 Evolution is stalled in ‘The Cycads’: the 
ancient trees ‘watch the shrunken moon, but never die’, ‘for time forgets the promise he 
once made’.169 In ‘The Mirror at the Fun Fair’, time has ‘small rat-teeth’, gnawing 
away.170 Time, in ‘The Bones Speak’ is dissipation: ‘The pulse’, ‘that only memory of 
time’, is ‘crumbled to darkness’.171 Time is cyclic again in ‘time’s recurrent / morning’ 
from ‘The Child’, and  destructive in: ‘time that brings us harm, / and undoes our 
knowledge’ from ‘The Bushfire’.172 For ‘The Idler’, ‘time sprang from its coil and struck 
his heart’.173 In ‘Waiting’, settlers are trapped in time’s grip as the ‘circling days weave 
tighter’, and the ‘spider / Time binds us helpless till his sting go in’.174 And in ‘Bora 
Ring’, time and place and people are lost as easily as a dream:  
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The hunter is gone: the spear 
is splintered underground; the painted bodies 
a dream the world breathed sleeping and forgot. 175 
 
In Einstein’s thought experiments, clocks move through time, creating their own 
time as they do so; similarly, Wright’s moving images are both apart from time and part 
of time, as the poet shifts freely between variable objective time and subjective time. 
Entropy plays its part too, as time dissipates, vanishes, or destroys. In the manner of the 
Wright/McKinney synthesis, time is consciousness in both a general and individual 
sense: time is our embodied collective sense experience, while it gnaws away at 
individual beings like ‘small rat-teeth’.176 Time is the lord of all, and no lord at all. The 
poems discussed, and many others, are built around time, almost made out of time 
distilled into images. Physical theory is only occasionally explicit; the poet has re-
imagined the theory, broken its encasement of reason, and brought it into the world of 
feeling. In an analogous manner, historical reality is re-imagined as emotional truth. 
Wright’s poetic themes and variations creatively hybridise the internal and the external 
worlds. Perhaps it was awareness of her own success in the fusion of rational thought and 
poetry, which allowed Wright to challenge with such confidence the divisive implications 
of the ‘two cultures’ argument, and say ‘it is the interaction of the poetic and rational 
principles in us that has led to all the great discoveries’, the ‘great poet is great, not 
because he is wholly given over to the poetic principle, but because he is capable of 
rational thought as well as intuitive relationship’, and similarly the ‘great scientist is great 
for exactly the same reason’.177 
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A Hybrid Worldview 
 
A completely separate strand of science in Wright’s work has been analysed by John 
Holmes in his 2012 essay ‘From Bergson to Darwin: Evolutionary Biology in the Poetry 
of Judith Wright’.178 In this concluding section of the Wright chapter I argue that by 
building on, and widening the scope of, Holmes’s analysis, Wright’s creative hybrid of 
idealism and realism comes into full view. I hope to show that Bergson’s vitalism was 
overtaken by the developing Wright/McKinney synthesis, and that Holmes’s 
characterisation of Wright’s Darwinism is equivalent to what I have called her natural 
realism. In his editor’s introduction to Science in Modern Poetry (the volume which 
includes his essay), Holmes says, ‘Wright’s vitalism is widely recognised by scholars of 
her poetry’, but that ‘Wright’s profound doubts over Bergson, expressed in the self-same 
poems’ have not been recognised.179 He is referring to the fact that ‘Walker in particular 
has argued that […] vitalism is central to Wright’s poetry throughout her career’ – a view 
which Holmes, while corroborating the presence of Bergson, more widely challenges.180 
Holmes charts the breakdown of vitalism in Wright’s work, arguing that ‘the ambiguities 
within her poems suggest she was uneasy with the casuistry of Bergson’s argument’.181 
However, if Holmes’s posited transition from Bergson to Darwin is described in terms of 
the development of Wright’s hybrid worldview, then the ambiguities disappear. There is 
a sense too in which Wright’s use of vitalism could be described as cherry picking: as 
Holmes’s comment about the breakdown of Bergsonism in ‘the self-same poems’ 
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suggests, there is always some factor other than vitalism at play in Wright’s poems; this 
constant probing and mediation of ideas is characteristic of her best work.  
Holmes opens his essay with a selection of Wright’s writing on science from 
some of the same essays I discussed in the Introduction to this chapter. Then Holmes 
turns to Wright’s second collection Woman to Man (1949), the collection in which, he 
argues, Bergson’s ‘influence is most clearly felt’.182 The first poem he studies is ‘Conch 
Shell’, a meditation on an empty shell, ‘a windless shelter housing nothing’, and the 
imagined former life within it.183 This is the last of the poem’s three stanzas. 
 
And here, half-guess, half-knowledge, I contract 
into a beasts blind orbit, stare deep down 
the cliffs not I have climbed; your prodigal, 
probe with my sense your senseless life –  
since life, the force that leapt between your poles, 
burns forward still in me against the night. 184 
 
There are compelling references to Bergson’s élan vital in this stanza. Citing vitalism’s 
‘notion of “life” and “force” akin to magnetism or electricity – “a current sent through 
matter”, in Bergson’s words’, Holmes identifies, for example, the ‘force that leapt 
between your poles’, and the way life ‘burns forward’ as unquestionably Bergsonian.185 
The influence of vitalism on ‘Conch Shell’ goes further: Bergson writes concerning 
molluscs, ‘the animal that shuts itself in a citadel or in armour condemned itself to a 
partial slumber’; he refers to this state as a ‘torpor’.186 This is resonant with the ‘beast’s 
blind orbit’ and the imagined creature’s ‘senseless life’.187 Bergsonian torpor appears in 
another mollusc poem, ‘The Nautilus’ (1956): Wright says the creature ‘conspires with 
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time to shroud itself’.188 Vitalism is key, but I find that there is more than vitalism in 
‘Conch Shell’: Jung’s influence also seems to be present.189 The poet says, ‘I contract / 
into a beast’s blind orbit’, as if merging with the primitive psyche; note Wright’s delicate 
individuation when the consciousnesses meet: she stares ‘deep down / the cliffs not I 
have climbed’.190 The stanza could be read as if it is the psychic contact, the awareness of 
the common subconscious, which reveals the presence of the life force. 
Holmes carefully picks apart the twists and turns of Bergson’s theory as it 
struggles to remain consistent, whilst accommodating the privileged evolutionary 
progress towards humanity with the obvious diversity of non-human life; Bergson finds it 
necessary to introduce consciousness into his theory. Holmes relates that Bergson argued, 
‘“consciousness or rather ‘supra-consciousness”  must be “at the origin of life”, its 
defining feature’.191 Holmes writes: 
 
The élan vital is thus a drive to re-generate this pre-existent mind. It is an 
‘aspiration’ after all, as well as an ‘impulsion’. The unconscious élan vital is 
consciousness itself, moving towards its own realisation. And because 
‘[e]verywhere but in man, consciousness has come to a stand’, it is humanity 
alone that ‘continues the vital movement indefinitely’. 192 
 
The Bergsonian ‘supra-consciousness’ though is quite different from, indeed opposite to, 
Jung’s hypothesised relationship between the individual consciousness and a common 
subconscious.193 In ‘Conch Shell’, the poet contracts into ‘a beast’s blind orbit’.  
It is worth exploring Jung’s ideas further, because they are absorbed completely 
into the Wright/McKinney synthesis, whereas Bergson is not mentioned in McKinney’s 
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books.194 Jung writes: our psyche ‘carries within it discernible traces of primeval 
evolution, and it is certainly a whole that functions purposively – for otherwise we could 
not live’.195 Jung rejects the élan vital, remarking ‘As long as this undertaking is 
restricted to the misty heights of speculative philosophy, no great harm is done’, but ‘if 
we should operate with this idea in the lower range of practical psychology […] we 
should find ourselves involved in the most hopeless difficulty’.196 Jung’s basis for this is 
a further rejection what he calls ‘naturalistic values’ (or seeing things in physical terms) 
in order to restore the spirit to life; he says ‘everything spiritual is an illusion from the 
naturalistic standpoint’.197 This does not harmonise with Bergson, who wrote that 
‘Consciousness, in man, is pre-eminently intellect’.198 Wright is not likely to have agreed 
with this; reflecting on Jung, she said: ‘we are emotional, thinking, physical, intuitional 
all at once’.199 Wright’s reflection on these ideas can be seen in a letter to Walker in 
1976, where she evaded the idea of the life force, and shifted the perspective, via physics 
and Jung, to McKinney’s synthesis: 
 
As for the life force; well, I don’t think that even scientists any longer regard the 
physical and the psychic as separate, and all the work being done seems to confirm 
this – what is the observer, what the observed? Can you tell the dancer from the 
dance? […] Jack’s own work implied that we are part of a unity with ‘nature’ and that 
human thought is the development of that relationship. 200 
 
Elsewhere in the same letter Wright says ‘[Jung’s influence] certainly shows up in 
Woman to Man and The Gateway’.201 
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It is possible to add substantially to Holmes’s account of Bergsonian breakdown 
within a single poem by introducing Wright’s contra-progressive treatment of time, for 
example the cyclic sense of time in ‘The Child’. This is the final stanza.  
 
Spring is always the red tower of the may-tree, 
alive, shaken with bees, smelling of wild honey, 
and the blood a moving tree of may; 
like a symbol for a meaning; like time’s recurrent 
   morning 
that breaks and beckons, changes and eludes, 
that is gone away; 
that is never gone away. 202 
 
The stanza echoes an earlier phrase in the poem – ‘the blood’s leap and retreat’.203 Life, 
symbolised by blood, becomes a seasonal flowering, individually; generally it ebbs and 
flows like the tide, and change may beckon, but it also eludes. The above stanza portrays 
a natural rhythm of life where change is possible – but the life force, the blood’s leap, 
struggles to make change happen, and retreats. Vitalism in this poem is elusive and 
changeable; it is also, strongly against the grain of Bergson’s theory, seemingly passive, 
and trapped within the cyclic confines of time’s recurrent morning. 
In another poem from Woman to Man, ‘The Cycads’, vitalism seems strongly 
present, this time moderated by Taoism.204 Wright may be reflecting on Bergson’s 
remark that ‘the vegetable renounced consciousness in wrapping itself in cellulose 
membrane’.205 In the poem, the trees’ life force is weak: the cycads’ ‘smooth dark flames 
flicker at time’s own root’.206 The antique trees ‘keep the old bargain life has long since 
broken’, as ‘time forgets the promise he once made’ and the cycads are consigned to 
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Bergsonian sleep.207 This sense appears again, but perhaps drifts from Bergson a little, as 
‘change forgets’ the cycads, ‘Among the complicated birds and flowers’.208 Wright 
appears to be meditating on an aspect of Bergson’s theory, while also probing it. 
Wilhelm’s commentary on Taoism mentions a ‘life-principle’ and a ‘downward 
movement of life-processes’; the latter is reminiscent of ‘time’s own root’. 209  There is a 
a typical Wrightian fusion of ideas is present in ‘The Cycads’.  
Holmes addresses the conceptual difficulties of Bergson’s theory: ‘the problem 
with vitalism is that it provides no a priori grounds on which to weigh one […] view 
against another, no basis for determining where the right choice lies, nor what the relation 
is between the choices we as individuals or polities make and the supposed direction of 
the élan vital’.210 Wright’s only detailed prose concerning vitalism is in an essay 
‘William Baylebridge and the Modern Problem’, originally a lecture delivered in 1954.211 
Challenging Walker’s and Strauss’s reading of this essay, Holmes argues that ‘Wright 
herself exposes this [inability to choose] failing within vitalist thinking’.212 Holmes 
earlier drew attention to Bergson’s privileged teleology of humankind, spiced up with 
Nietzsche; towards the end of Creative Evolution, Bergson writes: ‘It is as if a vague and 
formless being, whom we may call, as we will, man or superman, had sought to realise 
himself, and had succeeded only by abandoning a part of himself on the way’. Bergson 
continues: ‘the whole of humanity, in space and in time, is one immense army galloping 
beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge’.213 Bergson’s theory 
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is pre-loaded with a sense of destiny, implicitly Western. Holmes charts the theory’s 
influence and rise in the inter-war years when it was ‘to many not only a convincing 
thesis but close to self-evident’; but the full horrors of the Second World War, ‘made the 
myth of progress barely tenable’.214 Rounding on his theme of transition in Wright’s 
thinking, Holmes says, ‘Wright’s disillusionment with vitalism owes more to politics 
than to science. But as her politics become increasingly activist, so her understanding of 
biology becomes more rigorously scientific’.215 He adds: ‘This turn away from 
Bergsonian vitalism towards Darwinian ecology can be traced in Wright’s poetry’.216 
Holmes cites as an example of Wright’s move away from vitalism the title poem of The 
Two Fires (1955), ‘Wright’s fullest and most direct response to the threat of nuclear 
war’.217 ‘The Two Fires’ can be read, Holmes argues, as in part ‘a grotesque reductio ad 
absurdum of vitalist principles’.218 It is not difficult, though, to see how Wright would 
have felt that the Bergsonian worldview was incompatible with all her activism, not just 
her conservationism; she could use the softer parts of vitalism in poems such as ‘Conch 
Shell’, and because her wider philosophical synthesis was developing, vitalism could 
quietly be ditched.  
Clarke and McKinney, introducing their volume of Wright’s letters, note a change 
of the sort identified by Holmes, ‘from the private, domestic, literary self to the public 
conservation activist’, adding that Wright ‘herself described it, in typical Jungian terms, 
as a shift in middle age from introversion to extroversion’.219 The demands of activism 
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meant that there were ‘increasing periods of poetic silence’; indeed Wright’s later poetry, 
with exceptions, tends to be simpler or less assured – but there is no evidence that her 
philosophy changed with her increasingly public life.220 The essay ‘Writing in a nuclear 
age’, from 1987, is evidence that it didn’t. Bergson seems to enter Wright’s poetry 
already castrated, shorn of his hubris; vitalism is never taken literally, but is always 
creatively misread. In her poetry one of vitalism’s fates is to be fused with Jung’s 
conception of the psyche, or she may trap the life force and probe the theory for 
weaknesses. John Hawke, although his focus is on Wright’s symbolist language, adopts a 
similar approach to myself: reading McKinney’s philosophical works in order to gain an 
understanding of the thinking behind her poetry.221 Quoting from The Challenge of 
Reason, Hawke asserts that McKinney identifies primordial consciousness as the ‘time 
when ‘knowing and being were one’; this, Hawke says, is a ‘world of Bergsonian 
“events”, in which the outer world and “the inner flux of human consciousness…are 
merged into a sort of continuum”’.222 However, McKinney does not mention Bergson, 
and I can find no secure allusion: vitalism, I believe, is absent from McKinney’s work – 
which helps explain why Wright did not treat Bergson’s theory holistically, but rather 
was inclined to cherry-pick. 
There is ample evidence to support Wright’s increasing interest in ecology as her 
activism increased, some of which is quoted in my chapter introduction. As Holmes puts 
it, ‘From the 1960s, the growing evidence of environmental destruction led her to 
formulate this problem in ecological terms themselves derived from Darwin’.223 But this 
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doesn’t account for her activism in support of Aboriginal rights; if Holmes’s argument is 
widened a little, and the concept of realism, present in her earliest poems such as 
‘Nigger’s Leap’ and ‘Dust’, is introduced, then a fuller picture emerges. I would argue 
too that all Wright’s activism was driven by a unifying moral outrage, rather than a 
reformulation of her ideas in ecological terms – the attraction of ecology, it is clear from 
her essays, was that she saw it as a value-based form of science, and therefore one which 
she could readily support.  
As early as The Moving Image, Wright’s acceptance of the impersonality of 
inanimate nature is clear; in ‘Waiting’, ‘time lifts no knife to heal or to destroy / and did 
not cause, and cannot cure, our pain’; this natural realism dovetails with the historical 
realism of poems from the same collection, for example, ‘Bora Ring’.224 This sense of 
mediated realism (as always, vying with other ideas) is again explicit in a poem from 
Woman to Man, ‘The Flood’.225 This is a poem with Biblical overtones of washing away 
corruption: ‘How strange these sudden panics are. / There’s a run on / money’, and a 
pause before the rain: ‘the noise in the Stock Exchange / drops for a second; the bleating 
of lambs in the abattoirs / dies down’.226 There is a denial of purposeful intervention as 
the poet asks ‘Where is our awkward Noah[?]’227 Then, as ‘the waters rise quietly’: 
 
They do not chose their victims or give reason. 
Neither the good nor the bad, neither man nor creature 
is favoured. This is the forgotten logic of nature. 228 
 
Forgotten by whom? – Bergson perhaps. A Darwinian reading of these lines, however, 
would not catch the full sense of the poem. After the flood a cyclic of re-creation ensues, 
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depicted in four-dimensional imagery: ‘the aeon-tide of earth’, ‘moves me on its gradual 
mammoth-shoulder’.229 There is a Bergson-like reference to ‘the sap that moves within 
me’; and also a more Biblical sense of creation: 
 
…I see your brilliant crystal eyes 
pierced in the clay, I know you. 
You are Man. 230 
 
The poem ends: ‘Uncouth beasts, roots of earth / we stare with love into each other’s 
eyes’.231 In ‘The Flood’ the world the poet deplores is washed away by its own logic, 
without discrimination; but creation re-asserts itself – both in terms of an innate life 
force, and also with a sense of Divine intervention. Here is Wright’s struggle of ideas: 
there is no ambiguity if ‘The Flood’ is understood in terms of a synthesis of various 
idealist philosophies, hybridised with an acute sense of realism. 
Holmes turns to Wright’s collection Birds (1962), to press his case that Wright 
had left vitalism behind; he argues that Birds gives ‘an overall impression of biology as 
ecology’, and ‘depicts a natural world governed by the same needs and preoccupations as 
those described by Darwin’.232 There is no argument about the predominance of natural 
realism in these poems. ‘Silver Terns’ (1960-1), describes an explosive incident, with the 
terns feeding on a shoal of fish, and with a bonito feeding in turn on both birds and 
fish.233 This is a selection of lines, starting with the beginning of the third stanza, and 
ending with the final quatrain:  
 
The sea was pocked with sudden silver fountains 
where the birds dived, so swift and clever 
                                                 
229 CPJW, 43. 
230 CPJW, 43, 44. 
231 CPJW, 44. 
232 CPJW, 161-81; Holmes(2012), 206. 
233 CPJW, 71-2; Walker(1981), 78. 
Judith Wright 169 
 
[…] 
 
That shoal the big bonito harried, 
and they took fish and diving bird together 
 
[…] 
 
All morning it went on, that slaughter 
with white birds diving, obstinate with hunger 
 
[…] 
 
The morning was as gentle as a pearl, 
the sea was pocked with sudden silver fountains; 
you would not guess the blood unless you saw it, 
that the waves washed from feather and from scale. 234 
 
It is tempting to find an allegory in ‘Silver Terns’. Its overt natural realism could 
symbolise the historical tragedy of the higher orders of colonialism benefiting from the 
struggle for existence of the lower orders. Also, the chance knowledge of a massacre and 
the transition from calmness back to calmness, for me, resonates with senses of ‘Nigger’s 
Leap’. Walker says the Birds poems serve ‘as a summation of Wright’s true attitude 
towards nature’, this is ‘honest, clear-eyed and chilling’.235 She continues, in the Birds 
sequence there is an ‘overall impression’, ‘not only of the determinism and impersonality 
of nature, but also of the active cruelty and violence of the natural world’.236 Walker 
refers to the ‘blood-thirsty fury’ of ‘Silver Terns’; but Wright’s language in this poem is 
calm and measured. The birds are ‘swift and clever’, though ‘obstinate with hunger’; and 
the scene soon fades: ‘you would not guess the blood, unless you saw it, / that the waves 
washed from feather and from scale’.237 In what amounts to a feeding frenzy on the 
poetry, Walker says that in ‘Birds there is a sense of the malevolence of nature’.238 In 
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Walker’s reading of ‘Nigger’s Leap’ and ‘Bora Ring’, however, Wright was supposed to 
be ‘ambivalent’, now she is suddenly ‘clear eyed’. In order to account for the difference, 
Walker posits a change in Wright, and entitles the chapter from which the quotes 
immediately above are drawn, ‘Changing Attitudes to Love and Process’.239 Walker 
claims that Wright had an ‘increasingly realistic view of the impersonality and cruelty of 
nature’.240 This is contradicted by Wright’s aforementioned letter to Walker, where she 
referred to her philosophy as a search for unity of nature.241 An alternative reading of 
‘Silver Terns’ could suggest that Wright is well aware of the difficulty of a unified 
philosophy of life, in fact she confronts the reader with it. If animals behave like this, as 
we can think, out of necessity, and humans are manifestly just as violent, what then is the 
relationship to necessity? Wright simply throws the question open. 
Generally, Holmes’s thesis with respect to Birds, holds, though there are two 
exceptions which further illustrate that Wright tended to think in terms of an intellectual 
synthesis, rather than an individual theory of life. This is the first stanza of ‘Pelicans’ 
(1960).  
 
Funnel-web spider, snake and octopus, 
Pitcher-plant and vampire bat and shark –  
These are cold water on an easy faith. 
Look at them, but don’t linger. 
If we stare too long, something looks back at us; 
something gazes through from underneath; 
something crooks a very dreadful finger 
down there in an unforgotten dark. 242 
 
Holmes says ‘Wright’s menacing “something” is less a revelation of malevolence within 
nature than a projection of this malevolence onto nature by the human mind’; I believe it 
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is correct to say that the poet is self-aware in this regard, at the same time, however, there 
is something quite un-Darwin-like about these lines.243 The poet is unsettled by her 
engagement with nature; there is no sense of the impersonal. The dominant image in the 
second part of the stanza is psychological; the poet is again encountering the primitive 
subconscious, as in ‘Conch-Shell’; this time it’s not torpor but danger she senses.  
There is a similar sense of physical and psychological merging in the poem 
‘Wounded Night-Bird’ (1960).244 In her shock at finding the creature, the poet reminds 
herself ‘the devil is no bird’. Lifting the helpless animal, she seems to feel its life force: 
 
From nerve to nerve I felt the circuit blaze. 
Along my veins his anguish beat; his eyes 
flared terror into mine and cancelled time 
and the black whirlpool closed over my head 
and clogged my throat with the cry that knows no aid. 
Far down beneath the reach of succouring light 
we fought, we suffered, we were sunk in night. 245 
 
The electrical metaphor in the first quoted line is reminiscent of ‘the force that leapt 
between your poles’ from ‘Conch-Shell’.246 There seems to be physical union, then, as 
time is cancelled, the poet finds psychological union with the evolutionary past. This 
again is a typical Wright hybrid of theories of life, vying with a more materialist, or 
simply realist, outlook.  
Holmes makes a sound point for Wright’s Darwinism when he notes the final 
poem in the Birds sequence, ‘Extinct Birds’ (1960); thinking of Darwin’s emphasis on 
extinction, and quoting A. D. Hope, he writes that ‘this poem retrospectively casts “its 
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prophetic light over all the rest”’.247 Introducing the final passage in his essay, Holmes 
says ‘Wright returns to the issue of manmade extinction in her famous poem “Lament for 
Passenger Pigeons”.248 First published in 1972, ‘Passenger Pigeons’ is collected in Alive 
(1973).249 Wright’s prominent epigraph seems to quote Wittgenstein ironically: ‘Don’t 
ask for the meaning, ask for the use’; as Holmes notes, this is a direct challenge to the 
instrumentalist worldview.250 Holmes draws attention to Wright’s generalisation of the 
issue of conservation: ‘The theme of Wright’s poem is not the bird itself, but humanity’s 
ever-increasing encroachment on and destruction of nature’; he points out that Wright is 
reminding us that we face a choice – implicitly recalling his earlier discussion that 
vitalism can provide no grounds for choice. ‘Lament for Passenger Pigeons’, Holmes 
writes, ‘is at once the lament it claims to be and a call for action. In both regards, it is 
grounded in a Darwinian understanding of ecology incompatible with a Bergsonian 
theory of evolution in which the élan vital works out its destiny through humanity’.251 
Holmes is surely correct, though I would add that Wright’s epigraphic challenge to 
instrumentalism, with its attendant assertion of meaning, combined with a Darwinian 
understanding, is a good example of her creative hybrid. 
A surprising conclusion to this chapter is that Wright was a deeply engaged poet 
of science, and an accomplished creative misreader. She manipulated complex ideas from 
Jung, Taoism, Bergson, Darwin, relativity, quantum mechanics, and McKinney with 
great skill, and used them as the creative foil to the realism which can be associated with 
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her moral anger and activism. Wright’s search with McKinney for a philosophical 
synthesis was driven by their mutual need to explain a world torn apart by war and 
destruction; her activism was a response to manifest injustice and value-free economic 
development. To aid her struggles, poetic and political, science could be pressed to the 
service she required of it. In ‘The Flood’, science is ‘the forgotten logic of nature’; in 
‘Eve to Her Daughters’, science is almost synonymous with the partial knowledge, the 
half-understanding which she teasingly ascribes to Adam; and in ‘Night After Bushfire’, 
‘The Two Fires’ (referring to Hiroshima and Nagasaki), and ‘Patterns’, science is the 
agent of violent destruction.252 Science is exploited, sometimes mercilessly, but it is 
never denied. For all the misreading and psychologisation, and also her deprecation of 
materialistic values which she associated with science, there is no trace whatsoever in 
Wright’s poetry or her wider writing of the developing tendency to deny scientific 
knowledge. Strangely, possibly in part because the science in Wright’s poetry is 
sometimes all too literal, as in her depiction of nuclear devastation, it seems to remain 
intact. In Wright’s poetry, science is never alien, and poetry and science as a description 
hardly seems interdisciplinary, so pure and elegant is science’s poetic expression. Wright 
develops an immense span of thought from ‘Nigger’s Leap’ to ‘Silver Terns’; her 
systemic inclusion of science, though internalised, or consigned to the shadow world, 
retains its abstract structure, and her poetry, like the universe of general relativity in the 
face of arbitrary complexity, remains lawful. 
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IV: EDWIN MORGAN, STAR MAKAR 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Judith Wright’s engagement with science was deep, but there remain many aspects to her 
poetry which lie outside the scope of poetry and science. The same is true for parts of 
Hugh MacDiarmid’s overall corpus, though science is an essential part of the integration 
in his late work. Only with Miroslav Holub, of the four poets considered in the present 
thesis, does the heading of poetry and science cover the majority of the poet’s work. For 
the Scottish poet Edwin Morgan (1920 – 2010), the heading of poetry and science again 
allows only partial coverage of his writing; this is notwithstanding the fact that he 
embraced science and scientific culture and promoted the trope of scientific adventure in 
his science-fiction poetry and techno-shock in his computer poems, and on this basis 
created an internationally recognised artistic persona. To define clearly Morgan’s 
relationship with science – and his use of ostensibly scientific material for poetic ends – it 
is necessary in this chapter to distinguish science from technology. From the perspective 
of scientific materialism, Morgan’s science fiction is unambiguously not science at all; 
the value of the conceits of imagined science, such as dematerialisation beams, time 
travel, telepathy, and so on, lies not in what can be said about the science, but in what can 
be said about the poetry which includes such materials. The science in Morgan’s science 
fiction is plainly mythologised, but the poet’s imagined science, at its most effective, is a 
poetic device like any other, and for Morgan, sometimes a stage where contemporary 
concerns of hope and despair can be enacted. If the science, with exceptions, in Morgan’s 
poems is largely imaginary, then on the other hand the poet’s engagement with 
technology, in its widest sense, is thorough to the point of completeness. At one end of 
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the scale the technology which is normally associated with science, for example, 
computers, cryptography, cameras, and tape recorders, is represented in a wide section of 
Morgan’s work and includes a cryptographic poem which is so technical it almost 
excludes poetry. At the other end of the scale, advanced technical skills of the literary 
type, form, metre, rhyme, and cadence, are the bedrock of Morgan’s entire canon. So 
extensive are Morgan’s technical skills as they push into sound poetry, concrete poetry, 
and poems of word morphology, that there is often no clear distinction between science-
associated technology and traditional literary technical skill; almost any imaginable 
synthesis of these may be realised in this Scottish Makar’s work. Morgan brings 
technology and technical skill together as art in the manner of craft – his poems are 
intricately designed made objects; they are created with the same merged skills of hand, 
eye, and mind that are abundantly demonstrated in concrete physical form in the well-
known scrapbooks which Morgan created over a significant portion of his early life.1 
The chapter follows these ideas in three sub-sections. The first discusses 
Morgan’s science fiction poetry; the following two sections consider his computer poetry. 
The first of these concerns a single poem (or section of a poem, ‘The Whittrick, Dialogue 
VIII’), and the second centres on the three works Morgan called his simulated computer 
poems.2 Before that, it is useful here briefly to introduce Morgan’s work in more general 
terms. In addition to writing poetry, Morgan was a prolific translator of Old English and 
European poetry. Such work included, for example, his highly regarded Beowulf (1952), 
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and his rendering of the Russian poet Mayakovsky in Scots (1972).3 The introduction to 
his 1961 collection of translations, Sovpoems, is close to a poetic manifesto.4 The 
introduction opens: ‘These translations are issued with a desire to redress a balance’.5 
Morgan claims ‘what Blok did with symbolism, what Mayakovsky did with futurism, 
what Neruda did with surrealism, holds a lesson for us which we don’t learn from our 
Yeats, Stevens, Pound or Eliot’.6 That lesson is ‘that literary movements should serve the 
ends of life as well as the ends of art’.7 Morgan cautions against bourgeois detachment; 
he compares Larkin’s ‘Church Going’ with Yevtushenko’s ‘The Partisans’ Graves’, and 
writes: ‘The graves in the churchyard are to [Larkin] only “so many dead”. What does he 
care about who they were, how they died, what they lived or died for?’.8 In a passage 
relevant to reading his science fiction, Morgan writes that in the West ‘the arts have 
become a sort of fascinating mental fantasy’, where the aim is to convince ‘a sceptical 
world that the materials used are more interesting than the mind that shapes them or the 
end it shapes them to’.9 It can be argued, on this basis, that science fiction for Morgan 
was a form of engagement with life, not withdrawal from it.  
Chris Jones includes a chapter on Edwin Morgan’s Beowulf in his book Strange 
Likeness in which he considers the lingering importance of Old English to modern 
writing.10 Referring to translation theory, Jones outlines ‘two more-or-less opposing 
                                                 
3 Edwin Morgan, Beowulf, (Manchester: Carcanet, 2000); Edwin Morgan, Collected Translations, 
(Manchester: Carcanet, 1996), 105-155; Morgan(1996). 
4 Morgan(1996), 27-31. 
5 Morgan(1996), 27. 
6 Morgan(1996), 27. 
7 Morgan(1996), 27. 
8 Morgan(1996), 28-9, 53-4. 
9 Morgan(1996), 31. 
10 Chris Jones, Strange Likenesses, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 123-181; Jones(2006). 
Edwin Morgan 177 
theoretical positions’.11 Characterising these positions in political terms, Jones says one 
position is that ‘the target language of the translation should colonize the foreign text’, 
and the other point of view considers ‘that the foreign text should itself be allowed to 
colonize the host language (letting the subaltern speak)’.12 Morgan took this theory 
seriously in his translations, but playfully engages with putative source-language 
intrusion in his own work, and sometimes casts himself as the subaltern. He sometimes 
coupled this approach with a widespread use of zaum, a word coined by the Russian poet 
Alexi Kruchonykh to mean a ‘“transrational” sound-poetry which involve[s], in effect, 
the creation of an imaginary language’.13 
Morgan’s playful poem ‘Interview’ opens: 
 
– When did you start writing sound-poetry? 
 
– Vindaberry am hooksma tintöl ensa ar’er. 14 
 
This and other zaum may contain references to one of the many European languages 
Morgan knew, but to most ears the sound-poet speaks in pure sound. The fuzzy sound of 
‘The Mummy’, by contrast, is a sound joke, and can be translated. In the poem, the 
swaddled Rameses II is being interviewed in Paris, and is able to make himself 
understood:15 
 
– M’ n’m ‘z ‘zym’mndias, kng’v kngz! 
 
– Yes yes. Well, Shelley is dead now. 
   He was not embalmed. He will not write 
   about Your Majesty again. 
 
                                                 
11 Jones(2006), 128. 
12 Jones(2006), 128-9.  
13 Quoting from the introduction to Wi the Hail Voice; Morgan(1996), 110. 
14 CPEM, 411-12, 411. 
15 CPEM, 397-99, 398. 
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In the anti-imperialist fable ‘The First Men on Mercury’ (1973) the Mercurians speak in 
almost pure  zaum, with only a tantalising handful of translatable words.16 ‘The First Men 
on Mercury’ uses the science-fiction conceit of telepathy to express a range of human 
concerns from a blunt response to imperial intent, sending the Earthlings home speaking 
Mercurian, to the more positive suggestion of the ability of cultures to learn from each 
other.17 
Translation in some of Morgan’s work is abstracted to codification schemes. ‘The 
Computer’s First Code Poem’ (1973) is a cryptographic work demonstrating Morgan’s 
analytical skills; the pure rationality of the encryption in this poem is a consideration 
when reading the more ‘concrete’ word-morphology computer poems.18 The word 
matrices which Morgan called ‘emergent’ poems are a transparent codification, without 
missing keys. These poems are based on a found or a chosen quotation which is 
completed in the final line. The preceding lines select letters from the found quote, to 
make remarks which modify and qualify it. For example in the emergent poem ‘Dialeck 
Piece’ (1967), Morgan combines codification with sound to effect two bathetic 
reductions.19 The chosen closing quote is the line from Burns’s ‘To a Mouse’: ‘a daimen 
icker in a thrave’ (roughly, a rare ear of corn in a bale); a famous passage in Burns’s 
poem is: ‘I’m truly sorry man’s dominion / Has broken nature’s social union’.20 In the 
emerging poem Morgan reduces the ploughboy’s fine sentiment to ‘I am Mick the Dick’; 
this is further reduced as one realises that the ‘Dialeck’ of the title contains the necessary 
                                                 
16 CPEM, 267-8. 
17 CPEM, 267-8. 
18 CPEM, 277. 
19 CPEM, 134. 
20 The Complete Poems and Songs of Robert Burns, (New Lanark: Geddes & Grosset, 2009), 83-4. 
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letters – and the sound – to summon up an image of robotic extermination.21 Morgan is 
imagining a part of Burns’s nagging conscience which never made it into verse, and also 
the mouse’s, very reasonable, point of view: the felt truth in this poem arises, as with 
‘The First Men on Mercury’, from its correspondence with our sense of natural justice, 
our innate sympathies.  
The emergent poem ‘Message Clear’ (1968), whose foundation line is ‘I am the 
resurrection and the life’, gained a claim to scientific truth which Morgan was not in the 
least expecting.22 The editor of Scientific American requested permission to publish this 
poem because:  
 
One of our readers has written to us to comment on the fact that the poem bears 
an uncanny resemblance to a technique whereby biochemists have determined 
the sequence of amino acids in a protein and of nucleotides in a nucleic acid. 23 
 
This unexpected reading is an accidental effect of translation, but when one casts as wide 
a net as Morgan, strange likenesses (to borrow Jones’s phrase) become likely to appear. 
Morgan drew into his own work European influence encountered while 
translating: surrealism is widely apparent, for example in this passage from ‘Rider’ 
(1973):  
 
Lucretius was found lying under the flary walls / of a universe in the  
crab nebula / crying 
the dancers brought him water / where he lay he rose, froze / in a  
mandala like a flame / blessing 
the darkness of all disbelievers 24 
 
                                                 
21 CPEM, 134. 
22 CPEM, 159, first published in TLS. 
23 MS Morgan L/5, letter of 18/01/1966 from Dennis Flanagan to the editor of the TLS (subsequently 
forwarded to Morgan). 
24 CPEM , 278-81, 279. 
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There is a distinct sense of scepticism here regarding know-it-all materialism, a sense 
which is not usually associated with Morgan, although a distance from materialism is also 
apparent in the developing use of science in his early work.  
The first poem (aside from a short prologue) in Morgan’s Collected Poems is 
‘Dies Irae’ from 1952.25 This poem of shipwreck and dreams within dreams establishes 
the poet’s visionary potential, and perhaps, his finding of a poetic identity with respect to 
MacDiarmid. Lines often seem to walk straight into ‘On a Raised Beach’, as when the 
poet takes ‘bloody steps along those rocks / That did not wince to break my flesh anew’; 
but the more dreamlike quality of ‘Dies Irae’ effects a separation from MacDiarmid.26 
Further establishing the poet’s vision, the climax of the poem is an encounter with God: 
‘I was taken into the blaze and the recession, / My flesh forgot to burn in mortal 
transgression’.27 This passage is reminiscent of the meeting with the Star Maker, the 
Creator, in Olaf Stapledon’s 1937 novel Star Maker, a book which Morgan had read 
before 1940.28 ‘Cape of Good Hope’ (1955), another poem underpinned by a religious 
faith, contains Morgan’s first significant reference to science in Collected Poems.29 A 
passage which opens ‘Newton lost the key of peace’, contains the following, as if spoken 
by Newton: 
 
Hermetic apocalypse 
And translucent paradox: 
But this crystal fellowship 
That held my wine of science 
Shattered when I drained the wine. 30 
                                                 
25 CPEM, 21-4. 
26 CPEM, 21. 
27 CPEM, 23. 
28 Olaf Stapledon, Star Maker, (London: Penguin, 1988), 223-231; Stapledon(1937); Morgan read, see 
Hamish Whyte, (ed.), Nothing Not Giving Messages, (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1990), 270; Whyte(1990). 
29 CPEM, 61-75. 
30 CPEM, 67, 68. 
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Materialism destroys mystery and disturbs the poet; later in the poem the imagined voice 
of Mayakovsky refers to ‘science with its secret face / Unmoralled and terrible’.31 The 
ending of the poem tries to muster hope, and lashes out against war: 
 
Moonbent rocket, rocket warhead, 
Houses shudder but the heavens are revealed 
    And faith will anneal you 
 
Shockwave and flashburn, forcewave and flashforce, 
The future has flashed, O destroyers, O martyrs 
    If you will have charity 32 
 
This charity ‘is the love that materiality / must learn’, and also ‘the materiality / That love 
must seize to be saved from despair’; a sort of dialectic compromise is made.33  
The next work in Collected Poems is The Whittrick: a Poem in Eight Dialogues, 
from 1961, though not published until 1975.34 The final dialogue, Morgan’s first full 
scale engagement with technology and artificial intelligence, is discussed later; the first 
dialogue is between MacDiarmid and James Joyce and contains, in the manner of the 
whittrick (Scots for a ferret, hardly ever seen), a fleeting reference to science. The 
passage is in Scots, and MacDiarmid is speaking: 
 
The warld, for aa that it’s gruppen wi sair decreets 
O physics, stound and steid, will preeve to you and me 
Yon auld camsteerie ghasitlie place Lucretie thocht 
He had exitit fae the nature o things. 35 
 
Morgan often adopted characters or voices in this way, and though the thoughts 
expressed always appear to be Morgan’s, the character provides a tilting nuance. In the 
passage just quoted, Morgan seems to be using MacDiarmid’s strongly stated anxiety to 
                                                 
31 CPEM, 71. 
32 CPEM, 75. 
33 CPEM, 75. 
34 CPEM, 79-116. 
35 CPEM, 79. 
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assert the view that the state of the world and its science shows Lucretius was wrong 
about materialism. The passage is, however, is finely poised and it is difficult to offer a 
secure interpretation; it has the elusive quality of the whittrick. However, the sense of a 
tempered gloom regarding science seems to be present, and here and elsewhere Morgan’s 
poetry occasionally engenders a feeling of conditional materialism which contrasts with 
his artistic persona. Morgan never had quite the uncritical attitude to science he publically 
liked to pretend he had. 
A hallmark of Morgan’s canon is sequences of poems, sometimes in tight series, 
sometimes more loosely grouped. The Instamatic Poems (1972 and after) are based on 
putative images taken from the then-new rapid-fire photography introduced by the 
Instamatic camera.36 The five poems of ‘The Moons of Jupiter’ narrate with detachment 
callous and exploitative extra-terrestrial mining operations; their fatalism is quite 
chilling.37 From the Video Box is a sequence of twenty-seven unusual poems based on 
the idea of a broadcast right of reply to television programmes.38 These are anonymous 
character poems which draw a faint and uneasy line between assumed and authorial 
voices, especially in moments of violence or rage.39 Morgan places one of the voices in 
‘that disgruntled and half-idle mood I’m sure you know’.40 Many of the poems have this 
sense of bad temper which interacts with the anonymous speaker’s perception.41 
Sensibilities are modified further by the intrusion of flaky technology, as in ‘I watched 
that scratch video that scratch video / last night we watched that last night I was’ – the 
                                                 
36 CPEM, 217-229, 383. 
37 CPEM, 390-4. 
38 CPEM, 479-500. 
39 CPEM: e.g. poem 8, 485-6, poem 24, 497. 
40 CPEM , 484. 
41 CPEM: e.g. poem 5, 483-4, poem 6, 484, poem 16, 490-1, poem 22, 495-6. 
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seeming disruption of the poetic voice by the technology contrasts with the complex but 
measured metrical lines in which the thought is rendered.42 The sequence Sonnets from 
Scotland (1984) describes a series of observations made by alien time travellers; the 
cheeriness of lines such as ‘Diving in the warm seas around Bearsden’ from 
‘Carboniferous’ or the witty temporal ambiguity of an ancient coin with the words 
‘Respublica Scotorum’, is casually juxtaposed with much darker poems such as ‘After 
Fallout’ and ‘Computer Error: Neutron Strike’.43 Douglas Dunn finds the sentiment in 
‘After Fallout’, if not ironic, ‘close to damnable’.44 ‘Morgan is content’, Dunn argues, 
‘with a nuked globe and an aftermath in which the survivors contrive “the freer ages”’; 
Dunn says ‘It is here that the ethics of science fiction can be called into question’.45 The 
apparent glibness of some of the Sonnets from Scotland is shocking; I believe there is a 
very real sense of near-fatalistic despair in some of Morgan’s work, disguised but also in 
some ways emphasised by juxtaposed cheeriness. There are a good number of informally 
grouped love poems in Collected, and it’s notable that in general the use of inventive 
techniques in these is radically scaled back.46 The love poems, however, are especially 
poignant and direct examples of Morgan’s universal theme of hope, or more abstractly, 
the possibility of hope, as against the very real possibility of despair. Morgan’s personal 
vulnerability due to his homosexuality, illegal in Scotland until 1980, cannot be ignored 
when reading his poetry. For example, the sense of fear in ‘The Suspect’, where a police 
officer says to the poet, ‘do you think / we don’t know what you are’, is palpable.47 
                                                 
42 CPEM, poem 6, 484. 
43 CPEM, 436-57, 437, 455, italics original, 452-3, 453. 
44 Douglas Dunn, ‘Morgan’s Sonnets’, in Robert Crawford and Hamish Whyte, (eds.), About Edwin 
Morgan, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,1990), 75-89, 87; Dunn(1990); Crawford&Whyte(1990). 
45 Crawford&Whyte (1990), 88. 
46 Exceptions include ‘Without it’ and ‘London’: CPEM, 187-8, 249-52. 
47 CPEM, 170. 
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John Holmes has written penetratingly in his book Darwin’s Bards about 
Morgan’s adventure into the far past in ‘The Archaeopteryx’s Song’ (1977), a poem 
which illustrates how an imaginary and impossible situation can feel uncomfortably 
true.48 As Holmes says, ‘Archaeopteryx is the most famous “missing link” in 
evolutionary history’, ‘A dinosaur with wings and feathers, or a bird with teeth, hands 
and a tail bone, it was first discovered in Bavaria in 1861, only two years after The Origin 
of Species was published’.49 Speaking in the first person, an Archaeopteryx fossil comes 
to life, emerging from the rock, to soar above the dinosaurs, those ‘dumb tons’, with their 
‘Damnable plates and plaques’.50 The Archaeopteryx foretells a great future for its 
lineage, as ‘The lords of creation’, who ‘are in my mate’s next egg’s next egg’s next 
egg’.51 As the proto-bird’s mental vision develops it becomes increasingly contemptuous 
of its evolutionary past: ‘do you imagine / I am ever going to crawl again?’.52 As Holmes 
points out, this is a science fiction poem; the closing two lines are: ‘I will teach my sons 
and daughters to live / on mist and fire and fly to the stars’.53 Holmes says ‘By putting 
these thoughts into the head of a non-human missing link, Morgan holds up a mirror to 
our myths of our own evolution’, ‘we see a distorted, strange, half-comic image of 
ourselves’; ‘Equally though’, Holmes continues, ‘the poem reminds us’ intelligent life 
‘might have been birds after all’.54 While there is an echo in the poem of the avian worlds 
in Star Maker, Stapledon’s writing is not ironic; Morgan, however, parodies the 
                                                 
48 Holmes(2009); CPEM, 403. 
49 Holmes(2009), 32. 
50 CPEM, 403. 
51 CPEM, 403. 
52 CPEM, 403. 
53 Holmes(2009), 32; CPEM, 403. 
54 Holmes(2009), 32, 33, 33. 
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arrogance of a mere accident of natural selection (us).55 There is an increasing sense of 
discomfort as the poem develops, and the apparent note of hope at the end is 
overwhelmed by the bad-tempered and arrogant form of life which emerges from the 
rock, as if some things never change. 
Morgan described his long poem The New Divan (published 1977), which is set 
nominally in the Middle East during the Second World War, as ‘a hundred short poems 
very loosely linked together’, and in a separate interview noted, ‘It must be difficult to 
interpret because it’s partly imaginary, with invented characters, and partly has real 
characters, including myself’.56 What applies to characters in The New Divan, also 
applies to place and time, the real and the fictional are nearly indistinguishable as they 
drift past and through each other. The New Divan is composed of rapidly changing 
sequences of images: Morgan manipulates imagery in The New Divan in an analogous 
manner to the way words shift and change in, say, ‘Unscrambling the Waves at 
Goonhilly’.57 Morgan’s shifting imagery in The New Divan is reminiscent of the moving 
four-dimensional images of Wright’s ‘The Moving Image’, but unlike Wright, Morgan is 
not seeking historical realism, mainly he is working through personal themes. Rodney 
Edgecombe comments that ‘Rather like the “Windows” computer program, The New 
Divan opens several files at once, and keeps them open while it shifts them round the 
screen’; Edgecombe’s metaphor is helpful but doesn’t catch the morphology of the 
images.58 David Kinloch’s essay ‘The Case of the Missing War: Edwin Morgan’s “The 
                                                 
55 Stapledon(1937), 114-18. 
56 CPEM, 293-330; Marshall Walker, ‘Let’s go’, in Whyte(1990), 54-85, 56; Christopher Whyte, ‘The 
Power of Things Not Declared’, in Whyte(1990), 144-87, 147-8. 
57 CPEM, 191. 
58 Rodney Edgecombe, Aspects of Form and Genre in the Poetry of Edwin Morgan,  
(London: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2003), 48; Edgecombe(2003). 
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New Divan”’ pushes further.59 Kinloch discusses the French writer Gilles Deleuze, 
whose work he characterises as a ‘metaphysics in which the concept of multiplicity 
replaces that of substance’; building on this, Kinloch describes the perhaps pivotal poem 
50 as ‘a Tarkovskian image of fragility, an atmosphere rather than a meaning’.60 Kinloch 
also identifies the reference to ‘passwords’ in poem 4 as a hint that Morgan is writing in 
code.61 There are a number of threads of science in The New Divan, often most 
effectively read as imagery. One of the most striking is in poem 30, which seems to 
centre around a recurring character who could be called the partisan.62 The partisan is 
aware of the fragility of his cause, that ‘his gifts were not / of stone’, but his language is 
universal and with it ‘he picks up the three / worlds and the seven seas’; he is also 
‘WANTED’, like a wild-west outlaw. This is the final passage in the poem: 
 
[…] In thought space-docks, 
in words the thoughts, dark softwear not spun over 
by hesitant light-pens, rise. Ships like peacocks 
spread vanes near Mars, wear out, are souvenirs. 
Their very scrap’s too active yet by half. 
I put it in lead – like this – immediately. 63 
 
Morgan’s materials for this imagery are exotic, but the pictures invoked are true to life. 
The partisan’s soaring ambition, which ‘In thought space docks […] rise’, is contrasted, 
using the conflationary spelling of ‘softwear’, to his disposability in war, while more 
powerful supervisory forces hesitate. Struggles repeat throughout the universe, but reduce 
to a souvenir, a Che Guevara tee-shirt – though Morgan’s partisan’s ideas remain too 
powerful to handle. The poet’s position is poised between respect for the partisan and 
                                                 
59 David Kinloch, ‘The Case of the Missing War’, in Scottish Literary Review, Vol.4, No. 2, 
Autumn/Winter 2012, 85-103; Kinloch(2012). 
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non-involvement, between emotional engagement and practical realism, coloured by 
fatalism. If the events were real, as a serving soldier, Morgan would have been flirting 
with treason. 
The establishment at Goonhilly on the Lizard Peninsula in Cornwall, near the sea, 
is a communication base station famous for its role in the first live trans-Atlantic 
television broadcast via the satellite Telstar in 1962. Morgan’s poem ‘Unscrambling the 
Waves at Goonhilly’ (1962/3), is a column of thirty six seven-letter words which 
scramble fish and sea-mammal names, and finally unscramble them to make the word 
‘telstar’.64 The effect is that the fish names are scrambled by sea-waves, as the words roll 
into one another: ‘narphin / hadwhal / nardock / teldock / hadstar’.65 In a similar way, 
though on a far more elaborate scale, the images in The New Divan seem to melt into one 
another. The passage from poem 30 picked out above has ‘thought space-docks’, rolling 
into ‘dark softwear’, ‘light-pens’, spaceships, and radioactivity.66 Like separating 
amoebae, one image gives birth to another in quick succession. As with ‘Goonhilly’, 
which ends with six real names, seemingly born from the waves, poem 30 ends on a 
coherent thought born from the sequence of images.67 The initial obscurity of The New 
Divan arises from verbal economy with which the images are drawn, and the speed with 
which, as in ‘Goonhilly’ one becomes the next. This rational solidity is the joie de vivre 
and delight of Morgan: poems as different as ‘Goonhilly’ and The New Divan share a 
floor plan. The combination of limitless variety and structural unity is a feature of the 
Mandelbrot set. Roger Penrose says: ‘The Mandelbrot set is certainly no invention of any 
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human mind. The set is just objectively there in the mathematics itself. If it has meaning 
to assign an actual existence to the Mandelbrot set, then that existence is not within our 
minds, for no one can fully comprehend the set’s endless variety and unlimited 
complication’.68 The set seems to represent a natural unity of objective reality and 
imagination, nature’s hallucinations even: it is as if Morgan’s Mandelbrot mind derives 
the limitless from the concrete, unbounded fantasies from a deep structural realism. 
 
 
Poetry and Science Fiction 
 
The most striking thing about Morgan’s science fiction poems is that, in terms of 
thematic content, they are almost unremittingly bleak. From nuclear war to the end of the 
universe, there is precious little hope expressed, and when hope appears it can frequently 
be read as forlorn. Even an apparently obvious exception, ‘The First Men on Mercury’, 
loses its shine of optimism when it is remembered that its thwarted imperialists are likely 
to return in greater force.69 I would like to take seriously the fairly clear pattern of 
emotional despair in the science fiction poems, and also Morgan’s injunction from the 
introduction to Sovpoems, that we should not read poems as if ‘the materials used are 
more interesting than the mind that shapes them or the end it shapes them to’; to do so it 
will be necessary to consider Morgan’s comments on his own work.70 First though, it’s 
worth an initial run through of a range of Morgan’s science fiction, to make the central 
argument of this section. Two of Morgan’s most famous science-fiction poems, 
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‘Memories of Earth’ and ‘In Sobieski’s Shield’, discussed individually towards the end of 
the section, represent alternate poles of authorial optimism.71 
In ‘Last Message’ (1973) the survivors of a nuclear war are sealing themselves in 
a pyramid, ‘to lie a thousand / thousand thousand years’, while ‘on the plains’, ‘the Forms 
clash in blue / our enemies’.72 The following poem ‘Frontier Story’ (1973) opens 
‘Meanwhile, back at the ranch factory’; the setting of this piece is dystopic, and it seems 
great factories are turning out replicas of a former human society, though these revert ‘to 
dust at the touch / of air’.73 ‘Spacepoem 3: Off Course’ (1973) is built with short phrases 
separated with a spaced caesura: the montages of images suggest a ship in chaos and a 
lifeline cut, recalling a similar image in Stanley Kubrick’s 1968 film, 2001 A Space 
Odyssey.74 In ‘Space Sonnet’ (1977) a prisoner’s words are rendered with missing letters, 
possibly as a result of torture or ‘what they call their penal therapy’ (where the italicised 
letters are missing in the original).75 In ‘Instamatic the Moon February 1973’, a Soviet 
lunar mission discovers a monolith as if from 2001 A Space Odyssey; on the side of the 
monolith is an inscription which recalls an early computer command line and might 
decode to suggest the theme of the film: the luring of a human specimen to the obelisk’s 
universe.76 Perhaps the irony in the poem is that the Soviet mission was unmanned. ‘The 
Worlds’ (1979) struggles to find hope as ‘Men / bring life and death both’; the ‘Particle 
Poems’ (1979) seem mostly benign, but end with shocking violence: ‘Go / bid the 
soldiers shoot’; in ‘Era’ (1979), ‘A silicon-based life replaced us’; and ‘The Mouth’ 
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(1979) is a poem with an affinity to Stapledon’s Star Maker which portrays the end of the 
universe as a stasis in the form of an computer loop, which collapses into the unknown.77  
‘A Home in Space’ (1979) could be read as a poem of freedom, as a ‘band of 
tranquil defiers’ agree to cut communication with Earth; but it’s a strange freedom – the 
defiers seem to be part of the machine as ‘Eyes, hands, food-tubes, screens, lenses, keys 
were one’.78 Notwithstanding positive senses of freedom in the poem, irony is easier to 
find than hope. The mining operations on ‘The Moons of Jupiter’ (1979) scarcely offer 
hope; as McGonigal comments, ‘In “Io”, the surface of the planet is a scarred industrial 
landscape that might well be Lanarkshire […] but is also like hell (these are sulphur 
mines)’.79 At the end of the sequence the narrator reflects with resignation: ‘These / 
memories, and love, go with the planetman / in duty, and in hope, from moon to moon’.80 
The sadness of these lines comes from the fact that it is not clear what the narrator could 
be hoping for. Sonnets from Scotland, as noted, has cheerier elements, but these are 
surely counterpoints to the sequence’s three nuclear apocalypses and the human sacrifice 
depicted in ‘The Ring of Brodgar’.81 There are a few counter examples, but these are 
mainly neutral rather than hopeful. ‘Clone Poem’ (1979), for instance, is playful, and 
‘Thoughts of a Module’ (1973) is descriptive of a U. S. moon landing.82 ‘From the 
Domain of Arnheim’ (1968), on the other hand, is a dark poem where time travellers 
observe an early human tribe as ‘They sang naked, and kissed in the smoke’.83 But the 
observers create a disturbance which upsets the tribe, and one of them throws a fire brand 
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79 CPEM, 391-4, McGonigal(2010), 256. 
80 CPEM, 394. 
81 CPEM, 452, 452-3, 453, 438-9. 
82 CPEM, 389-90, 266. 
83 CPEM, 198-9, 198. 
Edwin Morgan 191 
‘where our bodies would have been’84 The narrator comments that this was the manner 
‘they would deal with every imagined power / seen or unseen’.85 The self-centred 
reflection of the departing narrator either chills or is ironic, or both: the last line is: ‘From 
time the souvenirs are deeds’; the reader may conclude that these time travellers toy with 
god-like delusions, and are simply collecting instances of their intrusive meddling.86 
There are several places where exploration of the world and exploration of space are 
linked, as in poem 5 of ‘New Year Sonnets’: ‘Martian badlands are the west for minds/ 
that cannot rest in watching schooners sail / beyond the Golden Gate’; but any sense of 
optimism is negated if the reader infers the influence of Ray Bradbury’s allegorical 
tragedy of the colonisation of America, The Martian Chronicles.87 ‘On the Way to 
Bernard’s Star’ at first sight appears to be an optimistic space poem; it is the final poem 
from the sequence Planet Wave, included in Morgan’s 2007 collection A Book of Lives.88 
This poem charts a hopeful voyage ‘not far off the speed of light’, which ends on the 
sighting of a pleasant-looking world, and the traveller leaving the ship: ‘“Open the 
hatch,”, I said’.89 However, this bright prospect is undermined by the bitter realism of an 
earlier poem in the sequence, ‘Easter Island’, which ends: ‘On the horizon, the first ship 
from Europe: / trinkets, missionaries, trousers, smallpox, guns’.90 It has to be admitted 
though that ‘Islands’, is an optimistic poem which extrapolates, in a Polynesian context, 
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earth-bound discovery to space exploration: ‘Take the voyage out then! Drink the milk of 
space!’.91 
The poem ‘A Visit’ was originally published in 1991 in the collection, Hold 
Hands Amongst the Atoms.92 It was re-published by Morgan in his final collection 
Dreams and Other Nightmares (2010), and selected by Russell Jones for his 2012 
anthology of science-fiction poems, Where Rockets Burn Through.93 The voice in ‘A 
Visit’ seems to be an indigenous speaker suffering from someone else’s exploration: 
 
[…] Whether they have nothing, 
or have become tired of whatever brilliance 
it was they swooped from, or are merely knocking  
by chance on this world’s half-hinged storm door  
[…] 
If you attack us, we shall not be gentle! 94 
 
There is something of the sense of ‘The First Men on Mercury’ in ‘A Visit’ – exploration 
is linked with imperialism and its looming destructive impulse. Poems such as ‘Space 
Sonnet’ and ‘The Moons of Jupiter’ also demonstrate that imperialism is oppressive for 
many of the perpetrators.95 In addition to holding anti-imperialist views, Morgan was 
throughout his life defiantly anti-war. There are many indications of this, including 
references to Vietnam, and the poem ‘The War on the War on Terror’ from A Book of 
Lives (2007).96 Morgan’s anti-war feelings are even more explicit in his scrapbooks. A 
photo-montage, ‘The Lemmings’, is an anti-war piece, as is an early word-montage poem  
which could be called (from its first line) ‘Despite Gloomy Forecasts’ (probably January 
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1940).97 The scrapbooks record page after page of images of mushroom clouds, and the 
attendant horror in Hiroshima; as McGonigal puts it: ‘Photo-images of atomic weapons 
counter more optimistic images of human endeavour such as the Russian space 
programme’.98 There is a newspaper headline from 1956: ‘U.S. Ability to Inflict 
Devastation Improving’.99 Rational existential gloom is repeatedly voiced in Morgan’s 
science fiction poems; I understand this as a disguised way to work through feelings of 
despair. 
Moving on to consider Morgan’s comments in prose, there are two essays, ‘A 
Glimpse of Petavius’ and ‘The Poet and the Particle’, both from 1963, which cover 
similar ground.100 In these essays, Morgan seeks to establish the legitimacy of science in 
poetry; in the former he writes, ‘What involves man involves reality; what involves many 
men is the great neglected material of our poetry’.101 In a number of comments in the 
interviews collected in Hamish Whyte’s Nothing Not Giving Messages (1990), Morgan 
builds on his conviction that poetry should include science, and explicitly associates 
science with optimism.102 In 1971 he said to David Smith ‘The space age will perhaps 
bring a kind of epic poetry back’.103 Speaking with Robin Hamilton, also in 1971, he 
reflected that his science fiction works take ‘a long view of the human species and its 
adventures’, and that ‘it’s not so much the science or scientific ideas that are important’, 
to far-future situations, but ‘human beings and how they would react’.104 In an interview 
with Marshall Walker in 1975, Morgan is asked if he conceded that technology has its 
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horrors; he responds, ‘I think that many of the things that are horrible or repellent are 
perhaps phases of a long-term process that is not going to be horrible in the end’.105 He 
quickly qualifies: ‘This may be a somewhat Olympian view of things’.106 In response to a 
question about the ‘Yeats-Eliot-Stephens axis’, Morgan distances himself from the 
pessimism of ‘The Waste Land’: ‘I do find a considerable element of repulsion in the 
view of life taken in the poem’, and adds, ‘This is true even more in the view of life I 
detect in Yeats’.107 At the end of the interview he comments: ‘I think it goes without 
saying that we shall go to other environments and adapt to other environments and adapt 
to them physiologically like in Stapledon’s Last and First Men’.108 In Nothing Not Giving 
Messages there are a number of explications of poems, though McGonigal comments, 
‘EM disliked analysing his own poetry, feeling like many other poets an almost 
superstitious respect for its mystery’.109 Discussing Morgan’s poem ‘What is “Paradise 
Lost” really about?’, Hamilton asked if it was ‘a sort of attempt to answer when 
somebody asked you what you believed’.110 Morgan responded, ‘I should just perhaps 
refer them to the poem and let them work it out for themselves!’.111 On the issue of what 
one believes, he elaborated: 
 
[…] when you’re writing poetry or creating any work of art, the whole thing is 
thrown into the melting pot right away and what you think you believe is not 
necessarily what you actually do believe, and you may not even really believe 
as much as you think you believe, or even say in speech or in prose, that you 
actually believe. 112 
 
Morgan was occasionally candid. 
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It’s worth a brief discussion of the science fiction and related background to 
Morgan’s work. Morgan’s interest in the writing of Olaf Stapledon (1886 – 1950), can be 
established from his book collection which is housed in the Mitchell Library in Glasgow. 
He owned most of Stapledon’s novels; and inside his copy of one of the study-
biographies of Stapledon in the Mitchell’s collection there is a thick pile of cuttings of 
reviews and miscellany related to the science-fiction writer.113 As well as the 
Stapledonian undertones already mentioned, some events in ‘In Sobieski’s Shield’ 
perhaps relate subtly to the physiological adaption Morgan notes in the interview with 
Marshall Walker.114 As a result of the dematerialisation described in ‘Sobieski’s Shield’, 
the narrator has ‘only / four fingers’, and his son ‘only one nipple’; this might be 
physiological adaption tugging both backwards and forwards: backwards in the 
regressive sense of loss of fingers, forwards in the sense of increasing divergence 
between male and female typology.115 The collective alien observer in Sonnets from 
Scotland also seems Stapledonian.116 Another likely influence on Morgan is Ray 
Bradbury’s The Martian Chronicles.117 Bradbury’s intricate portrayal of telepathy in this 
work has an affinity with the same conceit in ‘The First Men on Mercury’; and if 
Bradburian telepathy is carried into ‘In Sobieski’s Shield’ it would suggest that all the 
events could be in the narrator’s mind.118  
Jack London was another favourite Morgan author, although unfortunately, his 
poetic portrait of the novelist in ‘Jack London in Heaven’ seems to miss the American 
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writer completely. That said, there is a powerful analogue between the imagined 
experience of Morgan’s soaring visions and London’s. The Star Rover, London’s 1914 
novel, is set on death row in San Quentin prison, where the protagonist, who is subjected 
to torture, narrates:  
In a few minutes of loosed subconscious I have sat in the halls of kings, above 
and below the salt, been a fool and a jester, man-at-arms, clerk and monk […] I 
have lain by the meagre shade of sun-parched sagebrush by dry water-holes 
[…] I have been a sea-cuny and bravo, scholar and recluse. 119 
 
If Star Rover’s visionary scenarios were used as an analogue to Morgan’s imagined 
experiences, then it would darken the poet’s work considerably. Another London novel, 
Before Adam (which Morgan retained among the ‘good book-booty’ on his final nursing-
home shelves), develops its vision of human origins through a series of dreams.120 In an 
interview, Morgan referred to his ‘Openness to experience’, as his ‘Jack London bit’.121 
If London’s influence on Morgan’s poetry is accepted, then the edgy excitement of 
adventure in the science fiction and other work becomes strongly coupled an acute sense 
of impending tragedy. 
One of Morgan’s most well-known science fiction poems is the ambitious 
‘Memories of Earth’ (1973).122 This poem is set in what might be the world of the 
observers of Sonnets from Scotland, or of the alien visitors in ‘From the Domain of 
Arnheim’.123 We follow a mixed-sex group of ‘time-people’ as they observe a series of 
past Earth events, from the horrific to the hopeful; unlike Sonnets from Scotland, the 
reader is aware of the observational team and their society, and drawn into their 
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viewpoint. ‘Memories of Earth’ is cast in blank verse which accommodates the poem’s 
dense information and its modes of observation, movement, and reflection; the verse 
form seems to endow the narrator with a sense of moral truthfulness. The time travellers 
live in an autocratic society governed by ‘the Council’, who authorise the mission to 
retrieve the memories of Earth; the record ‘survives’ on two tapes, the ‘playing’ of which 
is the central structure of the poem.124 A major part of the conceit is that the party must 
undergo a shrinking process ‘near the atomic sub-structure’ to enter Earth, which brings 
them into the domain of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. 125 This principle is central to 
the poem, and the particular way in which it is implemented can be traced to Morgan’s 
copy of Erwin Schrodinger’s Science and Humanism, held in the Mitchell library.126 
In Science and Humanism Bohr and Heisenberg’s interpretation of (their own) 
uncertainty principle is challenged by Schrodinger; key passages in this argument have 
been side-barred by Morgan.127 Following Penrose briefly, the uncertainty relation is 
expressed as follows. 
 
ΔxΔp ≥ ħ 128 
 
Penrose says according to the principle ‘it is not possible to measure (i.e. to magnify to 
the classical level) both the position and the momentum of a particle accurately at the 
same time’, and moreover ‘there is an absolute limit on the product of these 
accuracies’.129 This means that ‘If the position were measured to infinite precision, then 
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the momentum would become completely uncertain’, and vice versa, and all the stages in 
between.130 Such is the physics of the uncertainty principle, but its interpretation, 
especially in terms of the role of human agency, has always been controversial. 
Schrodinger addresses this issue directly in a section of Science and Humanism entitled 
‘The Alleged Break-down of the Barrier between Subject and Object’. Schrodinger, 
writing in English, summarises the principle. 
 
We cannot make any factual statement about an object without ‘getting in touch’ 
with it. This ‘touch’ is a real physical interaction. Even if it consists only in 
‘looking at the object’, the latter must be hit by light rays and reflect them into the 
eye, or into some instrument of measurement. This means that the object is 
interfered with by observing it. 131 
 
Bohr and Heisenberg, Schrodinger states, hold that the principle implies that ‘the object 
has no existence independent of the observing subject’, and that ‘the direct physical, 
causal, influence between [subject and object] is regarded as mutual’.132 Schrodinger 
concludes the section: 
 
What remains doubtful to me is only just this: whether it is adequate to term one of 
the two physically interacting systems ‘the subject’. For the observing mind is not 
a physical system, it cannot interact with any physical system. And it might be 
better to reserve the term ‘subject’ for the observing mind. 133 
 
Schrodinger seems to be seeking an escape route from the mutuality of the uncertainty 
relation, from a descent into outright subjectivity, as implied by Bohr and Heisenberg. He 
allows that a physical system is changed by the interaction, but implies that the mind is 
not. Morgan is not going to let Schrodinger have his refuge – he creatively misreads the 
quoted passages (mostly side barred) to gain the sense of the uncertainty principle used in 
the poem: that the interaction is mutual, that the mind is the subject, and that both 
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observer and observed are changed. This is next to explicit in ‘Memories of Earth’; the 
narrator is reflecting on his experience on Earth: 
 
It seems this is a world of change, where we, 
observing, can scarcely fix the observed 
and are unfixed ourselves. 134 
 
If the Earth which the travellers find is subject to quantum physics, implying also 
the notion of chance or probability, the travellers’ own world, by contrast, could be seen 
as representing classical physics: the clouds the party see on Earth are ‘not fixed / as ours 
are in a chosen set but free / to drift’, and even ‘birds can come and go / unchecked’.135 
At one point near the start of the poem, the narrator chides himself with what sounds like 
a Council slogan: ‘Surprise / comes from old microstructure thinking’, as if in some way 
quantum uncertainty has been banished from the travellers’ own world.136 Before they 
travel the party are sent to ‘anti-brainwashing sessions’, in an attempt – futile as it turns 
out – to stop the travellers being affected by the events they are to witness. The duty of 
the observers is ‘to record whatever we have found to be’ on Earth and ‘meditate on 
everything recorded’, until ‘the plain figure of promised order appears’. But the party is 
unable to make classical observations: on arrival on Earth, the landscape ‘melts / at the 
edges like a photograph in flames’.137 As the travellers are orienting themselves, Morgan 
introduces relativity into the poem; he must have considered relativity when reading 
Science and Humanism, because the relevant passage is side-barred. Schrodinger writes: 
‘two events may happen in such a way that either of them may be regarded as the earlier 
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one’.138 Morgan writes regarding the Earth: ‘its images, its messages, its life must come 
to us like an eternal present’; he continues, referring now to quantum mechanics, ‘by our 
very meagrest interfering / we trigger fragments of the vanished prints’.139 The first 
memory of Earth which appears to the travellers is the vicious execution, in the form of a 
mock coronation on a red-hot throne, of a Hungarian peasant revolutionary, ‘King’ 
Dozsa.140 The party looks at the scene, seeing more and more detail, ‘till suddenly the 
whole scene snaps tight shut’.141 Trying to fix an object too much in one dimension, 
causes it to completely unfix in another. The desperation of the King Dozsa scene is 
alleviated by a series of images which recall various montages in Morgan’s scrapbooks: 
Wordsworth on a mountain, a drive-in movie in the US, the antics of Tom and Jerry.142 
This passage has a fleeting, fragile quality, the images are detailed, but they disintegrate 
quickly. After witnessing a scene from Auschwitz, the narrator, who we now know is 
called Erlkon, comforts his companion Baltaz; he notes ‘She’s changed / I’m 
changing’.143 The subject is the mind. The final memory, before the travellers return, is of 
Polynesian adventurers; it is almost as if by the very strain of Auschwitz the party has 
willed into existence this sustaining memory. Along with Wordsworth, the Polynesians 
represent the poem’s figure of hope.144. On their return, the de-briefing does not go well, 
the report was ‘totally deplored, useless / to contemplate, ruinously incomplete’. The 
Council, they are told, would be ‘training non-susceptibles’ (classical observers) ‘for a 
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further expedition’.145; in the final section of the poem the party appear to have become 
dissidents; this stanza opens: ‘We meet / in secret now, the six of us, from time / to time, 
and study how to change this life’.146 
Colin Nicholson comments on ‘Memories of Earth’ in his essay, ‘Remembering 
the Future: Edwin Morgan’s Science Fiction Poetry’, and covers similar ground in his 
book-length work on Morgan: Edwin Morgan, Inventions of Modernity (2002).147 In his 
essay, Nicholson writes that ‘Memories of Earth’ adapts Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
principle by ‘Deconstructing realism’s assumed equation of epistemology and the 
representation of external facticity for experiencing subjects’.148 Casting the principle in 
epistemological terms suggests Nicholson might be undermining the knowledge structure 
of the poem and suggesting unreliable narration, but he does not do this. Instead 
Nicholson discusses the relationship between the poem’s narrative and its events: 
‘suspension between simultaneity, linear narrativity, and reconstructive recall’, 
‘complicates our time-travellers’ encounters’, and ‘their experience of sensation beyond 
approved discourse alienates them from a prescriptive home environment’.149 This 
suggests, rightly I believe, that Morgan is using types of narrative form to develop a 
questioning attitude in his protagonists. Nicholson illustrates his point with Erlkon’s 
words as he prepares to brief the Council, ‘We made our report in troubled confusion, / 
memories flashing between sentences / to make us falter’.150 Again Nicholson verges on 
questioning the reliability of the poem’s narrative. He may have considered this 
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possibility, and then backed off for lack of evidence, as I have done. Nicholson’s 
conclusion is convincing and catches the romantic sense of the poem; quoting from 
Paradise Lost, he writes: ‘“Memories of Earth” sings of aliens’ “first disobedience, and 
the fruit / Of that forbidden tree, whose mortal taste / Brought pain into their world, and 
all their woe”’, and this ‘transgression’, ‘expands the subject towards political 
freedom’.151 This, in analytical terms, fits well with the poem, but Milton’s words soar 
far above ‘Memories of Earth’. The story of ‘Memories of Earth’ seems simply to replay 
a cold-war narrative of Western-style humanity releasing itself from mechanical and 
oppressive totalitarianism, the sort of plot used repeatedly on Star Trek. But the tyranny 
is too cardboard, and the oppositions too obvious for any genuine feeling of hope to be 
developed. Perhaps Dunn was right, and Morgan’s science fiction may relate 
‘Undeserved or unlearned feeling’, and thus it is difficult for the poem to escape 
sentimentality.152  
Morgan’s witty, and very dark, poem ‘In Sobieski’s Shield’ (1964) describes the 
experience of a human family – mother, father, and son – who have evacuated from their 
home planet to the named constellation in the Milky Way ‘the day before solar 
withdrawal’.153 The travellers’ journey is accomplished by means of a mildly 
dysfunctional Blake’s 7-like dematerialisation transport system, which according to the 
narrator is, ‘the best technique / who said the only technique’.154 The erratic re-
materialisation echoes George Langelaan’s 1957 story The Fly, where an insect 
accidently enters the dematerialisation experiment of a pioneering scientist, resulting in 
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an exchange of heads between man and beast.155 Morgan perhaps alludes to The Fly in 
the lines, ‘I wouldn’t have been / utterly surprised if some of us had turned out / mice or 
worse’, but he resists the grotesque in this poem. ‘In Sobieski’s Shield’ is written as a 
stream of consciousness, devoid of punctuation and almost uncapitalised. Commentators 
have noted that the poem is in medias res, or told from the midpoint of the events 
described, but as this is science fiction one could go further and suggest that the central 
conceit is telepathy. This is perhaps suggested by the early phrase ‘who said the only 
technique’ (my italics), where the narrator seems unable to individuate the speaker.156 
The events of the poem are clearly in the narrator’s mind; this might be the literal as well 
as the figurative situation. ‘In Sobieski’s Shield’ is a fast and exciting read: one is 
propelled through the poem by a springy trochaic metre punctuated by iambic breaths in 
lines of variable length sometimes stretching to seven or eight feet. Despite this overt 
dynamism, however, the narrator’s mind is surprisingly calm as he comes to terms with 
the events which are apparently taking place. 
The poem opens with scientists cast as prophets celebrating their prediction of the 
end of the world: ‘well the prophets were dancing in the end much / good it did them and 
the sun didn’t rise at all’.157 The narrator’s family ‘weren’t amongst the frozen’, having 
been dematerialised ‘in a hurry it’s true’.158 They were sent to a planet in the region of 
Sobieski’s Shield, ‘to the best of my knowledge’.159 On re-materialising, the narrator 
observes the ‘harsh metallic plain / that belches cobalt from its craters’, yet he stoically 
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accepts, ‘it was / all they could do for us’.160 There is also a ‘lake of mercury’, though the 
liquid metal is ‘confused with / what is it blood’.161 In a much commented on passage, 
the narrator recalls his apparent interaction, when dematerialised, with a particularly dark 
episode in human history, the ‘great war was it called France Flanders fields’.162 The 
narrator finds he has acquired a tattoo from a ‘dead arm’ in the trenches, and reflects that 
now ‘we are bound to all that lived’.163 Perhaps the travellers’ atoms have been scattered 
in space; in any case a key motif is their imperfect re-construction.164 His wife has an 
unfamiliar ‘beautiful crown of bright red hair’, which might symbolise her role as the 
new Eve, in this (as the poem allows the reader to believe) group of the last humans.165 
She is also the frailest of the three, and the narrator tries to ‘hide the sobbing / shuddering 
first breaths of her second life’; ever thoughtful, the narrator ponders the words ‘second 
life’: ‘I don’t / know what made me use that phrase’.166 In the darkest moment of the 
poem, towards the end, the narrator perhaps foresees his wife’s death: ‘as I run my hand 
through her / amazing hair streaming on my shoulder I feel / a fist shaken in a shell-hole 
turn in my very marrow’.167  
At the end of the poem, some innate urge seems to propel the narrator onwards 
(the others are not consulted) – ‘let’s take our second / like our first life out from the 
dome’ – they don their space suits and prepare to leave their protective environment: ‘it’s 
hard / to go let’s go’.168 
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‘In Sobieski’s Shield’ appears to depict the survival not just of a family, but of the 
agonies and trials of humanity. Speaking with Marshall Walker, and asked to reflect on 
the darkness in this and other poems, Morgan agreed, and added, ‘I would regard “In 
Sobieski’s Shield” as not being finally dark’.169 Morgan elaborated: ‘It was meant to be a 
poem about shock’ – reaction to dematerialisation – and, with the final ‘Let’s go’, ‘a kind 
of acceptance of the unknown’.170 However, I believe there is sufficient evidence in ‘In 
Sobieski’s Shield’ to support a different reading. Morgan sets up an acute dialectic 
between the narrator’s laconic assessment of his family’s altered circumstances, and the 
narrator’s urgent and somehow innate need to leave their protective dome. The tension 
between change and remaining unchanged is palpable in the closing passage: the narrator 
can still cry and laugh, he is whole, indivisible, though re-born. The poem then ends: 
 
    …the old moon’s in 
the new moon’s arms let’s take our second 
life like our first out from the dome are the suits 
ready the mineral storm is quieter it’s hard 
to go let’s go 171 
 
The last two words of the poem, ‘let’s go’, echo the last spoken words of both acts of 
Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot; however, the actual final line of both acts is the 
stage direction, ‘They do not move’.172 If Morgan’s allusion is taken seriously then an 
alternative narrative is generated, one which, by throwing a blanket of stasis over the 
poem, resonates with the strange sense of equilibrium already present in the narrator’s 
mind.  
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Russell Jones, in the critical section of his 2014 creative writing PhD thesis: 
‘Broken Wor(l)ds: Edwin Morgan’s Science Fiction Poems’, discovers another literary 
allusion in ‘In Sobieski’s Shield’.173 The phrase ‘the old moon’s in / the new moon’s 
arms’ refers to an illusion called planet shine, the appearance of the old and new moon 
together caused by a secondary reflection of the sun’s light from the earth.174 Jones notes 
the relationship to stanza seven of the old Scottish ballad, ‘Sir Patrick Spens’: 
 
‘Late, late yestere’en I saw the new moon   
Wi’ the auld moon in hir arm, 
And I fear, I fear, my dear master, 
That we will come to harm’ 175 
 
Concerned by the omen, Sir Patrick reluctantly agrees to captain a ship carrying Scottish 
noblemen, but there is a storm which leads to the death of all on board. Noting this, Jones 
writes: ‘However Morgan avoids the ballad’s tragic end, instead offering the possibility 
of a new beginning for the narrator and his family’.176 Jones also suggests that poem 45 
of The New Divan is a likely later allusion to ‘In Sobieski’s Shield’, because the former 
poem contains the suggestive lines: ‘Watching the speeded up universe is dreadful / but 
who knows what’s the speed of gods and / prophets, is their only metal / mercury’.177 
This is a later passage from poem 45: 
 
[…] We’ve endured 
the frames per second thing but a  
reality that rolls off in vapours 
is still on the cards 178 
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There is a sense of end and illusion and the possibility that what appears to be real could 
turn to vapour; if Morgan is referring back to ‘In Sobieski’s Shield’, then the distinct 
sense of death in these lines would support my alternative reading of the science fiction 
poem. 
There are other indications that ‘In Sobieski’s Shield’ is a poem about the 
extinction of humanity: at the opening of the poem the most basic inductive law we live 
by is broken – the sun doesn’t rise; and the ‘second life’, (‘that phrase again’), could refer 
to the afterlife.179 It’s not difficult to understand why Morgan would have hesitated to 
destroy the mystery of this poem by offering a full explication. As thoughts combine, 
break up, and re-combine in a calm and almost quiet manner in the narrator’s mind, this 
sense of stillness is counteracted by the almost caricatured compulsion to press forward 
to the concluding ‘let’s go’. Switching on this phrase with a note of Beckettian nihilism is 
incredibly strong; ‘They do not move’ freezes the poem and the last representatives of 
humanity, rendering them unable to embark on a mission which is apparently crucial to 
their survival.180 But the probability of survival of this small group, if it ever existed at 
all, must be low. Perhaps the ‘frames per second thing’ is over, and reality has 
dematerialised; perhaps there are omens of a fatal shipwreck; perhaps the new Eve will 
die; perhaps humanity’s final mission is as futile as waiting for Godot. In the same way 
as some of Holub’s poems, ‘In Sobieski’s Shield’ supports layered and interacting senses. 
The overt sense is an apparent affirmation of continued human life, but this is 
undermined by numerous covert indications that the mission will fail. Setting aside the 
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materials used, and considering ‘the mind that shapes them or the end it shapes them to’, 
‘In Sobieski’s Shield’ can be read as an ironic poem of despair; it is a dark reflection on 
the personal and political risks attendant on Morgan’s life and time.181 The everyday need 
to carry on with hope is transposed to an exotic setting where the probability of a positive 
outcome is very low. The poem is an engagement with life, however harsh the 
possibilities, and not a withdrawal, though ‘In Sobieski’s Shield’ is heavily disguised by 
an exotic setting, its empathetic narrating mind, and a laconic wit. 
 
 
The Whittrick Dialogue VIII – prophecy or parody? 
 
Shifting for the remainder of this chapter from science to technology, specifically to a 
discussion of Morgan’s computer poems, it is worth recalling at the outset Morgan’s 
words in the interview with Robin Hamilton: when you are writing, ‘the whole thing is 
thrown into the melting pot’ and ‘what you think you believe is not necessarily what you 
actually do believe’.182 The point at issue is that while Morgan, in many public remarks, 
accepted and even welcomed the idea of artificial intelligence, the way in which his 
poetry engages with the issue leads me to question his stance. This is partly, I would 
argue as a long-term AI sceptic, because it’s simply not possible to imagine – at any 
plausible level of engineering rigor – what an intelligent machine would actually be. AI 
hyperbole is gathering pace again today, this time backed by powerful commercial 
interests. But there is absolutely no evidence that any non-mechanical machines have 
been developed, even though, now as in the 1960s, there are the usual claims that such 
things are just round the corner. What’s interesting in the context of this chapter is that 
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the argument are exactly the same today as they were in the 1960s, notwithstanding the 
vast increase in quantitative computer power.  
Morgan’s first and perhaps his fullest work on the issue of machine intelligence 
was written as early as 1957 in ‘The Whittrick’, specifically in the final part of this poem: 
‘Dialogue VIII: Grey Walter and Jean Cocteau’.183 W. Grey Walter (1910 – 1977), the 
author of The Living Brain (1953), was a neurophysiologist and pioneering cyberneticist 
who, according to a Times obituary (folded inside Morgan’s copy of the book in the 
Mitchell), ‘became interested in the modelling of behaviour and made such scientific 
“toys” as a mechanical tortoise’.184 The scale of Walter’s claim is set out in the author’s 
preface to the Pelican edition of The Living Brain. 
 
The imitation of living creatures by working models has advanced and 
extended to the point where there are several genera and species of artificial 
animals, displaying many features of the flesh in metal counterparts. 185 
 
To give an indication of Walter’s tone, in a later passage he says: 
 
We now come to an electromechanical creature which behaves so much like an 
animal that it has been known to drive a not usually timid lady upstairs to lock 
herself in the bedroom, an interesting blend of magic and science. 186 
 
As if nothing has changed but the engineering medium, an article in the New 
Scientist of 24 November 2014 claims that a digital creature which ‘has an artificial brain 
precisely modelled on that of a nematode worm’ is about to be created.187 In ‘Dialogue 
VIII’ the whittrick’s elusive, perhaps imagined, presence in the earlier dialogues finally 
enters centre stage as an apparently living machine. The narrative of the poem has Walter 
                                                 
183 CPEM, 77-116; 111-16; MS Morgan B/1/5 is a notebook which contains the complete manuscript of 
‘The Whittrick’; it is dated July – September 1957. 
184 W. Grey Walter, The Living Brain, (London: Penguin/Pelican, 1961); Walter(1953); The Times, 9 May 
1977. 
185 Walter(1953), 15. 
186 Walter(1953), 112. 
187 New Scientist, 24/11/2014. 
Edwin Morgan 210 
proudly showing off this electromechanical creature to the French writer Jean Cocteau, 
while the poem maintains a background note of technical realism supplied by two Scots-
speaking assistants, Roddy and Eck.188 Morgan makes use of the fact that Walter was a 
follower of Pavlov – in order to get the whittrick working Eck explains ‘I hut it wan, and 
it’s aa right’.189 Morgan’s Walter introduces Cocteau to his previous creations with their 
biological names such as Machina speculatrix in a passage which draws directly from 
The Living Brain, and again alludes to Pavlov: one of the machines was ‘a teachable little 
beast, Machina / Docalis. We kicked him and blew whistles; he learned’.190 Cocteau is 
invited to question the whittrick: ‘Whittrick, what is my name?’.191 The response is a 
Morgan joke: ‘Cock Toe’.192 Cocteau asks, ‘Whittrick, the square root of minus one – ’; 
the whittrick responds, ‘Is an imaginary, expressed by a small i’.193 Walter declares, ‘It’ll 
read your thoughts soon’.194 Morgan’s Walter proceeds to wax lyrical about his device, 
and is provocative to the poet: ‘The poem you write is already foreshadowed’.195 Cocteau 
becomes sceptical, lyrical, defensive, in a passage in which he compares the whittrick 
unfavourably to local seagulls, and muses on the nature of life in a delicately ambiguous 
allusion to The Winter’s Tale: ‘The statue moves, Hermione breaths. What is life?’196 
Walter says: ‘You fear what I hope: the created may create’; Cocteau responds with what 
seems like a decisive rejection of machine intelligence: ‘That it will never do with neither 
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will nor wit / The whittrick in the fields has far more wit than it’.197 The ending of the 
poem parodies Walter at his visionary (or unhinged) best. The actual Walter writes 
regarding his creations: ‘As totems they foster reverence for the life that they have so 
laboriously been made to mime in so humble a fashion – and still would foster it even 
should they, creatures of “sorcery” peering into the dim “electrobiological” future in 
search of a deus ex machina, look up at us and declare that God is a physiologist’.198 The 
poem ends on a farcical note: the whittrick is getting out of control, about to speak when 
it has not been spoken to, and disturbing its creator; the creature then says to Morgan’s 
Walter: ‘Now Faustus, what wouldst thou have me to do?’.199 
‘Dialogue VIII’ may be effectively read as a parody on machine intelligence. 
Walter’s claims in The Living Brain are outlandish; Morgan’s text draws from the book, 
but, as in the references to Pavlov, always seems to mock. In the portrayal of Cocteau, 
perhaps the Morganesque heart of the poem, there is a distinct sense of recoil from the 
apparently living machine. The reference to Hermione from The Winter’s Tale could 
suggest the inanimate coming to life, but more powerfully suggests illusion.200 Roddy 
and Eck are constantly aware of the machine’s limitations: ‘It’s getting gey hot, sir, will I 
switch it aff now?’.201 The ‘whittrickmath’, as Morgan calls it in an unpublished 
‘dedication’ associated with the poem in manuscript, surely parodies machine self-
awareness.202 The whittrick knows of the ‘small i’, and that it is imaginary – this surely 
contains the meaning that the whittrick’s intelligence is illusory.203 My argument could, 
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however, be challenged from the poem’s first epigraph which explains that the square 
root of minus one, the imaginary, can be seen as passage between ‘two truths of the real 
domain’ – if this is granted status then it could be argued that the whittrick of ‘Dialogue 
VIII’ is perhaps portraying the passage to real machine intelligence.204 Or perhaps this 
epigraph is as crafty as a whittrick. The second epigraph (not present in manuscript) is a 
short quote from Act IV Scene 1 of A Midsummer Night’s Dream; Oberon says: ‘Silence 
awhile. Robin, take off this head’.205 This implies unmasking, breaking the spell, 
revealing the mundane truth – precisely what Morgan seems to be doing in regard to The 
Living Brain.206 
The foregoing reading of ‘Dialogue VIII’, namely that the poem is a parody of 
artificial intelligence, is controversial in terms of other critical responses, and also when 
Morgan’s own published comments are taken into account. Edgecombe sees the whittrick 
(the machine) as ‘set to change the course of human history’.207 Edgecombe accepts that 
‘the poet seems ultimately to counter Dr Walter’s Promethean claims’, but at the same 
time he states that Morgan grants the whittrick a ‘miraculously independent “mind”’.208 
Edgecombe adds that this is one of the ‘very few poems’ in which ‘the admittedly rare’, 
‘misgivings Morgan entertains about our technical future’ are articulated.209 Nicholson 
seems simply to accept the possiblilty of artificial life; he says ‘the whittrick has 
transmuted [from its incarnation in the previous dialogues] into a genetically engineered 
evolution of machine intelligence’.210 McGonigal discusses Morgan’s comments on ‘The 
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Whittrick’ in a letter to a potential publisher, Erica Marx, in August 1957; Morgan wrote 
to Marx: ‘The Whittrick in general stands for truth or reality’.211 Morgan goes on to say 
with respect to the final dialogue, which McGonigal notes at that point had not been 
written, that ‘The whittrick thus finally becomes a machine that is made to talk and think 
creatively’.212  
A page in the Glasgow University archive suggests, however, that Morgan, as he 
worked on ‘Dialogue VIII’, was unsure where to centre the truth of his poem.213 The 
relative scrawl of Morgan’s writing on this page suggests the composition of the poem 
was in progress. The page is headed ‘Cocteau’, and amidst writing of difficult legibility, 
there is a passage: ‘… le Bête Profheé [prophète?] is dedicated to “that truth which is 
truer than truth, what [Goethe?] called the truth to wh [sic] reality is opposed and wh is 
the gt [sic] conquest of [?] poets”’.214 It’s difficult to know how to read this, and whether 
irony is involved or not; I don’t think it is, however it suggests that Morgan was unclear 
about how to represent Cocteau’s point of view. The published poem’s Cocteau 
decisively rejects the prophetic beast, and in this regard it’s hard not to agree partly with 
Edgecombe’s comment that ‘Dialogue VIII’ is an (uncharacteristic) warning of the 
Promethean arrogance of science. In a 1971 interview with Robin Hamilton two years 
before ‘The Whittrick’ was finally published, Morgan refers to the ‘Promethean dream’ 
specifically in the context of Grey Walter’s work; he says: ‘I don’t myself find this 
frightening or bad’.215 In this interview Morgan appears to be in sympathy with Walter, 
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saying with regard to artificial creatures that ‘They are already perhaps a kind of half-
life’; Morgan doesn’t avoid the problems such things would cause if actually created, but 
concludes he ‘would perhaps like to write about it’, in order to ‘place it in some kind of 
context of art’.216 Morgan may have drifted from the context of Walter’s creations here, 
otherwise his use of the future tense is puzzling – ‘The Whittrick’, including ‘Dialogue 
VIII’ was complete (apart from the second epigraph), according to the University archive, 
by September 1957.217 It’s possible that Morgan added the second epigraph, with its 
sense of returning to normality after a vivid dream, when he realised that the poem as 
actually written had drifted from the sense of the first epigraph – realisation of the 
seemingly impossible – as it had drifted from the probable sense of the ‘Cocteau’ page in 
the archive.218 Reading ‘Dialogue VIII’ as a parody seems to push against the grain, it 
privileges the text over authorial comment; or does it? If Morgan’s future tense in the 
Hamilton interview is taken literally then Morgan appears to acknowledge that he hadn’t 
yet written benignly about artificial life. 
 
 
Poetry and Software 
 
The sense of tongue-in-cheek parody in ‘Dialogue VIII’ is direct; there don’t seem to be 
competing layered senses, with one undermining the other, as in ‘In Sobieski’s Shield’. 
Morgan seems to be teasing computers rather than warning of any potential for a 
Promethean threat, Edgecombe’s comment notwithstanding. The same seems to be true 
of his three ‘simulated computer’ poems, ‘The Computer’s First Christmas Card’ (1963), 
‘The Computer’s Second Christmas Card’ (1965) , and ‘The Computer’s First Birthday 
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Card’ (1966).219 I will try to establish the parodic, AI-sceptical sense of the simulated 
computer poems in this final section of the chapter, first by considering, very briefly, the 
depth of Morgan’s technical skill.  
In addition to the three simulated computer poems, Morgan wrote two other ‘The 
Computer’s  First…’ poems, though of different character. Regarding ‘The Computer’s 
First Dialect Poems’ (1970), Morgan says: ‘The mechanical part comes from the fact that 
I culled from the glossary of Robert Burns’s complete poems’, ‘the most Scottish, the 
most ethnic words, like a computer programmed to spot and spit out anything non-
English’.220 The poem was then composed from this collected word set. ‘The Computer’s 
First Code Poem’ (1968), is next to 100% pure rationalism; it is not a simulated software 
program – there is no relationship between the code in the poem and a computer language 
– though it is compelling evidence of a similar skillset.221 ‘Code Poem’ is a piece of 
analytical cryptography strikingly similar in form to many of the examples in Helen 
Fouché Gaines Cryptanalysis (1939), a book which Morgan owned; considerable further 
evidence of Morgan’s depth of thinking on the subject can be found in the archive 
records, ‘Cybernetics (1945 – 1985)’, which contains a collection of cuttings, many 
underlined.222 In a letter where he discusses ‘Code Poem’, Morgan comments: ‘I have 
taken an interest in cryptography since I read Edgar Allan Poe at school’.223 Nothing can 
be added to McGonigal’s comments on ‘Code Poem’; and note also McGonigal’s 
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comments about Morgan’s attitudes towards technology.224 The purity of ‘Code Poem’’s 
analytics demonstrates Morgan’s knowledge; such skills are key in making the computer 
poems convincing. 
‘The Computer’s First Christmas Card’ is formally a concrete poem set out as a 
vertical block of text, ten characters wide and thirty-five lines long.225 The computer 
seems to have been set the task of arriving, by a heuristic process, at the phrase ‘Merry 
Christmas’ – it gets tantalisingly close, but fails.226 Here are the final five lines. 
 
m e r r y C h r i s  
a m m e r r y a s a 
C h r i s m e r r y 
a s M E R R Y C H R  
Y S A N T H E M U M 227 
 
It’s difficult to show without typesetting that the first two characters on the penultimate 
line are in a smaller font size than those in the rest of the poem.228 It is almost as if the 
computer is drawing breath before its final capitalised pronouncement; more subtly, in 
computer terms, it could be read as an error creeping in right at the end, disrupting the 
final guess.  
In ‘The Computer’s First Birthday Card’ (1966), the computer is given the 
apparently simple task of re-arranging the words ‘many returns happy’ into a well-known 
birthday greeting.229 This poem portrays a less stable heuristic and greater stochastic 
level than ‘First Christmas Card’, with the computer dropping into control characters on 
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one line and binary in another.230 The higher level of randomness leads, however, to a 
successful outcome. The final seven lines are: 
 
raise   police  pay    p 
ost   early   for    chri 
stmas   watch   forest 
fires    get   well   soo 
n bon voyage KRRGK 
many  happy  returns 
eh? eh? eh? eh? eh? eh?  231 
 
The computer seems to be referencing a database which contains amongst other things, 
trade union and government slogans. The cog-crunching ‘KRRGK’, which might be an 
early fragment of Mercurian, presages the coherent birthday greeting articulated in the 
penultimate line.232 The final line, not present in manuscript, inflects the meaning: 
although successful, the computer is made to seem puzzled by the strange idiomatic 
semantics of ‘many happy returns’, with its play on the control character ‘return’.233  
‘The Computer’s Second Christmas Card’ is a matrix which looks like a core 
dump.234 The final two lines are:  
 
lstop subst itute track merry chris tmasa ndgoo dnewy 
earin 1699? check digit banks orryi n1966 endme ssage 235 
 
The computer is successful in its second attempt to construct a Christmas greeting, 
though it settles for the unidiomatic ‘good new year’, and needs two tries to get the year 
right (for which it apologises).236 The ‘Second Christmas Card’ shows two levels of 
engineering abstraction: embedded control commands (underlined) and the program’s 
                                                 
230 CPEM, 522. 
231 CPEM, 522; with some font size and spacing adjustment. 
232 CPEM, 522. 
233 MS Morgan P/1/328; CPEM, 522. 
234 CPEM, 142. 
235 CPEM, 142; re-cast into a proportional font. 
236 CPEM, 142. 
Edwin Morgan 218 
internal workings. The start condition at the beginning of ‘Second Christmas Card’ is 
‘goodk kkkkk’, followed by the control command ‘unjam’.237 There is a sense of 
conflation of hardware and software – mangled printout, and looping on the letter ‘k’ (an 
aural signifier for Christmas). The computer is able to fix itself and start again. This idea 
still resonates in the AI community: an article from 2013 in New Scientist is entitled, 
‘Machine, heal thyself’, and the accompanying image shows a computer apologising for 
an error.238 
The literary critical perspective tends to focus on the concrete aspects of the 
simulated computer poems.239 Nicholson simply notes that the two Christmas card poems 
‘generate their comic printouts from technological error’; Edgecombe, referring to 
‘Second Christmas Card’, says the poem breeds ‘new meanings out of the command 
matrix in DOS’, (DOS wasn’t invented until around 1980, at least twelve years after the 
poem was written).240 In contrast, Robert Crawford, sure-footedly, says ‘First Christmas 
Card’, ‘is to be celebrated for the same reason as the semi-literate pioneers of the Channel 
Tunnel’, who in Morgan’s poem ‘O Pioneers!’, misspell, in an extant inscription, a 
dedication to their heroic effort.241 
In the simulated computer poems, Morgan portrays a normally invisible 
intermediate level of software engineering abstraction. The most abstract engineering 
level, the user interface, would normally display only the result – ‘Merry 
Chrysanthemum’ in the case of the ‘First Christmas Card’.242 The most concrete level is 
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the source code, or the program, in ‘compiled’ binary form. The intermediate level 
portrayed in the poems would not normally be concretely manifest, except for the 
purpose of debugging, where the code might be ‘instrumented’ to make the internal 
workings visible. However, the intermediate level would always be manifest in the 
developer’s imagination which reifies the internal workings of the written software. The 
simulated computer poems are not code as such, nor the final output, but a working 
picture of the executing software, akin to a mechanic’s mental image of an active internal 
combustion engine. In these three poems Morgan has convincingly portrayed the 
imagined but real software execution space.  
Morgan, in a short piece, ‘Notes on simulated computer poems’ (1968), said his 
concern in was to ‘take an ironic but not antipathetic look at the relations that will exist 
between computer creativity and human creativity’.243 He imagined the simulated 
computer poems as ‘servo-mechanism[s]’.244 A servo-mechanism is a class of 
mechanical device which is self-correcting through the use of negative feedback from an 
external reference which might be, for example, a thermostat. Morgan had an impressive 
grasp of how a servo-mechanism might be implemented as a heuristic process in the 
complex environment of software – a starting condition or initial guess is given, and we 
can see his imagined algorithms thrashing about – substituting, trying, failing, then at 
points apparently reaching out to a reference source for a new phrase, and starting again. 
Morgan further imagined his computers ‘scanning a semantic as well as a formal 
“store”’, but a semantic database, to any serious level, is beyond the purview of digital 
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computers.245 A suggestion that Morgan realised this is in the anarchic poem ‘Adventures 
of the Anti-sage’ (1976), which might be about scepticism.246 In the third section of the 
poem, ‘ELECTRONIC’, the anti-sage is trapped inside a computer, ‘thinking about 
thought’. He then, ‘with a sudden laugh’: 
 
exploded in a printout WISDOM 
THERE IS 
NO WISDOM THERE 
IS NO WISDOM THERE IS NO 
WISDOM THERE IS 247 
 
The capitalisation would seem to make the point unambiguously; though just to make 
sure, the anti-sage says to the men in white coats, ‘“Nothing! – get it – / zero – clowns! – 
hidden there [”]’.248 
Morgan’s three imagined engineering computer poems portray the curious non-
physical  materiality which is a property of computers. The computer is actually 
streaming binary digits and altering the state of transistors; categorically, it has no 
inherent knowledge or intent. The quasi-physical action of the software (portrayed in the 
poems) manipulates data and adds programed intent; the software is both knowable in 
principle and completely analytical in a real computer, even if stochastic processes are 
involved. There is however a seductive analogy between computer hardware and 
software, and the human brain and mind; this is the basis of the dream of artificial 
intelligence. Morgan was writing in the wake of not just Grey Walter, but a coterie of 
‘visionary’ thinkers such as Herbert Simon, who according to Russell and Norvig’s 
undergraduate text book Artificial Intelligence, said in 1957: 
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It is not my aim to surprise or shock you – but the simplest way I can 
summarize is to say that there are now in the world machines that think, that 
learn and that create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to 
increase rapidly until – in the visible future – the range of problems they can 
handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been 
applied. 249 
 
Russell and Norvig might regard Simon’s claim as premature, but not outlandish, as 
evidenced by their own claim: 
 
For thousands of years, we have tried to understand how we think; that is, how 
a mere handful of matter can perceive, understand, predict, and manipulate a 
world far larger and more complicated than itself. The field of artificial 
intelligence, or AI, goes further still: it attempts not just to understand but to 
build intelligent entities. 250 
 
Morgan defended his pro-artificial intelligence position against a sceptical Jack Rillie (a 
literary critic and university colleague of Morgan’s), in two radio broadcasts on what was 
then the BBC Third Programme. A transcript of the broadcasts, recorded on 6 July 1964, 
is preserved in the University of Glasgow archive.251 The broadcasts were entitled: ‘The 
Computer and the Critic’, and ‘The Computer and the Creator’. The discussion in some 
ways parallels Morgan’s Jean Cocteau/Grey Walter dialogue; in my reading of the 
transcriptions, Rillie, playing the Cocteau of the piece, carries the day. Rillie objects to 
Morgan’s futurism with specific and thought-out arguments; he asks, for instance, why 
‘human interference’ in programming a computer doesn’t make the machine ‘far more 
like a tool than an independent creator’.252 Morgan sidesteps this challenge, and on a 
number of occasions is reduced to vague assertions such as ‘I think you are 
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underestimating what a machine can possibly do’.253 While Morgan sticks doggedly to 
his formal line, under pressure, he is notably more conditional in his statements.254 For 
example, discussing a computer-generated poem which has not impressed Rillie, Morgan 
says ‘this [is a] paradoxical mixture I admit of freewheeling and mathematics’ – in other 
words it isn’t at all clear what it is.255 Towards the end of the second debate, Rillie 
suggests a ‘correspondence theory of truth’; Rillie says, ‘of course [a poem has] got to be 
true to itself, of course it’s got to be self-consistent, its got to be whole. But it’s also got 
to be true to the whole human situation outside of itself’.256 Again Morgan responds with 
fanciful appeals to the future: ‘Machines should eventually be able to receive and ingest a 
very wide variety of stimulus from […] outside’.257 Morgan’s argument, that machine 
intelligence is simply a matter of time, is still heard today; but notwithstanding that, 
computers are far more networked today than in the 1960s, and it’s hard to see how they 
are any more intelligent.  
In 1984 John Searle’s Reith Lectures lent serious weight to the anti-AI cause. 
Some months afterwards Morgan delivered an address, ‘Computers, Poetry and Society’, 
organised by the Computer Science department at the University of Edinburgh.258 In 
preparation, Morgan had studied the arguments around Searle’s position, as indicated by 
underlined press cuttings stored in the Glasgow archive.259 A manuscript of the address 
survives, and Morgan appears of have opened with a clear statement of Searle’s position, 
namely: (i) computers have no intentionality, and (ii) computers don’t understand what 
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they are doing.260 Morgan responds, reflecting the tone of some of the articles he had 
read: ‘Well, neither of these arguments is really so straightforward as Searle seemed to 
claim’.261 Keen to maintain a long-held position, Morgan suggests that computers ‘can 
include a mixture of rules and randomness which is strikingly like the working of the 
creative process’.262 It is not difficult to detect a lack of conviction in these words, 
perhaps reflecting doubts which had been nagging him for some time: the poet must have 
been aware that his formulation seems to accept Searle’s argument, while still insisting 
on machine creativity; and Morgan can hardly have missed the fact that he does not 
assign any role to emotion in the creative process.263 Searle continues to make robust 
anti-artificial intelligence arguments, for example, in the essay ‘What Your Computer 
Can’t Know’ from the NYRB of 9 October 2014.264 
Morgan the poet, it can be argued, was unable to execute on his intent to portray 
computer creativity in part because creativity cannot be specified, isolated, or defined, 
and also in part because of his commitment to intellectual honesty and poetic truth. In the 
first part, portraying computer creativity couldn’t be done, so Morgan portrayed his own. 
He almost said as much: ‘My use of irony or comedy in most of these [simulated 
computer] pieces was conceived as the best way of drawing attention to some of the 
human/electronic relationships which will have to be investigated’.265 In the second part, 
Jack Rillie’s correspondence theory of truth (which I borrowed earlier) is in fact 
Morgan’s route to poetic truth. Rillie might have pointed out, if Morgan’s computer 
                                                 
260 MS Morgan L/8/2, paraphrased. 
261 MS Morgan L/8/2. 
262 MS Morgan L/8/2. 
263 Doubts: see letter to ‘Mr Kendall’, 29/10/1974, MS Morgan L/8/2. 
264 John Searle, ‘What Your Computer Can’t Know’, NYRB, 9/10/2014; see also letters: NYRB, 18/12/2014. 
265 Whyte(1990), 258. 
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poems could only work by some form of magic (or a supposed future technology), then 
they could not be true, in any poetic sense of the word. They would not correspond to the 
outside world, they would not be true to life. Instead, these poems do correspond, at a 
reasonable level, to real computers. Under Rillie’s argument Morgan’s computer poems 
can claim poetic truth, although if they had conformed to the poet’s intent, this would not 
be the case. Further, the truth these three poems contain is material, factual, and concrete; 
they are unique and special in Morgan’s body of work. The simulated computer poems 
portray the convergence of the imagined and the real. Imagination and engineering are 
reified as a single entity. Within a tightly specified microcosm, imagination and actuality 
are in practice unified. The three simulated computer poems are concrete both in form 
and content: mental and physical are cemented together. The poems seem like a pure 
distillation of much of what Morgan was trying to achieve. They are a material origin, a 
locus, a launch pad from which the mind can soar. Five decades after they were written, 
Morgan’s simulated computer poems retain a refreshing, teasing perspective on 
computers from a poet with the analytical skill to make them convincing, in a culture 
which – in this engineer’s opinion, then as now – takes the idea of machine intelligence 
far too seriously. 
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V: MIROSLAV HOLUB: THE POETRY OF MATERIALISM 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is likely that Hugh MacDiarmid met Miroslav Holub in 1968, though I could find no 
further details; he devotes, however, several pages of Lucky Poet to his meeting in 
Scotland with the Czech writer Karel Čapek (1890 – 1938).1 Edwin Morgan notes 
meeting Holub at the Edinburgh Science Festival in 1998 in his obituary of the Czech 
poet, which appeared later the same year in the Scotsman.2 Morgan writes in the obituary 
that Holub, ‘contributed hugely to what poetry could or should do in a world where 
science and technology had become so salient’.3 Although Judith Wright and Holub 
never met, their poetry shares an intellectualism and a deceptive sparseness. Holub (1923 
– 1998) was an eminent biological and medical scientist who wrote or collaborated on 
numerous research papers and published a monograph: Immunology of Nude Mice.4 His 
poetry is conditioned by his professional career, and sometimes ventures into the 
laboratory where experiments were carried out on mice and other animals for the purpose 
of medical science. All commentators note that his poetry responds through relentless use 
of allegory to the ideological distortions of the Communist state in which he lived. 
Holub’s verse, however, also expands widely into Bohemian history and culture in its 
response to ideological distortion and oppression; as the poet comments: ‘The spirit of 
                                                 
1 NLS: MS.27158, Folio 119, 30/07/68; LP, 107-10. 
2 Edwin Morgan, ‘Miroslav Holub’, The Scotsman, 17/07/1998. 
3 The Scotsman, 17/7/1998. 
4 Miroslav Holub, Immunology of Nude Mice, (Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1989); Holub(1989); the 
foreword to Miroslav Holub, The Dimension of the Present Moment, (London: Faber and Faber, 1990) says 
Holub wrote three monographs; Holub(1990). 
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Kafka lived in Prague centuries before he was born’.5 Literary, historical, and political 
connections to Czech culture in Holub’s poetry can be found with the aid of Angelo 
Maria Ripellino’s seminal Magic Prague (1973) and other studies, as well as original 
literary sources.6 The Czech academic Jiří Holý’s university primer, Writers Under Siege, 
Czech Literature Since 1945 (2008), notes the importance of Jaroslav Hašek (1883 –
1923) and Karel Čapek to post-war writers: ‘They were the inspiration for those authors 
who portrayed the great “small events” of everyday life, sometimes with compassion for 
life in all its forms, sometimes with humour, parody, satire and imaginative 
exaggeration’.7 Holub’s poetry is located in the tradition described by Holý; but more 
than anything, as this chapter argues, it is characterised by the poet’s rejection of 
ideology and idealism, and his forceful presentation of scientific materialism as a secure, 
perhaps the only secure, foundation for judgement. 
The chapter develops its arguments in three sections. ‘The Anatomy of Nude 
Poems’ explores the workings of Holub’s verse in terms of literary tradition, surrealism, 
and some of his methods for disguising senses and meanings. ‘Materialism Pinned 
Down’ starts with Holub’s political situation and then focuses on the case for Holub’s 
scientific materialism through a range of poems including two set in the laboratory, 
‘Suffering’ and ‘Skinning’.8 The final section of this chapter is called ‘Controversy and 
Synthesis’. It opens with controversy in a discussion of what is seen as Helen Small’s 
                                                 
5 ‘In Search of the Enemy’ in Miroslav Holub, Shedding Life, (Minneapolis: Milkweed Editions, 1997), 
228-38, 237; Holub(1997). 
6 Angelo Maria Ripellino, Magic Prague, (London: Picador, 1995); Ripellino(1973); Peter Demetz, Prague 
in Black and Gold, (London: Penguin, 1998); Demetz(1997); Derek Sayer, The Coasts of Bohemia, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Sayer(1998); Derek Sayer, Prague, Capital of the Twentieth 
Century, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); Sayer(2013). 
7 Jiří Holý, Writers Under Siege, Czech Literature Since 1945, (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2010), 
219; Holý(2008). 
8 CPMH, 105, 284. 
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idealist reading of Holub’s ‘Intensive care unit’; this is followed by an examination of the 
poet’s syntheses.9 In the latter regard, based on a hint in Holub’s essay ‘Poetry and 
Science’, a quantum mechanical reading of ‘The root of the matter’ is suggested.10  
The chapter draws on the translations in Bloodaxe’s Poems Before and After with 
one exception, the rendering of ‘Brief reflections on the test tube’ included with Holub’s 
essay ‘Poetry and Science’.11 The titular capitalisation convention of Poems Before and 
After is also followed.12 The phrase ‘before and after’ refers to the watershed of the 
crushing of Alexander Dubček’s Prague Spring in 1968. A second watershed is 
noticeable in the poetry: the fall of communism in the Velvet Revolution of 1989. The 
Collected Works of Miroslav Holub have been published in Czech in three volumes by 
the Moravian house Carpe Diem: volume I (Básně (Poems), 2003), volume II 
(Cestopisné prézy (Travel Notes), 2003), and volume III (Eseje a sloupky (Essays and 
Columns), 2005), all edited by Michal Huvar.13  
 
 
The Anatomy of Nude Poems 
 
Holub initially published some poetry shortly after the Second World War, but his early 
formative period seems to have been the time, as Jiří Holý and Jan Culík put it in their 
essay ‘Miroslav Holub’, when ‘hard-line communism became slightly more liberal in the 
second half of the 1950s’.14 Holub was associated with other Czech writers inspired by 
                                                 
9 Helen Small, ‘The Function of Antagonism’, in Holmes(2012), 19-37; Small(2012); CPMH, 421. 
10 ‘Poetry and Science’ in Holub(1990), 122-46; CPMH, 113-18. 
11 Holub(1990), 122-46; c.f. CPMH, 157. 
12 CPMH. 
13 See Holý(2008), 238; italics added as appropriate; all other italics in quotations throughout this chapter 
are original. 
14 Jiří Holý and Jan Culík, Miroslav Holub, http://www2.arts.gla.ac.uk/Slavonic/Holub.htm, 16/10/2012; 
this reference given on Culík’s University of Glasgow website: 
(http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/mlc/staff/janculik/#tabs=1, (9/2/14): Holý, J. and Culík, J., (2001) ‘Miroslav 
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the French Surrealist poet Jacques Prévért and Italian cinematic neorealism, grouped 
around the journal Kveten (May).15 Holub formulated his programme in an article ‘Our 
ordinary day is firm land’, published in Kveten in September 1956.16 Holý and Culík say 
that ‘Holub and his colleagues wished to get away from abstract ideological 
proclamations’; ‘Only by capturing life around us’, Holub wrote in the Kevten article, 
‘we may be able to express its dynamism’.17 This radical, demotic approach also entailed 
giving up ‘regular, rhymed and melodious poetry and to adopt irregular and free verse’.18 
Holub’s ‘poetry of the everyday’, whose ‘heroes are obscure working people’ or the 
‘pawns of history’, is saturated in responses to oppression.19 For example, an early poem, 
‘Cinderella’, re-tells the fairy tale in terms of quiet submission to the yoke of oppression; 
in Holub’s version there is ‘no prince that charms’.20 But as with many Holub poems, 
there is more than just a literal reading: ‘Cinderella’ is also an allegory of the need for 
integrity in day-to-day science. Cinderella’s mundane task, sorting peas, is performed 
with rigorous honesty, and there is something precious: ‘a gossamer of truth’.21 
Jaroslav Hašek’s classic Czech novel of the Great War The Good Soldier Švejk 
(1922-3), responds to oppression by mockery of authority.22 This significant, powerful, 
and anarchically funny work remains in print in the UK. It can be roughly characterised 
by imagining the bureaucrats of Franz Kafka’s The Castle at war, unable to come to 
terms with the partly Chaplin-like protagonist Švejk, with, as Holub puts it, his ‘way of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Holub’ in: Dictionary of Literary Biography, Bruccoli Clark Layman, The Gale Group, London, Boston, 
Detroit, San Francisco, pp. 139-145; Holý&Culík(2001). 
15 Holý&Culík(2001). 
16 Holý&Culík(2001). 
17 All quoted from Holý&Culík(2001); no translation of the Kevten article has been located. 
18 Holý&Culík(2001). 
19 Holý(2008), 237; Holý&Culík(2001). 
20 CPMH, 23-4. 
21 CPMH, 23-4. 
22 Hašek(1923). 
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saying no by saying yes’.23 Hašek was an anarchist, a notorious trickster, a writer for the 
serious scientific journal Animal World, sacked for inventing animals such as the 
‘sulphur-bellied whale’ and speculating that ‘werewolves would soon be sold as pets’, a 
Hapsburg soldier who defected to the Russians, and a Bolshevik commissar, among other 
things.24 Holub’s life was not as colourful as Hašek’s – nor as tragic: Hašek drank 
himself to death while writing his great novel – but Holub’s writing is replete with an 
apparent Švejkian innocence at every 180 degree reversal of meaning. Such plausible 
innocence is found, for example, in the poem, ‘How we played the Gilgamesh epic’ 
(published 1986).25 In Holub’s ‘Gilgamesh’ a puppet relates the cuts which the puppet 
master makes to the text: ‘To make the play suitable for juvenile audiences the puppeteer 
deleted all questionable passages, such as Enkidu’s fornication with the Lady of Easy 
Virtue’.26 N. K. Sanders’s The Epic of Gilgamesh discusses this scene in terms of the 
‘civilising’ of the ‘natural man’ Enkidu.27 In Holub’s censored version, Enkidu will be 
civilized in a more appropriate manner: the re-cast seductress gives a lecture on ‘the 
advantages of a school education’.28 All the puppets are crazily miscast, and Gilgamesh 
is cut to ribbons, all for well-intentioned and apparently practical reasons – Holub mocks, 
but he never sneers. 
Holub’s poetry is often constructed from powerful, sometimes obscure, imagery 
deeply rooted in surrealism. His surrealism is not dreamlike – Holub’s verse is wide-
awake – it is a means, as Maurice Nadeau puts it in his History of Surrealism (1964), ‘to 
                                                 
23 Franz Kafka, The Castle, (Oxford, Oxford World’s Classics, 2009); Kafka(1926); ‘No’ in Holub(1997), 
258. 
24 Quotes: Ripellino(1973), 223, 224; general support: Ripellino(1973), 223-33; Demetz(1997), 346-8. 
25 CPMH, 238-40. 
26 CPMH, 238-40. 
27 N. K. Sanders, trans., ed., The Epic of Gilgamesh, (London: Penguin, 1972), 22, 30-1, 62-9. 
28 CPMH, 238. 
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penetrate reality’.29 Quoting André Breton, Nadeau might have been describing Holub’s 
work: the aim of surrealism is to ‘arrive at an ever more precise and at the same time ever 
more passionate apprehension of the tangible world’.30 The surrealist poets Jacques 
Prévért (1900 – 1977) and Vítězslav Nezval (1900 – 1958) are often cited as influential in 
Holub’s work, and the continuity of technique is sometimes striking.31 Prévért’s 
‘Procession’, in Edwin Morgan’s translation, combines amusing word play with a 
liturgical feel.32 Here is a selection of lines: 
 
A gallows-composer with a music-bird 
[…] 
A St Helena duck with Napoleon and oranges 
[…] 
A member of the prostate gland with a hypertrophy of the French Academy 
[…]  
A terrible surgeon with a dental enfant 
And the general of the oysters with a Jesuit-opener 33 
 
Prévért-like reversals and switches of meaning appear throughout Holub’s work. 
Nezval’s ‘Prague with fingers of rain’ opens with a negative, again reminiscent of Holub: 
‘It is not in anything’.34 Pragueness, Nezval writes, is not ‘In how a bird perches on your 
forehead’, nor ‘In the smell of tramcars while the bells of St Loretto ring out’, nor ‘In 
how a frankfurter tastes in the vaults which date back to the Thirty Years War’; 
Pragueness is in the poet: 
 
I am the tongue of your bells but also of your rain 
[…] 
I am the tongue of your slovenliness but also of your melancholia 
[…] 
                                                 
29 Maurice Nadeau, The History of Surrealism, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1968), 35; Nadeau(1964). 
30 Nadeau(1964), 35. 
31 E.g. Neil Astley, (ed.), Bloodaxe Poetry Introductions, 2, (Tarset, Northumberland: Bloodaxe, 2006), 31, 
36; Astley(2006); Holý&Culík(2001). 
32 Morgan(1996), 272-3. 
33 Morgan(1996), 272-3. 
34 Vítězslav Nezval, Prague with Fingers of Rain, (Tarset, Northumberland: Bloodaxe, 2009), 61-2; 
Nezval(1936). 
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I am the tongue of your fire siren but also your legends 
[…] 
To future generations I bequeath my experience and a long sigh 35 
 
One can feel the breath of Nezval’s sigh in many Holub poems, often more darkly. 
‘Collision’, for example, is a poem about a traffic accident and is suspended in the 
moment of death; there is a deep sigh of every-day tragedy.36 Resonating with both 
Prévért and Nezval, this and many other Holub poems combine surrealist imagery and 
litany. Holub writes of the accident: ‘all that was left of the car / was a grotesque pretzel 
with a chunk bitten off / by the dentures of a demented angel’.37 The poet searches for 
meaning with a litany of questions: 
 
And what about the magnetic monopoles 
escaping after the Big Bang […] 
 
What about the giant molecular clouds 
under the galaxy’s shoulders […] 
 
What about the loneliness of the first genes 
accumulating amino acids in shallow primeval pools […] 38 
 
‘Collision’ ends with the death of ‘the professor who understood the approximate 
universe / but forgot the traffic rules’.39 
‘Žito the magician’ is a short and abrupt poem with a precisely-defined plot: it 
contrasts the variable appearance of reality with absolute mathematical certainty.40 The 
abruptness, combined with the presentation of a single strong idea is suggestive of a 
puppet play: surely Žito is a stock Czech puppet playing the part of Kepler at the court of 
Rudolf II (1552 – 1612), the melancholy and tyrannical King of Bohemia, Holy Roman 
                                                 
35 Nezval(1936), 61-2. 
36 CPMH, 215-16. 
37 CPMH, 215. 
38 CPMH, 215-16. 
39 CPMH, 215-16. 
40 CPMH, 69. 
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Emperor, and patron of art, science, and alchemy.41 Žito, ‘To amuse His Royal Majesty’, 
agrees that reality is a matter of perception – he can make ‘Frogs into footmen’, ‘a 
Minister out of a rat’, grow daisies from his finger-tips.42 This illusionism perhaps 
represents Kepler earning his living at the court by casting horoscopes.43 Žito can make a 
star black and water dry – words are only conventions.44 But when asked by a student to 
‘Think up sine alpha / greater than one’, ‘Žito grows pale and sad: Terribly sorry. Sine is 
/ between plus one and minus one’. Knowledge of the absolute in the presence of 
temporal power is dangerous: Žito exits the stage: he ‘leaves the great royal empire’, and 
returns ‘to his home / in a nutshell’.45 Kepler retreats to his kernel of truth. The 
mathematical example is well chosen. Kepler was ‘a Pythagorean at heart’, and sine 
performs a surreal transformation of its own: it changes a triangular function into the 
undulating sine wave.46 Plays, of course, contain many meanings. Victoria MacKenzie in 
her 2013 PhD thesis, Contemporary Poets’ Responses to Science, observes that Holub is 
making a literary-critical point.47 Holub’s use of mathematical precision, she notes, 
‘gives the lie to I. A. Richards’s term “pseudo-statements”’ which are not supposed to be 
verifiable.48  
Holub’s reference to Kafka in ‘Jewish cemetery at Olšnay, Kafka’s grave, April, a 
sunny day’ is obviously explicit.49 His other references to Kafka are more suggestive. ‘A 
                                                 
41 For the back story see e.g. Demetz(1997), 190-4; Ripellino(1973), 62-4; or John Banville, Prague 
Pictures, (London: Bloomsbury, 2003), 130-95; Banville(2003). 
42 CPMH, 69. 
43 Demetz(1997), 193-4; Banville(2003), 167; Ripellino(1973), 62-4. 
44 CPMH, 69. 
45 CPMH, 69. 
46 Demetz(1997), 190; see also Holub(1997), 183 for a different nuance. 
47 MacKenzie(2013), 59; as MacKenzie is aware, Holub reflects on this point in Holub(1990), 134-5. See 
also my Chapter I. 
48 MacKenzie(2013), 59. 
49 CPMH, 204. 
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dog in the quarry’ recalls the ending of The Trial, where Josef K. is taken to a quarry to 
die ‘like a dog!’.50 ‘The dangers of the night’ expresses a fear of metamorphosis.51 At the 
parable level, Holub’s tale of investigating moles in ‘Brief reflection on cats growing in 
trees’, resembles Kafka’s short story ‘Investigations of a Dog’.52 In Kafka’s teasing 
parody of the scientific method, the dog is contemplating the source of its food:  
 
Our scientific knowledge, which generally makes for an extreme specialisation, is 
remarkably simple in one province, I mean where it teaches that the earth engenders our 
food […] Those who have preserved even a little freedom of judgement in scientific 
matters – and their numbers are truly small, for science draws a wider and wider circle 
around itself – will easily see, without having to make any specific experiment, that the 
main part of the food discovered on the ground in such cases comes from above; indeed 
customarily we snap up most of our food, according to our dexterity and greed, before it 
has reached the ground at all. 53 
 
Science, according to the investigating dog, ‘recognises two chief methods of procuring 
food; namely the actual preparation of the ground, and secondly the auxiliary perfecting 
process of incantation, dance, and song’.54 Holub’s parable also wittily portrays a 
rationalism flawed by the inability to see the whole. Moles, in the days when they ‘still 
had their annual general meetings’, make two conflicting above-ground observations on 
the nature of what grows in trees: birds or cats.55 A venerable mole decides the question, 
and after making a further observation in the dark, declares: ‘Birds and cats are optical 
illusions produced / by the refraction of light’, ‘In fact’, the venerable mole continues, 
‘things above // Were the same as below, only the clay was less dense and, / the upper 
roots of the trees were whispering something’; Holub writes: ‘And that was that’.56 This 
                                                 
50 CPMH, 74, Franz Kafka, The Trial, (London: Penguin, 2000), 178; Kafka(1925). 
51 CPMH, 167. 
52 CPMH, 144; ‘Investigations of a Dog’ in Franz Kafka, The Complete Short Stories, (London: Vintage, 
2005), 278-316; Kafka(1922). 
53 Kafka(1922), 302-3. 
54 Kafka(1922), 303. 
55 CPMH, 144. 
56 CPMH, 144. 
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seeming perfection of knowledge is a nice counterpoint to ‘Žito the magician’, and 
perhaps challenges the reader to find the reverse pseudo statements, the lines which aren’t 
verifiably false.57 Holub, however, often likes to end with a nagging doubt. The moles 
give up making observations, and no longer presuppose the existence of cats, ‘Or if so 
only a little’.58  
Kafka seems in his three novels to parody the irrational dressed up as rational; his 
protagonists yearn for the sanity of reason. Kafka’s vision of oppression is to be trapped 
in paradoxes and circular logic, as if caught in something like a waking dream. Holub’s 
poetry also abounds in contradictions and illogic, and similarly explores our limits, our 
inability to quite come to terms with the world around us; but Holub’s writing is not 
dreamlike, and there is often a Swiftian sense of escape at least to the next problem. 
Holub’s Cinderella, however, is trapped, and so is the old woman in ‘Brief reflection on 
an old woman with a barrow’.59 In the latter poem Kafkaesque oppression is fully 
determined, the irrational is locked down with mathematical certainty. Holub’s target in 
‘an old woman’ is poverty as a divinely ordained state of affairs – there is no need to 
believe he is thinking only, or at all, about communism in this poem. The poem surely 
responds to the Biblical phrase ‘For ye have the poor always with you’.60 Thus ‘an old 
woman O’, with her ‘barrow B’, form a system moving ‘at constant velocity v’, to ‘a 
constant destiny’.61 It’s an independent, isolated, complete, unchanging system. Holub 
ends with a litany of definitions: the ‘unit Our daily bread’, the ‘unit As we forgive 
                                                 
57 CPMH, 69. 
58 CPMH, 144. 
59 CPMH, 23, 148. 
60 Matthew 26:11; also John 12:8. 
61 CPMH, 148. 
Miroslav Holub 235 
them’, ending with the ‘unit of life-fulfilment Amen’.62 Unlike ‘Cinderella’, there is no 
hint of the dignity of labour or the truth of an honest existence in ‘Brief reflection on an 
old woman with a barrow’.63  
Holub was frustrated by mechanical thinking and simplistic worldviews – to 
counteract this his poetry sometimes disguises multiple meanings as a sort of meta-
allegory for the hidden complexity of life. ‘Conversation with a poet’ (published 1982), 
for example, has two forms and both literal and allegorical readings.64 Holub mentions 
‘Conversation’ in his essay ‘Poetry and Science’; his context is the search for a synthesis 
of poetry and science, a common origin, and he is examining his own feelings and 
emotions in the performance of one or the other activity.65 A symmetry in ‘Conversation 
with a poet’ between ‘scientist’ and ‘poet’ in the poem is clearly implied in the essay.66 It 
is a small step to substitute further ‘experiment’ for ‘poem’; in doing so (as well as 
making a few minor grammatical adjustments) a second (implicit) form of ‘Conversation 
with a poet’ is generated. For copyright reasons it is not possible to quote the poem in the 
implicit ‘science’ form; it is worthwhile doing so as a thought experiment, however, as 
Holub’s verse reads naturally in the implicit version, and has distinctly different nuances 
from the explicit text. The explicit version of ‘Conversation with a poet’ opens: 
 
Are you a poet? 
 Yes, I am. 
How do you know? 
 I’ve written poems. 
If you’ve written poems it means you were a poet. But now? 67 
 
                                                 
62 CPMH, 148. 
63 CPMH, 23, 148. 
64 CPMH, 192. 
65 Holub(1990), 142-4. 
66 CPMH, 192; Holub(1990), 142-4. 
67 CPMH, 192. 
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The poet (or scientist) says he will write (or experiment) again, but the interrogator 
expresses scepticism suggesting that a poem (like an experiment) is a unique event which 
cannot be reproduced. The poet (or scientist) responds that he believes the circumstances 
of the notional future poem (or experiment) will be the same; the interrogator responds: 
‘If you believe that then you won’t be a poet and never were a poet’.68 At the end, the 
poet, whose confidence seems shaken by this argument, asks, ‘And who are you’.69 
In both the explicit and the implicit forms of ‘Conversation with a poet’, every 
activity is once off, things only exist in the moment they happen, if you think you can 
make the same thing happen again, then you can’t be what you claimed to be in the first 
place.70 Regarding the explicit version, MacKenzie points out that the poem was written 
during the ‘time when the Communist government had designated [Holub] a “non-
person” and forbidden him from officially publishing his work in Czechoslovakia’.71 
Holub’s route to rehabilitation involved a public self-criticism; Holý comments: ‘In 1973 
a statement was published in his name in which Holub seemed to revoke his previously 
held “incorrect” views’.72 Holý also notes, ‘After the fall of Communism, Holub argued 
that the statement came out without his knowledge, and that no one would publish his 
protest at the time’.73 Holub’s political situation is considered more widely in the next 
section; but perhaps the agony of self-criticism is in ‘Conversation’. In the original 
‘poetry’ version of the poem, the allegory, as MacKenzie suggests, is ‘a reaction to the 
                                                 
68 CPMH, 192. 
69 CPMH, 192. 
70 CPMH, 192; ‘in the moment’, c.f. Holub(1990), 143. 
71 MacKenzie(2013), 55-6. 
72 Holý(2008), 237. 
73 Holý(2008), 237.  
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political situation’, that is, censorship, with ‘the poet turning on the interrogator in the 
final line’.74  
The implicit ‘science’ version of ‘Conversation with a poet’, however, not only 
has a different meaning, but a different reaction to authority. The ‘science’ version 
exposes a key question relating to the scientific method: how valid is it to extrapolate 
from one experiment to the next? The naïve view that circumstances can be exactly 
reproduced is laid bare as sloppy thinking – the interrogator is right on this point. The 
would-be scientist admits defeat, and the final sentence can be read as an enquiry as to 
the nature of the more knowledgeable voice. If ‘Conversation’ is a reflection on self-
criticism, it leaves in the mind both the desire for individual freedom, and the need to 
learn.  
The self-criticism allegory works technically, but appears to fall short 
emotionally: the poem seems at first too cool to express agony. The emotional side of the 
poem emerges, I think, by reference. An Ordinary Life is the final novel of Karel Čapek’s 
acclaimed modernist trilogy.75 In a pivotal passage of the novel, the ordinary man’s 
previously complacent view of his own life is subject to an internal interrogation.76 There 
is a resonant edginess between Čapek’s passage and Holub’s poem. Čapek’s story 
involves the ordinary man abandoning poetry (as Holub may have though he would have 
to) and also his bohemian circle, for a junior position in the railway.77 At one point, the 
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interrogated voice asks: ‘who are you’?78 Čapek’s passage is heavy with anxiety and self-
doubt – it seems that Holub has re-modelled this scene to imply the agony he needs to 
convey in ‘Conversation with a poet’, but would rather not admit explicitly. The 
deceptively simple ‘Conversation with a poet’ thus develops through three levels, literal, 
allegorical, and referential. There are probably no truly simple Holub poems. 
The poem ‘Animal rights’ contains Holub’s most shocking lines.79 It presents a 
graduation of sympathy, starting with, ‘Pity for dogs / that cry / (boundless pity)’.80 
Holub was a dog lover. The next lines are: ‘Pity for mice / that squirm // Pity for 
earthworms / that wither helplessly / (limited pity)’.81 It sounds like a distorted echo of 
the Sermon on the Mount; but then the poem ends: 
 
Patients 
with progressive amyotrophic lateral sclerosis 
can just fuck off. They shouldn’t have been born. 
Hieronymus Bosch be with them 
for ever and ever amen. 82 
 
No pity at all. Holub would have been aware that the condition referred to is the one 
Stephen Hawking (b. 1942) suffers from. This poem is a bitter attack on animal-rights 
campaigners. Unsurprisingly, due to the nature of his work, Holub opposed what he 
regarded as naïve and self-appointed critics of animal experiments.83 Holub comments in 
an interview, perhaps thinking of this poem: ‘To me, an earthworm qualifies for the same 
moral feeling as a dog. I hate hierarchies. Morality must be absolute’.84 ‘Animal rights’ is 
                                                 
78 Čapek(1934), 398. 
79 CPMH, 313. 
80 CPMH, 313. 
81 CPMH, 313. 
82 CPMH, 313. 
83 See e.g., Miroslav Holub, ‘Chemical Common Sense’ in LRB, 4 July 1996; Holub(1996); Suzanne 
O’Shea, Interview with Miroslav Holub in The Poetry Ireland Review, No. 30 (Autumn – Winter, 1990), 
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a brutal parody of false moral hierarchies. Forcing the issue into the open with black 
humour, Holub is suggesting that the consequence of excess sympathy for animals is a 
lack of sympathy for suffering people. This particular poem doesn’t appear to give any 
ground, but Holub’s poems work together. Subtlety and complexity emerge from sets of 
poems in the themed collection Vanishing Lung Syndrome (1990), to which ‘Animal 
rights’ belongs.85 ‘The sun of hope’, several pages on, opens: ‘They’ll certainly 
remember, / in the twenty-third century’.86 This, you suspect, means ‘certainly’ in the 
sense of ‘certainly won’t’. Those who won’t remember are ‘preserved / in liquid nitrogen, 
/ implanted in a uterus’.87 In the futuristic world, replete with treatment for depression, 
Holub says ‘they will remember themselves / actual calves’.88 Perhaps they will 
remember: ‘The sun of hope’ is an animal rights poem.89 
Seamus Heaney notes in his finely-titled essay on Holub, ‘The Fully Exposed 
Poem’, that ‘We forget we are reading a translation’.90 Warming to the Shakespearian 
feel of Holub’s ‘dramatis personae’, ‘Whatever the reason’, Heaney continues, ‘[Holub] 
has found in English an emotional and literary climate that suits perfectly’.91 It is the 
sound, however, which is the greatest loss of translation, not just the Czech words, but 
the rhythms of the Czech Bible, the incantation of the church service, the hum of 
language. Yet, cadences develop with comprehension – as litanies are sensed, or as birds 
                                                 
85 CPMH, 271-326. 
86 CPMH, 321. 
87 CPMH, 321. 
88 CPMH, 321. 
89 CPMH, 321. 
90 Seamus Heaney, ‘The Fully Exposed Poem’ in The Government of the Tongue, (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1989), 45-53, 50; Heaney(1989); on translation, see also Holub’s comment to Dennis O’Driscoll in a 
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flap or dogs bark, as bells ring (there are lots of bells), as puppets clunk and clack.92 A 
mental cacophony is induced by the phrase ‘the hysterical barking / of cats’ from ‘What 
else’.93 For me, the rhythm of Bob Dylan’s ‘A hard rain’s a-goanna fall’ towards the end 
of ‘Suffering’ is unmistakable.94 Like Dylan, Holub took a strongly anti-war stance, for 
example in poems such as ‘Casualty’ and ‘The fly’.95 Holub’s lyric in ‘Suffering’ 
ironically reverses Dylan’s sense.96 After the horrors portrayed in ‘Suffering’, the poet’s 
mind wanders to an ironic utopia: ‘In which I met a general covered with oak leaves / In 
which I met ambulance men who could find no wounded …’.97 The English versions of 
Holub’s poems are remarkable, even though reference and allusion probably run quite 
deeply. To a British reader, the Czech notes in ‘Brief reflection on killing the Christmas 
carp’ are comprehensible; and this poem thrills and amuses with its extreme reverse 
bathos of the marvellously exaggerated comparison of the dying fish to Galileo’s defiant 
resistance after he was forced to recant: ‘And yet it moves’.98 ‘On the origin of 6pm’, for 
me though, only communicated as a poem on reading a passage in The Good Soldier 
Švejk, where Švejk agrees on parting from a comrade, both bound for the front, to meet 
after the war at a certain tavern in Prague at 6pm.99 There is a scene, a battlefield 
remembered years later, also in Švejk, which seems to prefigure ‘The fly’.100  
                                                 
92 Bells, e.g., CPMH, 73, 150, 226, 235, 237, 317, 322, 329, 334. 
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The figure of Faust in ‘The root of the matter’ may be read with more confidence 
in the light of Ripellino’s comment on the tendency in puppet theatre for the puppets to 
be cast in inappropriate roles (as in ‘How we played the Gilgamesh epic’); thus, for 
example, a Faust may come ‘close to the Czech Punch – Kašpárek by name’.101 Local 
nuance is occasionally to the fore, but Holub’s special type of fastidious erudition is 
wide-ranging. The critic David Graham, in his essay ‘“The Frightened Fawn of Sense”: 
Mind and Nature in the Poetry of Miroslav Holub’, identifies the British King Canute 
speaking, ‘though with typically modern, layered ironies’ in Holub’s ‘Man cursing the 
sea’.102 Moreover, this is not the Canute who ‘has become emblematic of royal 
arrogance’, but Canute as the story was first recorded: ‘the moral did not concern pride 
but the evils of sycophancy’.103 
Richard Dawkins’s The Extended Phenotype (1982), explores the projection of 
phenotypes into animals’ characteristic behaviour; for example, birds building nests, 
beavers’ dams, and termites’ mounds.104 Termites’ monoliths may take generations to 
complete; Dawkins compares termite builders to ‘medieval masons’, who would work ‘a 
lifetime on one cathedral and never meet their colleagues who would complete it’.105 
Holub’s development of this idea in terms of humanity’s expression of itself in art and 
artefacts, and these being housed in all their variousness, is the subject of his poem ‘The 
British Museum’.106 There is a clear reference to Dawkins’s earlier work, The Selfish 
                                                 
101 Ripellino(1973), 97. 
102 David Graham, ‘The Frightened Fawn of Sense: Mind and Nature in the Poetry of Miroslav Holub’ in 
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Gene in the couplet: ‘Only our genes are eternal / from body to body’, lines which also 
echo the continuity of endeavour, from termites to medieval masons.107 The ending of the 
poem links our traditional emotional centre and our genetic makeup to the production of 
art and craft: ‘The British Museum is in us, / in our very hearts, / in our very depths’.108 
Holub’s poems are like models of reality, distilled insights; it is as if these are pinned up 
for display like butterflies in a collection in all their variety and similarity, or carefully 
presented like items in a cabinet of curiosities: the poetic effect is both individual and 
cumulative. Holub’s work is drawn together in a British Museum of life, the parts are 
related to the whole as in one of Archimboldo’s composite faces.109 Holub’s form is 
individual and composite, sparse and expansive. Holub’s beaver’s dam, his extended 
phenotype, his poetry, is a pure vision of complexity. This sense of necessity engenders 
the poetry’s resonant sense of integrity, well expressed by Heaney: it is the ‘emotional 
reliability’, and the ‘obedience to what is generally true’ that ‘constitutes one of the main 
attractions of Holub’s work’.110  
 
 
Materialism Pinned Down 
 
The writer and medical doctor Iain Bamforth, in his article on Holub, ‘Applied Poetry’ 
(2001), gives the most concise account of Holub’s contribution to science I have 
found.111 Noting that the monograph Immunology of Nude Mice ‘established Holub’s 
reputation as a leading experimental scientist’, Bamforth writes: ‘One of Holub’s key 
                                                 
107 CPMH, 393; Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); the quasi-
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discoveries was that the omentum – the apron of abdominal fat – in mice acts as an 
immunological historian: it retains a physical record of battles won’.112 Bamforth is a 
writer with a philosophical outlook, however, and in his essay he tries to fit Holub into 
various philosophical categories. Bamforth claims, for example, that Holub was a 
‘disciple’ of Immanuel Kant – Holub was no one’s disciple.113 Elsewhere Holub is a 
‘neo-Malthusian’ or moving close to ‘classical liberalism’.114 Bamforth claims that 
Holub’s ‘In the microscope’ represents a ‘Hobbesian war of all against all’ – but this 
seems to go much further than the poem, which reads more like a metaphor for class 
oppression.115 Bamforth’s politicised assertion that ‘For forty years, science was all over 
the place in the countries of the Eastern Block – but it was Marxist-Leninist science, 
counter-science’, can be challenged.116 Holub deprecated Lysenko, but Bamforth 
contradicts what he has mentioned himself, Holub’s important discovery. Holub wrote in 
1990 ‘we are not so badly off in science, even within institutions such as the Academy of 
Sciences, or this or that institute passively established after the Russian model’.117 He 
wrote again in 1996 that science ‘enjoyed a reasonable degree of freedom under the 
communists’.118 The situation for science wasn’t perfect, but neither is it in the West, 
where it can be influenced by commercial pressure, or worse.119 Bamforth’s essay sits 
very uneasily with Holub’s consistent and un-ideological writing.  
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It would not be possible to construct an argument for Holub’s materialism via 
Marxism or dialectical materialism – Holub had a bellyful of all that, and it gave him 
indigestion. The sense is of scientific materialism throughout. Holub was a balanced and 
consistent thinker, as free of ideology as is possible, and though neither a philosopher or 
politician, he was an informed observer. Holub’s consistency is demonstrated by his post-
communist poetry, which does not flip mental states, but shows an ongoing concern for 
ideological corruption of values. As in ‘Conversation with a poet’, Holub always sees 
both sides: Holý and Culík point out (in the context of Holub’s untranslated travel 
writing), for example, that Holub was ‘enchanted as well as worried by the United 
States’.120 Holub’s consistent thinking, as expressed throughout his poetry, from the 
communist era, through its fall and beyond is, I would argue, one of the most important 
observations which can be made of his work. He was not slave to any political system, 
and will not fit into the category of freedom-loving writer trapped under communism, as 
most Western commentators seem to assume. Holub’s lack of ideological predilections is 
the complement to my argument that his poetry is a profound expression of materialism. 
Holub’s post-communist poem ‘The duties of a dustbin’, from the collection 
Supposed to Fly (1994), opens with the couplet: ‘To take up all post-Bolshevik baroque, / 
balderdash, barnacles, bankruptcies, barristers’ wigs’.121 In Bohemia, the word ‘baroque’ 
is symbolic and emotive. Ripellino writes:  
 
The Baroque came to Bohemia in the first half of the seventeenth century, during the 
Thirty Years War. Its appearance coincides with events ruinous for Czech lands, that 
is, with the victory of Ferdinand II at the Battle of White Mountain (1620) and the 
Peace of Westphalia (1648). […] Initially, then, the Baroque thrust itself, a foreign 
body, upon the Czechs. It was the pacifying, propagandist art of the oppressors, and 
aggressive symbol of the Counter-Reformation, of subservience to the Hapsburgs, the 
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scorn of the Church Triumphant at the anguish of a defeated nation. Initially, then, 
Czechs viewed the Baroque with hostility, like a narcissus born of a rotten onion. 122 
 
In ‘Aloof’ from The Rampage (1997), ‘The self expands like / an elastic wart, swells like 
/ a cattle tick / pumped with paradise gas’.123 In ‘The Pied Pipers’, also from The 
Rampage, ‘skinny, grubby, scraggly-bearded / Pied Pipers’ seem to return the children, 
and also the rats.124 In the new capitalist order ‘instead of information / there’s only going 
to be Truth’, and this ‘truth puffs up / in our homes like a cuckoo’s egg’, ‘it howls and 
trumpets, / like a dead driver, slumped against his car-horn’, and swells ‘like a pot of 
porridge’.125 ‘Truth’ here is quite distant from the elusive but grand scientific truth, the 
‘splendid silver bulldozer / in the tumbling darkness’, of ‘Suffering’.126 The image of the 
magic porridge pot surely stands for the central myth of capitalism: infinite growth. All 
this is unsettling to any Western reader looking for a potted morality tale about the evils 
of communism from a newly-free writer, and probably also to Czech dissidents, many of 
whom were Holub’s fellow writers. This, in addition to the fact he had high quality and 
(presumably) well paid work, while many dissidents had to take building or cleaning 
jobs, along with his foreign travel rights, and the simple fact that, since his Kveten days 
he probably didn’t mix in literary circles, may help explain Holub’s second ostracization, 
this time under the new capitalist order.127 Robert Crawford, after a visit to the Czech 
Republic in 2013, noted: ‘I was struck (as before) by how much suspicion of Holub there 
was there among people I met. Of the local residents it was some Americans long 
resident there who were clear he was a great poet, while several Czechs seemed wary of 
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him; one even said to me he might have been “a spy”’.128 Holý and Culík say ‘Some of 
his fellow Czechs could not accept Holub’s self-criticism, there were even unfounded 
allegations of his alleged cooperation with the communist secret police’.129 Crawford and 
Holý and Culík suggest the allegations arose because of his travel rights, and presumably 
Holý and Culík can say the allegations are unfounded because nothing incriminating has 
been found in the communist-era files.130 It’s worth noting that the Czech writer Milan 
Kundera (b. 1929), who fled to Paris in the early 1970s, has also been ostracised in the 
new order – this, along with the hardships suffered by dissidents, is discussed in ‘A 
Conversation in Prague’ between Ivan Kílma and Phillip Roth in the New York Review of 
Books, 12 April 1990.131 
Perhaps Holub’s political situation can be compared with that of another writer of 
great integrity, Seamus Heaney. Heaney walked a tightrope with regard to Irish 
Republicanism: if he had, for example, written in support of political prisoners, Bobby 
Sands, or the hunger strike, he would, at the very mildest, have been branded a 
‘controversial’ figure. If he had refused to apologise (self-criticise), he would have been 
stigmatised by the British establishment, and his career as a poet might have been 
marginalised. Similarly, Holub passively co-operated with the communist state in order 
to pursue his career as a scientist. In Dennis O’Driscoll’s interviews with Heaney in 
Stepping Stones (2008), Heaney is challenged directly on how Holub ‘should’ have 
responded to communism, and his answer, for me, draws a line under the issue. 
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[O’Driscoll] Miroslav Holub, the subject of one of your essays, held an important 
research job in communist Czechoslovakia and was not an active dissident. How do 
you regard poets like Holub and Tadeusz Różewicz, who reached varying degrees of 
accommodation with officialdom? 
 
[Heaney] What I’d say about them is what I’d say about any poet: the task was to take 
the strain of being themselves in their own time and place, to survive without 
compromising their moral and artistic self-respect; the ones you mentioned seem to 
have managed that. I find it hard to adjudicate in these areas. Presumptuous, even. 
 
Let me push you nevertheless, with a hugely hypothetical question: had you been a 
poet in say, post-war Romania or Poland, how do you think you would have dealt with 
the demands of the Communist Party for socialist realism and conformity to the party 
line? 
 
Whatever answer I give to that is going to sound either too self-deprecatory or too 
self-inflatory. Still, going on how I worked in my own political circumstances, I 
believe I might have found a way to maintain a hygienic distance, found some non-
confrontational but still contrarian stance. I risk saying this because I began as the lad 
who wrote ‘Requiem for the Croppies’, in ‘official’ Northern Ireland in 1966, and 
over the years have had to keep parrying demands for poetry that would fall into line 
with one or other party – or para-party. 132 
 
Without knowing exactly what either poet thought, both were constrained by radical 
circumstances, and both acted with moderation. 
The most material fact of all – death – is never far away in Holub’s poetry; in his 
day-to-day work Holub was the agent of death for the greater purpose of human life. This 
moral compromise disturbed him, as one of his most powerful poems, ‘Suffering’ 
(published 1963), shows.133 The ‘Ugly creatures, ugly grunting creatures’ of the poem 
are, according to an essay, ‘Vietnamese socialist minipig[s]’ which ‘resembled a 
semibald porcupine caught in a frontal collision between two armoured cars’.134 For 
reasons of scale and morphology they were promising experimental subjects, and Holub 
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and his team were endeavouring ‘to catch up with bourgeois pseudoscience and surpass 
it’.135 Holub writes in the poem ‘Suffering’: 
 
They close ugly blue eyes, 
The open ugly blue eyes, 
    and 
    they’re 
    dead. 
 
But I ask no questions, 
no one asks any questions. 136 
 
After death, the ugly creatures are free to ‘graze in the greenish-blue pool / of the 
chromatogram’.137 Holub continues: 
 
Naturally no one asks 
Whether these creatures wouldn’t have preferred  
    to live all in one piece, 
    their disgusting life 138 
 
And if they wouldn’t have preferred being ‘Incredibly terrified / Incredibly happy’ in 
their ‘muddy stinking little world’.139 The poem’s final stanza includes lines which echo 
‘A Hard Rain’s A-Gonna Fall’, as noted above. Dylan’s lines respond to the maternal 
refrain, ‘Oh, where have you been, my blue-eyed son? / Oh where have you been, my 
darling young one?’.140 Well, the blue-eyed sons have been chopped up and allowed to 
‘run in pieces along the white expanse / of the paper electrophore’ and driven for a dip ‘in 
alcohol / in xylol’; but rest assured, the ‘bits of animals are satisfied’, ‘like kittens at the 
bottom of the pond’.141 And the darling young ones of the experimental team have lost 
their innocence. 
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‘Suffering’ doesn’t need an allegorical reading – Holub has administered a strong 
enough dose of reality to be going on with. However, the couplet which starts, ‘But I ask 
no questions …’ occurs three times, and has a sinister, collusive ring.142 The exaggerated, 
relentless, damning of the creatures for their ugliness, their degradation, is chilling. 
‘Civilised’ attitudes towards native peoples, the Aborigines, the Roma, as well as more 
than a hint of the victims of the Nazis, press forward strongly. ‘Naturally no one asks’ if 
the pigs would have preferred not to be cut into pieces, their lives are disgusting. 
‘Suffering’ positively shouts: we must ask questions. Some things can be justified (this is 
not an animal rights poem), but words are slippery – someone might be exploiting our 
emotional blind spot. If Holub is responding to T. S. Eliot’s famous phrase ‘human kind / 
Cannot bear very much reality’, he is suggesting we must force ourselves to bear reality if 
we want to least have a chance of telling the difference between right and wrong.143 In 
‘Burnt Norton’, Eliot’s famous phrase is uttered by a bird, chasing the poet out of a 
garden.144 Holub is saying, come and have a look in my laboratory.  
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Figure 2: Materialism Pinned Down 145 
 
 
‘Skinning’ (written between 1985 and 1989) begins: ‘We make a noose’.146 A 
laboratory animal, a rabbit as it turns out, is to be killed and skinned. The poem is 
structured as a pedagogical lecture on the technical process of skinning, such as Holub 
probably delivered many times, which falls to pieces as the narrator’s mind becomes 
overwhelmed by a horrific and insane vision. A response to the poem is that too much 
reality leads to madness; this explicit sense persists, though it is also strongly reversed. 
The instruction continues, the noose is tied to a ladder, the hind legs pulled, the noose 
tightened. The narrator says, ‘We cut the skin all around. It’s easy’.147 There then follows 
an interjection, Biblical in nature, which governs the poem. 
 
    In the beginning the fact created the Word. 
    And the Word hovered over the abyss. 
Then go your ways and I will be in your mouth 
                                                 
145 Holub(1989), 44; original caption: Macroscopical appearance of thymuses in 7-day-old NFS/N nu/nu 
(left), nu/+ male (centre) and +/+ male (right). The +/+ thymus was 1.85 times heavier than the nu/+ 
thymus. (From Kojima, A., Saito, M., Hioki, K., Shimanura, K., and Habu, S., Exc. Cell Biol., 52, 107, 
1984. With permission). 
146 Date: CPMH, 274; poem: CPMH, 284-6. 
147 CPMH, 284-6. 
Miroslav Holub 251 
and I will teach you what you should say. 148 
 
Holub has materially re-configured Genesis and John: the fact is the creator and the 
created is the Word.149 The fact is God: the sense slips between metaphorical 
materialism, and literal paradox. The ‘Word’ is free though, and potentially catastrophic. 
The italicised couplet is from Exodus, where God is speaking to Moses; Moses is to 
speak with the word of God.150 The passage is known as the appointment of Aaron. 
Several verses later, God speaks to Moses regarding Aaron:  
 
And he shall be thy spokesman unto the people: and he shall be, even he shall be to 
thee instead of a mouth, and thou shall be to him instead of God. 151 
 
God will speak to the people through Moses, and Moses in turn will pass this permission 
to speak God’s word on to Aaron; Moses shall be to Aaron ‘instead of God’. In Holub’s 
context, there is a sense of distance from the Biblical text, here the word of God becomes 
the word of man.  
The lecture on skinning re-commences, but the teacher’s concentration is 
breaking down and the language becomes muddled with imagery.  
 
… we cut around the forelegs 
push the joints through and break off 
the paws, crack crack the first word, crack the last word, 
from here up to the morning star, a rustling 
of satin can be heard, as if 
a blue sky was being torn into strips. 152 
 
It is as if physical violence is done to all words, from first to last, as they are broken from 
the body, detached from reality with the paws, set free. The morning star is the planet 
Venus, also the goddess of love. A rustling presence in heaven seems disturbed. Perhaps 
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love is being violated. Soon the rabbit is divided into two parts, the skin and the skinless 
body. The narrator has a vision where the two parts come back to life.  
 
Already the first skinned rabbit 
starts running on broken-boned limbs, 
romping through fields and green pastures 
[…] 
and thousands of naked bloody zombies 
run into city streets 
in mindless oblivion 153 
 
The empty skins have the happier lot in this bifurcated world. These ‘empty grey skins’ 
live in the ‘countryside with yellow flowers along the brook’, and touch whiskers ‘with 
Diderot’.154 Meanwhile ‘the naked rabbit bodies crowd together / under the lash of the 
pied pipers’, and there is ‘nakedness raped / by nakedness’.155 There is a striking 
resemblance to the Eloi and Morlock peoples in H. G. Wells’s The Time Machine.156 The 
vision is of a class society so extreme that the ruling class and the proletariat have 
become separate species and exaggerated stereotypes of how they see each other.  
 The development of the Wells-like vision is interrupted by other powerful 
imagery. Holub references ‘I am Goya’ by Russian poet Andrei Voznesensky (1933 – 
2010); this is the second stanza: 
 
I am the tongue 
of war, the embers of cities 
on the snows of the year 1941 
I am hunger 157 
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This resonates with Holub’s earlier lines: ‘the subcutaneous tissue gives off / a mild 
stench, like distant smouldering cities’. Voznesensky’s third stanza echoes the hanging, 
much more terribly: 
 
I am the gullet 
of a woman hanged whose body like a bell 
tolled over a blank square 
I am Goya 158 
 
This is closely followed by a reference to the Moloch passage in Allen Ginsberg’s Howl!, 
which has the sense of cursing America.159 The introduction of Moloch to the poem ties 
into Wells’s novel, and also brings in the darkness of Čapek’s The War with the Newts, 
where the salamanders adopt Moloch as their god.160 The penultimate stanza seems to 
reference the Inquisition, and returns to the theme of fact and word. 
 
the Spanish gabble of the word 
stripped of fact, 
the drain of fact, left behind 
by the word, 
an empty Ferris wheel, 
swooping across the abyss 
and towards the zenith. 161 
 
The word has lost its association with fact, and takes off like a flying saucer towards 
some unspecified ultimate. The poem ends: 
 
And it all started 
with a mere noose 
and a ladder, 
or whatever, 
to heaven. 162 
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Utopia, or the route to utopia, started with a hanging. It seems like cruel irony to orient 
the foregoing bitter vision towards heaven, but the sense of this ending is surely the 
Christian idea of sacrifice and redemption. Except that there is sacrifice in this poem, but 
no redemption. 
 It’s useful to divide the discussion of ‘Skinning’ into two parts: first the poem 
itself, then the poem in conjunction with an earlier Holub poem, ‘Wisdom’.163 ‘Skinning’ 
is resolutely anti-ideological: when words loose contact with facts, they cannot be trusted. 
The poem condemns war and class oppression, and perhaps also has the same or larger 
set of targets as George Orwell’s 1984.164 Orwell also warns against denying facts; the 
broken protagonist, towards the end of the novel, unconsciously traces in the dust on a 
table: ‘2 + 2 = 5’.165 There is a clear sense in the poem that words free from facts are 
dangerous. However, Holub has introduced a governing paradox: God is fact. This 
paradox forces an additional sense into the poem – facts are not sacred and are not to be 
worshiped. Remaining sceptical, surely the poet says, is remaining sane.  
‘Wisdom’ (published 1969) is a much earlier and very different Holub poem, but 
there’s a suggestive link to ‘Skinning’.166 The earlier poem is about the impending death 
from tubercular meningitis of ‘A small boy not yet bound / by the hempen fetters of 
speech’.167 The suggestive link is that both ‘Skinning’ and ‘Wisdom’ have a couplet 
which makes a similar point: ‘Wisdom’ reflects, ‘There’s nothing in the mind that / 
hasn’t been in life’; ‘Skinning’, referring to the rabbit as its largest sense organ is being 
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removed, says ‘There’s nothing in the mind that wasn’t / in the senses’.168. The wisdom 
of the earlier poem is the wisdom of innocence, unencumbered by the word, in the 
presence of incontrovertible fact. The child who bears pure reality knows wisdom. If this 
is linked to ‘Skinning’, then the death of the rabbit, the death of innocence, is the 
destruction of wisdom, and the destruction of wisdom leads to madness. In an essay, 
Holub quotes a remark of Josef Čapek’s (Karel’s artist brother and collaborator) which 
seems relevant: Josef said, ‘the true opposite of wisdom is not stupidity but madness’.169 
Pushing further, the pedagogical part of ‘Skinning’ is most likely to have been based on 
personal experience. Even if the vision, the madness, is scaled back, there remains a clear 
sense of inner disturbance at this taking of a life – there must be a secure moral 
foundation if such work is to be done. ‘Wisdom’ provides one.170 It is clearly noted in the 
earlier poem that meningitis was still fatal at the time the boy died, with the equally clear 
implication that this was not the case at the time ‘Wisdom’ was written.171 Medical 
science had progressed through precisely the kind of work described in ‘Skinning’. 
‘Wisdom’ provides the justification, even the redemption, the secular redemption, which 
Holub appears to seek in the final stanza of ‘Skinning’.172 By entering Holub’s 
laboratory, and by bearing its reality, the reader is forced to check their own moral 
security with what’s happening; Holub is providing the material evidence trusting that 
superficial responses to the poem are unlikely.  
Holub never lets go of the idea that words and facts must be questioned. His early 
classroom poems, perhaps inspired by his mother’s anecdotes, are playful with 
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denotation, meaning, and authority.173 In ‘Napoleon’, the children are asked what the said 
historical figure did: ‘Won a war, the children say. / Lost a war, the children say. / No one 
knows’.174 Both things the children say are true, but the way it’s said makes it wrong. A 
child pipes up: ‘Our butcher had a dog / called Napoleon’ – the dog was beaten and died: 
‘all the children are now sorry / for Napoleon’.175 A denotation error.  
Facts, in ‘The sick primer’, are a matter of wishful thinking and poor wording: 
 
the children are good and work hard. 
But that isn’t really quite true, 
the leaves drop in autumn 
but that isn’t really quite true 
flames burn, the moon shines, 
but that isn’t really quite true 176 
 
In ‘The teacher’, ‘The earth rotates, / says the young pupil. / Not so, the earth rotates, / 
says the teacher’.177 This and other tautological violations occur because ‘teacher knows 
best’.178 Words and letters are often literally slippery, sliding off their pages, as in ‘A 
well-read man’.179 ‘Alphabet’ is constructed from images suggesting the incompleteness 
of literary knowledge.180 In ‘Discobolus’, individual excellence, as if in the present, is 
challenged in a fine snatch of slippery party language.181 The athlete is about to throw, 
when someone says: 
– Just a moment, 
we still have to discuss this, 
purely as a matter of form, 
– You don’t know the situation, 
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comrade 182 
 
Discobolus turns to stone, and, as a statue, safely unable to do anything, is admired ‘by 
the finest pedagogues’, as a symbol of ‘the courageous human heart’.183 There is an 
image of fish trying to speak in ‘The gift of speech’; in ‘Punch’s dream’, the puppet is 
determined to speak in his own voice, but all that comes out is ‘Hi there, kids, you’re a 
great bunch’.184 Words may not come at all, or if they do they might be somebody else’s, 
or they might be deceitful, or if not all that then they’re probably paradoxical. Only the 
material world is secure – this point is firmly nailed down in Holub’s materialist 
masterpiece: ‘Immanuel Kant’.185 Kant, according to Wikipedia, ‘makes the claim that an 
external environment is necessary for the establishment of the self’.186 Holub’s poem 
turns on the point conveniently made by Wikipedia that ‘Kant would want to argue that 
there is no empirical way of observing the self’.187 The immunologist Holub has 
discovered an empirical, internal definition of self: 
 
The philosophy of white blood cells: 
this is self, 
this is non-self. 
[…] 
And he knows nothing about it, 
though this is just the critique 
of pure reason. 
 
Deep inside. 188 
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Words, for Holub, are not always slippery, language is not inherently deceitful, suitably 
anchored words can express precise and meaningful thought. The only reliable anchor is 
physical reality. 
Holub’s poems demonstrate that there is more to science, and of course poetry, 
than facts. Central to Holub’s writing is the knowledge that facts are complex and not 
always what they seem: facts always interact with the way they are expressed. Except in 
mathematics, there is no unambiguous fact: ‘the word’ must be questioned. Scepticism is 
as important in science as facts. Holub’s materialism does not conform to literary 
criticism’s mechanical stereotype:  his verse is warm, humorous, human-scale, achingly 
filled with suffering, and his distillations of the human condition are knowingly 
incomplete. Holub does not claim to be in possession of a theory of everything. Physical 
reality is not fully determined, definitive, free of ambiguity, or devoid of mystery, either 
in itself or in its interaction with our senses and our language. As with the investigating 
moles, there are limits to our knowledge of which we may never become aware (or if so 
only a little). Reality is much too complex to describe in a unified way – but material 
reality is, Holub is repeatedly saying in his poems, our only secure foundation. 
 
 
Controversy and Synthesis 
 
Helen Small’s essay ‘The Function of Antagonism: Miroslav Holub and Roald 
Hoffmann’, in John Holmes’s collection Science in Modern Poetry, begins with a 
discussion of literary criticism and science which in many ways is open and balanced.189 
She is right to point out, for instance, that ‘Current work in “literature and science” is, in 
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short, interdisciplinary principally from the vantage point of the humanities’.190 (An 
important exception is Robert Crawford’s Contemporary Poetry and Contemporary 
Science).191 She also discusses the philosopher Bernard Williams’s observation regarding 
the damage done ‘to the prestige of the humanities in the eyes of scientists and educated 
audiences generally’, by ‘the philosophers and theorists who would have us believe that 
there is no such thing as truth obtainable in language’, and that there is ‘no scientific truth 
uncontrolled by social forces’.192 However, she asks: ‘How can literary criticism give an 
accurate account of the content of science, as distinct from its rhetoric, without becoming 
merely a reduced report and without retreating into a form of minimal positivism?’.193 
Her purpose in this essay is not to answer this question, but rather to examine a number 
of poems, written by scientists, about science; however, my response to Small’s 
rhetorical question would be that scientific content is beyond literary theory’s purview. 
Small has framed the problem: if science is more than rhetoric, how can theories from the 
realm of texts and discourse have any relevance? She refers to science as ‘a form of fact-
based knowledge’; but Holub’s writing shows that this is a completely inadequate way of 
describing science – science is a materialist discipline, not a collection of facts, which in 
any case are not straightforward as they might seem.194 In the wider zone of controversy 
between literary criticism and science this insufficiency of description dominates; in the 
current unsatisfactory engagement, literary theorists seem surprisingly unaware of the 
limits of their own theories: it’s noticeable, for example, that there is no theory of the 
contingency of theories which claim that science is contingent. 
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The controversy between literary criticism and science is strongly delineated by 
Small’s reading of Holub’s ‘Intensive care unit’, one of his last-published poems.195 This 
is the complete poem. 
 
God’s insects stuck on pins 
betrayed heroes of the abdominal cavity. 
 
Cracked faience of whining puppets, 
human soul dripping from plastic tubes. 
Behind white curtains a scene 
from the war of the salamanders 
is endlessly getting ready. 
 
And liturgies change 
and souls change 
and blushings and palenesses change 
and winged prophets change 
and writers of chronicles change and 
gods change. 
 
But amikacin, 
the antibiotic, 
is the only one. 196 
 
The cells of the immune system, which Holub refers to elsewhere as the bearers of ‘the 
inner wisdom of the body’, are like glorious but dead butterflies, pinned down, 
inoperative.197 There is damage, severe pain, life is draining away, and there is a haunting 
image of an endless rehearsal of a scene from Čapek’s War with the Newts.198 Depending 
on the scene, the mood lightens (barely), or darkens – the outlook for the patient is not 
good. The liturgy which follows opens by violating its own sense of constancy, 
contradicting itself. Ebb and flow, blushings and palenesses, individual life and life in 
general, are set amongst humanity’s changing temporal and spiritual narrative. Holub’s 
liturgy, which some would call heretical, summons time on a grand scale, and compresses 
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it into a moment of recitation – it’s like a secular prayer to ward off superstition while the 
medics have their fingers crossed. The final stanza stops the liturgy of change, and locks 
onto the life-saving God of the moment. The feeling is of relief. Learning from Wikipedia 
that amikacin (as Small notes) is typically used to treat hospital-acquired infections 
allows the poem’s back story to develop: the doctors have been let down by their own 
hospital.199 The medical system itself is the betrayer of the cellular heroes. The image of 
the broken puppet becomes more shocking, suggesting careless handling; the salamander 
scene engenders disbelief that something as terrible as this can be happening; the hospital 
and the liturgy contradict themselves. Holub is showing that hospitals can be dangerous 
and intensive care is a brutal experience; but the liturgy suggests no medical practice is 
forever. ‘Intensive care unit’ is a fully-exposed Holub poem (to use Heaney’s phrase), 
constructed from strong, complex images which linger, deepen, and clarify with 
referential comprehension. It is not remotely triumphalist. The ethics of the poem emerge 
from the betrayal. ‘God’s insects’, Holub’s ‘betrayed heroes of the abdominal cavity’, are 
the subject of his life’s work as an immunologist – this is a passionate call to improve 
medical practice. 
Small also picks up the unsettling nature of this poem, but her interpretation is 
radically different from that suggested above. She says: ‘“Intensive Care Unit” would be 
a triumphalist poem by a scientist rather than an ethical achievement by a scientist poet if 
it were not for a persistent undercutting of the authority of science’.200 Small claims that 
‘undercutting starts with the dehumanised quality of the hospital scene, where patients 
like pinned insects, gutted carcasses, broken dolls, are subjected to technological 
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solutions to human problems’.201 Next Small asserts that Čapek’s War with the Newts is a 
‘dark satire on Nazi science’, and that ‘if the humility of mere accuracy and the sense that 
drugs should not be treated as God are lost’ from the poem, then Holub’s reference to this 
work suggests that if ‘all is made secondary to scientific progress, one would be left with 
Nazi science, a false religion worshipping the latest drug’.202 Čapek’s novel plays on a 
large stage, and does contain a number of choice parodies of science, British, French, 
American, and German; but Nazi science is not a clearly isolable sense in the novel, and 
there is no suggestion of the same in ‘Intensive care unit’. Small’s misleading 
introduction of Nazi science seems to confuse her reading – she needs to qualify: ‘Not 
that the drug itself is sinister, of course. It makes people better’; although at the end of the 
paragraph she appears to contradict this: the ‘possibility [of Nazi science] is hinted at, 
perhaps, in the sinister accuracy of the word “amikacin”, which achieves the poetry of 
pure denotation’.203 What is sinister about accuracy? In the final sentence of her essay, 
Small’s claim that Holub is ‘undercutting’ science in ‘Intensive care unit’ is 
consolidated.204 She says: ‘poetry, as this poem shows supremely well, may be a way of 
anchoring science, of keeping its provisional truths true to their provisionality’.205 
A throw-away remark Small makes would not deserve attention, except that such 
comments are widespread: unfortunately, she colours her narrative with an unnecessary 
sneer at both science and religion, ‘Scientists in their priestcraft […]’. 206 Science is fully 
analytical, continuously questioning itself, and well aware of the limits of its own 
                                                 
201 Small(2012), 36. 
202 Small(2012), 36. 
203 Small(2012), 36. 
204 Small(2012), 36; CPMH, 421. 
205 Small(2012), 37. 
206 Small(2012), 36. 
Miroslav Holub 263 
theories; it is nothing like a religion. The failure to see the difference between science and 
religion arises from a failure to take either of them seriously, and ultimately, a denial of 
facts. The significant issue to discuss, however, is Small’s use of literary-critical 
formulations as an analytical tool and as a point of conclusion. In using unquestioningly 
concepts such as ‘authority’ and ‘provisionality’ to characterise science, Small is 
following the near-universal humanities practice, although it is acknowledged that there 
are important exceptions where science is discussed in an open and balanced manner.207 
To be clear, the scrutiny of science is not objected to, it is essential both inside and 
outside the scientific community. The problem arises when closed-loop discourses are 
applied to the discussion of science, discourses with which it is impossible to engage 
without accepting their terms, and whose terms are configured to admit only a certain 
point of view. For example, it is absurd to describe the vast complex of science in terms 
of any single attribute; but to reduce the status of science as a whole to the loaded 
concept of ‘authority’ is completely misleading. If the term ‘authority’ applies at all, 
science has a very large number of interacting levels and types of authority. Moreover, 
the assertion that someone is ‘undercutting the authority of science’ is paradoxical: in 
scientific practice questioning increases legitimacy.  
Small’s concluding remark asserting the ‘provisionality’ of the entirety of science 
echoes widespread practice in the humanities and reflects idealist thinking about science 
from Kuhn to postmodernism; also thinkers more friendly to science have grappled with 
the fact that, in science, some things are plainly provisional, just as some are statistical, 
and the fact that some parts of science are in a state of change because the state of our 
knowledge is incomplete. The objection to Small’s remark, which in its context 
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foregrounds idealist thinking, however, is simple: it is completely inadequate to 
characterise the vast complex of science. Antibiotics, for example, do change; but the 
underlying molecular model does not. Dietary science, in the absence of a complete 
theory of the body, is empirical and its advice may change as studies proceed; these 
considerations do not apply to the laws of thermodynamics, yet both are drawn by 
implication of Small’s general statement under the totalising umbrella of ‘provisionality’.  
The assertions of literary and cultural theories of science have all the rigor of the 
conclusions drawn by Holub’s investigating moles in his parody of inductive logic, ‘Brief 
reflection on cats growing in trees’, except there is no nagging doubt.208 Literary 
criticism’s ‘theories’, and the discourse on science at its heart, fail to admit science’s 
materialism; sometimes even the possibility of materialism is denied. Science is 
wrenched from its foundation, treated like a set of abstract ideas, or a cultural artefact, 
and reduced to an object of study, although there is so much distortion that it is no longer 
science which is being studied. Such ‘theories’ are bound to fail because they cannot 
account for the success of science’s description of the physical world, and the technology 
derived from it. 
At one level this is just unfortunate; it doesn’t really matter if literary theory is 
meaningless when applied to science. What’s troubling, though, is the closed and self-
fulfilling nature of the discourse. The comparison to Orwell’s Newspeak is more than 
suggestive. It’s not possible, for example, to argue that Holub is not ‘undercutting the 
authority of science’ in ‘Intensive care unit’ because, in accepting the formulation, a 
discussion of the credibility of science as a whole is imposed. ‘Provisionality’ is also 
dictatorial in its intent: literary theory does not acknowledge that in science certain things 
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are changing within a framework of accumulating knowledge, so the ability to express 
this is removed from the discourse. The descriptive poverty of literary criticism’s 
discourse on science eliminates, in a blanket fashion, all traces of complexity, intricacy, 
and balance. The difficulty faced by scientists attempting to engage with literary 
criticism’s position on science is in essence a political one: the terms of the discourse 
carry the assumptions of specific idealist theories, and therefore the same terms cannot 
simply be picked up and used; the underlying theories need to be exposed first. 
Productive dialogue between literary criticism and science is not possible without open, 
neutral, and mutually understood expressions. It is highly regrettable, in my view, that so 
much discussion is conducted without such expressions, and without the inherent biases 
in terms such as ‘provisionality’ being presented for critical appraisal. A useful step 
forward for the interdisciplinary study of Literature and Science would be to re-position 
literary and cultural theories of science as hypotheses so that they could be subject to 
evidence-based scrutiny. 
It should be noted that Small is writing within the terms of an established 
discourse: it is this which is being criticised, not the limited scope available to one 
scholar to make wider assessments in a short essay; in addition Small is herself 
responding to Holub’s outspoken remarks about humanities academics in his final essay – 
hence her title: ‘The Function of Antagonism’.209 Her response in the first part of the 
essay is balanced and thoughtful, but her reading of ‘Intensive care unit’, and the terms 
used to characterise science, can be questioned.210 A more subtle Holub essay than his 
final one, ‘Poetry and Science’, opens with a reading of ‘Waiting for the Barbarians’ by 
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the Greek poet Constantine Cavafy (1863 – 1933), in which Holub mischievously 
associates barbarians with scientists.211 The main purpose of Holub’s essay, however, is 
to find synthesis. Examining, for example, his own subjective experience of writing a 
poem, he compares it to laboratory work in terms of the discipline, the trial and error, and 
the sense of a ‘unique inner atmosphere’.212 Holub says that, for him, the moment of 
‘“finding it”, the moment of success’, in poetry or science, is ‘virtually identical’: ‘The 
emotional, aesthetic and existential value is the same’; it is ‘A strong feeling of 
reality’.213 ‘Yes’, Holub writes, ‘there is a common root of so-called creativity’.214 
Holub’s feeling of normal routine life, interspersed with the rare moments of successful 
completion of a poem or experiment is elaborated, he remarks, in his poem ‘Conversation 
with a poet’, a translation of which follows in his essay.215 As the essay closes, Holub 
synthesises even further by shifting the meaning of culture to the biological sense, 
finishing with a fine translation of his definitive one culture poem, ‘Brief reflection on 
the test tube’.216 
‘Poetry and Science’ also hints at the interpretation of the poem ‘The root of the 
matter’.217 Quoting (perhaps from memory) Heisenberg’s comment, ‘Even in science the 
object of research is no longer nature itself, but man’s investigation of nature’, Holub 
remarks, ‘The root of the matter is not in the matter itself, as I put it in a poem’.218 This is 
only a hint, not a reading, but it legitimises a quantum mechanical approach to the poem.  
‘The root of the matter’ (published 1969) runs to six pages and is divided into four 
                                                 
211 Holub(1990), 122-46, Cavafy: 122-3. 
212 Holub(1990), 142-3. 
213 Holub(1990), 142-3. 
214 Holub(1990), 142. 
215 Holub(1990), 142-3. 
216 Holub(1990), 145-6; cf. CPMH, 157. 
217 Holub(1990), 122-46; CPMH, 113-8. 
218 Holub(1990), 128. 
Miroslav Holub 267 
sections.219 It is a free-verse narrative constructed of images which are interspersed with 
a second italicised voice.220 The form, surely, is again puppet theatre, this time a play in 
four acts, with the images representing the scenes. The relationship between puppet 
master and puppet is a strong metaphor for ‘the involvement of the observer in the 
observed’, a remark which is adjacent to Holub’s quote from Heisenberg in the former’s 
essay.221 This idea is developed further by placing the observer’s italicised voice literally 
inside the poem giving the impression of a single interacting system. The protagonist is 
the everyman Czech Faust, with his stock puppet theatre companion, a black poodle, 
entering in act two.222  
Act one of ‘The root of the matter’ is set in the open, perhaps in a park.223 Faust 
seems to be both with and against the ebb and flow of a crowd. In one image he ‘walks 
around like a grandfather clock’, suggesting the movement of a pendulum.224 In another 
he ‘walks around like a run-down battery / on a movable pavement’ – he is part of a 
moving system.225 The first act introduces at least three types of senses in the various 
images or scenes. There is a sense of probabilistic outcome, often mischance: a nail 
which bends at the first stroke or a puddle stepped into. There is a sense of unresolved 
outcome, or in quantum terms, entangled states, for example: ‘the weather’s either cloudy 
or set fair’.226 And there’s the sense of a system, as in the moving pavement, or the way 
in which Faust becomes part of the crowd.227 There are suggestive references to two 
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quantum paradoxes. The observer’s remark ‘Nothing has happened but we / always saw it 
coming’, which is repeated towards the end of act four, suggests, in an inverse sense, the 
strange paradox where the mere probability of something happening, even if it does not 
occur, can have a material outcome.228 Physical effects can arise, according to Penrose, 
from ‘things that might have happened, although they did not in fact happen’.229 At one 
point Faust has a choice of five roads. The choices are written serially, as they must be, 
but nothing else in the text suggests seriality, and in the quantum context the passage 
brings to mind the celebrated paradox of  wave-particle duality where a photon of light 
must pass through two slits at once.230 One of the roads is in fact banned: Faust ‘takes the 
banned road past the council offices’.231 Perhaps this little paradox opens the door to the 
larger one, where Faust takes all five roads at once. 
In act two Faust comes across a black poodle; Holub puts in parenthesis the word 
‘naturally’ in this connection, suggesting that Faust and the dog together are a single 
state.232 The poodle is running round in smaller and smaller circles, ‘like an ominous 
spider / spinning its vast web’.233 There is then the first of many references to the poem’s 
title, which develops into the refrain ‘The root of the matter is not / in the matter itself’. 
 
– Look, now we shall see 
the poodle’s true kernel, 
the root of the matter 234 
 
But it’s neither a kernel nor a root, it’s a web, a network of interstices. Perhaps Holub is 
saying that the root of matter is an array of gaps. The pace of the poet-observer’s 
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interjections quicken, and seems to presage, or cause by observing, the one real event in 
the poem: the death of the poodle. The brief death scene opens as if Damocles’s sword 
drops: 
 
suddenly 
like a knife that falls 
half-blade into the ground 
a bus slips through 
and 
the poodle’s run over and dies 235 
 
The bus just slips through – knowledge of a quantum system is always incomplete. The 
third act introduces the themes of blood and the word, echoed at the end of the poem. 
Faust lifts the dead dog, and its blood clothes him ‘like a chasuble put on’236 He places 
the dog on a book, and the ‘letters drink up the blood’, the ‘pages suck it in’.237 The act 
ends with the poet alluding to Ginsberg’s Howl!.238 Reversing the sense of mingling with 
the book, Holub seems to be thinking of Howl! as a performance poem, detached from 
the written word: ‘Howl! You won’t have any / trouble with your spelling’.239 The words 
are quiet, but the sense is of rage. 
As the final act starts, Faust is trying to rationalise what has happened, to find 
meaning. Faust says: ‘Dog and nothing but a dog / who might have been the allegory of 
creation / and are no more than the very meaning of death’.240 Holub puts an end to this 
futile speculation in the following, stunning, image: 
 
[…] there is no 
mystery 
except the thread which from our hands 
                                                 
235 CPMH, 116. 
236 CPMH, 116. 
237 CPMH, 116. 
238 Ginsberg(1956). 
239 CPMH, 117; Ginsberg(1956). 
240 CPMH, 117. 
Miroslav Holub 270 
leads round the far side of things, round the collar of the landscape 
and up the sleeve of a star 241 
 
One way to read this image is to allow the opening phrase ‘no mystery except’ to sit with 
its unwritten complement, ‘all is mystery except’, as if in two simultaneous states. The 
interplay between these two senses then conditions the rest of the image. In the former 
(written) sense we think we know all about life, except we are mysteriously subject to an 
unknown force. In the latter sense the only thing we know for certain is we are collared to 
the universe like a dog, but, because we are aware of it, perhaps there is a thread of 
understanding. The fourfold meaning (two parts to each state) becomes richly complex as 
the various senses ripple through each other; as the permutations develop, the image 
gathers the feel of theoretical physics. The sense of the image is collective; it is the entire 
theatre of life which is collared. Another quantum paradox is also suggested: 
instantaneous action at a distance, which results from the collapse of entangled states.242  
There is an image, ‘no more than / crunched bones’, shortly after Faust’s 
speculation that the dog might have been the ‘allegory of creation’, which appears to 
refute the idea of allegory.243 There are multiple senses to life, the ‘The root of the 
matter’ seems to say, but they are all literal. Death is literal and that’s it. Faust himself 
seems to be dying as the poem ends. The final scene brings together the themes of blood, 
the word, and the lack of allegory: 
 
All in all India ink 
is the blood’s first sister  
and song is just as final 
 as life and death 
and equally without allegory, 
without transcendence 
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and without fuss. 244 
 
Words are our life blood and song is the life of words. Song relates to life and death 
through its timed and timeless qualities. There is no allegory, no transcendence, no 
possibility of further interpretation. Life is literal, which doesn’t mean it’s simple. This 
powerful expression of materialism is also a stopping point in terms of science’s end 
theory, quantum mechanics – there is nothing more, though it’s still paradoxical and 
mysterious. 
The poem’s synthesis of poetry and science is expressed, with typical Holub 
mischief, in the second act: 
 
    like a cat, like a mouse, 
    like a black-burning bush, 
there is poetry in everything. That 
is the biggest argument 
against poetry 245 
 
Poetry and science is a cat and mouse game, but it is not determined which is which. 
Holub was probably imagining Schrodinger’s famous dual-state feline.246 The burning 
bush is black, seemingly inverting the burning bush of the Old Testament; instead of 
God’s commands, there are those of the devil, and this is the argument against poetry. 
The word ‘poetry’ in the quote could equally well be ‘science’, which can also be 
diabolical. There is symmetry, poetry and science are entangled states, like the sides of a 
tossed coin in mid-air. Some of us end up as one, some the other, and occasionally the 
coin lands on its edge, and someone ends up as both. In the essay ‘Poetry and Science’ 
Holub writes: ‘There is no such thing as a “scientist” and there is no such thing as a 
“poet”; these roles are only realised in the rare moments of success in either field, and in 
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these moments, there is a ‘strong feeling of reality’.247 The moment of realisation in 
Holub’s essay passage is like the moment of quantum observation. Simon Armitage, in 
his essay in Contemporary Poetry and Contemporary Science, makes a resonant 
comment on the role of ‘poetry’. Armitage writes, ‘science didn’t drop the bomb on 
Hiroshima’, ‘It was a poetic nightmare-vision of hell-fire […] that opened the bomb-
hatch’; like Holub, Armitage draws poetry onto the same moral plane as science.248  
‘The root of the matter’ is a haunting poem. It feels inhabited by the ghost of the 
oppressed Hordubal, the eponymous protagonist of the first novel of Čapek’s trilogy. 249 
A case could be made for a relationship between ‘The root of the matter’, Hordubal, and 
the wider trilogy; if successful it would provide a literary counterpart to the science-based 
reading suggested here.250 Holub’s themes of plurality, complexity, the mysterious nature 
of events, and the limit of knowledge, echo Čapek’s. A link to the trilogy would 
introduce a philosophical theme into ‘The root of the matter’ which the title seems to 
imply; however, the current quantum reading perhaps suggests this: the root of matter is 
not in matter itself, because, in the quantum mechanical world, there is no matter itself, 
there is only a system of suspended possibilities, some of which sometimes become real.  
The ‘cat and mouse’ passage in ‘The root of the matter’ is expressing a synthesis 
of poetry and science in terms of physics. Holub develops in the poem ‘Brief Reflection 
on the Test Tube’ another synthesis, this time in terms of biology.251 In the essay ‘Poetry 
and Science’, Holub reflects on the human condition: we live ‘in an age dominated by the 
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giants of management and manipulation, by untamed autonomous superstructures which 
look down on us as if at an easily manageable culture’.252 He continues: ‘And this is the 
last aspect [described in this essay] of reality where there is a total amalgamation of 
poetry and science: some sort of actual or potential hope in the world of autarchic 
actions’.253 The essay, by way of illustration, then concludes with the poem ‘Brief 
Reflection on the Test Tube’.254 Here is part of the second stanza:  
 
you have a look – and it grows, 
a little sea, a little volcano, 
a little tree, a little heart, a little brain, 
so small you don’t hear it pleads 
to be let out, 
and that’s the whole point, not to hear. 255 
 
The idea of hope which Holub usefully mentions in his preamble is the hope of 
worthwhile endeavour, not of release. It is reflected in the poem in the phrase ‘look – and 
it grows’, in the stanza which follows, where question marks change into exclamation 
marks, and in the reflexive ending: 
 
And the point is 
 that for the moment you forget 
 you yourselves are 
 
In the test tube. 256 
 
To conclude, using the word science as a proxy for materialism – there is nothing 
peripheral about science in Holub’s work. It’s not an engagement with or a response to 
science in any sense. Holub’s poetry is unthinkable without science. It’s not as if science 
was something external, something he ‘believed’ in, something he might undermine or 
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not believe in at some point. He just thought that way. Scepticism in science is not 
undermining, it’s mandatory. It is precisely this sceptical attitude which Holub forces into 
the open that makes his poetry such an important literary expression of scientific 
materialism. Moreover, this work is important because of its cross-cultural harmony, its 
balance and symmetry: like standing between parallel mirrors, Holub’s poetry is reflected 
scientifically, and his science is reflected poetically, into an apparently infinite distance.  
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CONCLUSION 
The structure of this thesis, the types and forms of the arguments which have been made, 
and the relationship between them, are the result of the particular experience I have 
brought to this work, balanced by the considerable amount I have learned during the 
course of the research. There are, as far as I can tell, very few active in Literature and 
Science who are from a scientific background, and perhaps even fewer who have carried 
this through to a detailed study of science in poetry. I’m sure my experience of 
encountering the humanities is typical of many from a scientific background to the extent 
that, on discovering the vigorous attacks which have been taking place on scientific 
materialism, from Thomas Kuhn to postmodernism, one feels a robust response is 
unavoidable. Two well-known scientific encounters with contemporary thinking on 
science in the humanities are those of the biologist E. O. Wilson and the physicist Alan 
Sokal. Wilson’s response was to write Consilience, a search for a bigger picture within 
which a unity of knowledge could be found.1 Unfortunately, in my view, this proved to 
be too great a challenge, and the result is unconvincing. Sokal’s initial response was 
parody and ridicule, which developed into a rounded philosophical counter-argument in 
Intellectual Imposters (with Jan Bricmont), and Beyond the Hoax.2 Sokal’s parody and 
the subsequent ‘science wars’ generated a great deal of noise, and may or may not be one 
of the factors in what I believe to be the improving interdisciplinary atmosphere; but 
nevertheless, a great deal is still said about science in the humanities which takes no 
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account of what Sokal and all the other scientists who sought to defend their discipline in 
volumes such as Theory’s Empire, have written.3  
 The structure of this thesis is thus based on a balance between a range of 
considerations. Sokal’s work stands as the reference defence of science against 
relativizing attacks, but it generated a great deal of division, and today, it seems like little 
account of it is taken. It seemed impossible for me to avoid further controversy in my 
engagement with Poetry and Science, if only because scientific materialism is not 
understood as a default position in the interdiscipline; on the other hand, too much 
controversy would have risked a divisive thesis which could have been dismissed as just 
another scientist’s rant. Further, my main objective was to undertake a detailed 
exploration of science in poetry, and to do this I needed an open and unbiased approach 
to what science in poetry might actually be, and how best to interpret it. To this end the 
idea of the creative misreading of science developed in Chapter I seemed to be a way of 
explicitly abandoning any preconceptions which the reader might have otherwise inferred 
from my background. The introductory preamble to Chapter I overviews how the 
particular balance implemented here was arrived at, that balance being that a provisional 
interdisciplinary working compromise is essential if the joint subject is to progress. A 
two-thread strategy has therefore been followed: one thread is a firm statement of 
scientific materialism, principally in the Kuhn section in Chapter I and the response to 
Helen Small in Chapter V; this is complemented by a second thread which might be seen 
as surprisingly open to the idealisation of science and its expression in the imaginative 
domain as poetic art. In defence of the latter part of this position I would argue that, 
certainly, art is not exempt from an obligation for fidelity to the real world – this idea was 
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discussed in conjunction with Morgan’s writing in Chapter IV – but at the same time art 
must be free to surprise and to challenge our preconceptions. Perhaps the particular 
balance which has been found is not perfect. I believe all four poets studied have been 
successful in integrating science and poetry, and I have only lightly touched on a counter-
example of poetic science (J. H. Prynne’s The Plant Time Manifold Transcripts) where 
failure could be robustly argued.4 A full chapter on Prynne was in fact considered, but 
rejected on the grounds that his appropriation of science, and perhaps his poetry, would 
have necessitated a sustained attack – this, it seemed to me, violated my principal of 
contained controversy, would risk unnecessary division, and could detract from my effort 
to make a positive contribution, from the perspective of scientific materialism, to the 
interdisciplinary subject of Poetry and Science. 
In Chapters II to V, my objective was to explore, in as detailed a manner as 
possible, the phenomenon of science in poetry. To do this, I sought to develop my own 
analysis of each poet’s writing – in each case, weighed with great care, this turned out not 
to be in agreement with a significant amount of the existing critical opinion. Thus a 
sceptical attitude towards some of the existing literary commentary is surely quite marked 
in these chapters; on the other hand, the same critical attitude towards the poets may have 
seemed a little veiled. For completeness, therefore, a few further remarks should be 
made. In the MacDiarmid chapter the suggestion was made in the Introduction that one 
could read the poetry by making one’s own edit of the late text – in the single-minded 
effort to press home my main points, the implication that making a personal edit 
necessarily implies leaving out much which is difficult (in a bad way), sometimes even 
ugly, and unenlightening to read, was not developed. The point was made that 
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MacDiarmid’s text is unedited, but I felt it would have been out of scope to discuss which 
parts text which might be ripe for editing out. Also, during the discussion of the 
computational model, it was noted that there are aspects to MacDiarmid’s work which 
look like a system for making poetry (though some might dispute that so much cutting 
and pasting could constitute poetry), but MacDiarmid was unable to control this system 
fully. This point too could have been followed into a more critical appraisal of the late 
text – but again, on the basis that one must remain focussed on the main theme, the point 
was not developed.  
 Regarding Judith Wright’s work, a slightly paradoxical situation was highlighted 
in the chapter Introduction where her most explicit remarks about science are to be found 
in her later poetry, of which a handful of examples were given. Attention was re-directed 
towards what I called the ‘deep and interesting’ science in her (in my view) much richer 
early work. Thus a critical view of what could be seen as a lightweight approach to 
science in this later work was not developed in the interest of exploring what I do believe 
to be an impressive depth of thinking in her early poetry.  
Perhaps more critical attention was addressed towards Morgan’s poetry than the 
others with the discussion of Douglas Dunn’s comments, the assessment of ‘Memories of 
Earth’, and the siding with his adversary in debate, Jack Rillie. I could have brought out 
more clearly that much of his science fiction poetry is unconvincing; again, however, this 
was not my point – I was interested in identifying the bleakness of the themes in this 
poetry in support of my own argument. Morgan’s work, clearly, is uneven, and it could 
have been argued that sometimes the mask used to disguise his personality was just that, 
a mask with little behind it. This, however, would have involved a sensitive discussion of 
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Morgan’s personal life, briefly alluded to but not developed, and would have distracted 
from the focus on science and technology. Perhaps an unexpected note in the Morgan 
chapter was the software engineer’s outright rejection of artificial intelligence; this, I 
would argue, is fully compatible with the wider perspective of sceptical materialism. A 
regret with the Morgan chapter is that space was not available for a proper discussion of 
what might come to be seen as his masterpiece, The New Divan.5 Such a discussion 
would require chapter-length consideration. There are rich veins of science in this work, 
and also a use of imagery and surrealism which could have been drawn through the 
poet’s own Collected Translations into a comparative discussion with some of Holub’s 
poetry.6  
Regarding Holub, without a knowledge of Czech, a better assessment of the 
translations of his work is not possible; there are opinions on some websites, but it’s 
simply not possible to provide a personal judgement on the matter.7 In one instance, for 
the poem ‘Brief reflection on the test tube’, the translation in the essay ‘Poetry and 
Science’ seemed clearer and more elegant than that in Poems Before and After; more 
widely one can only comment that the power Holub’s work delivers in English is quite 
remarkable.8 Holub’s essays, it can be noted, were referred to for support, but generally 
held in the background. Further attention to the essays would have been interesting, but I 
suspect that there are translation issues and also context-of-writing issues, which could 
not be addressed without Czech, or a greater biographical knowledge of the poet. While a 
great deal of Holub’s work has been translated, there are notable gaps. A selection of his 
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journalism – a regular column for the popular science magazine Vim – is available in The 
Jingle Bell Principle, but none of his travel writing (aside from several short quotes), 
which forms a stand-alone volume in his Czech Collected Works, is available in English.9 
A consistent theme through all four chapters is what used to be called (when I was 
at university in the 1970s) ‘modern physics’ – relativity and quantum mechanics. Before 
ending the thesis by reflecting on its political aspects, it’s worth a look at one 
distinguished physicist’s view of modern physics today, as a way of highlighting the 
literary attitudes to science at the time when all four poets were writing.  
The physicist Steven Weinberg (b. 1933) in a 2013 essay in the New York Review 
of Books: ‘Physics: What We Do and Don’t Know’, surveys physics’s well known 
achievements, and then its spectacular non-achievement: a unified theory which 
incorporates gravity (general relativity) and quantum mechanics. 10 For the last three 
decades the candidate unifier has been string theory; Weinberg comments, ‘String theory 
if true would not invalidate theories like the standard model or general relativity; they 
would just be demoted to “effective field theories,” approximations valid at the scales of 
distance and energy we have been able to explore’.11 Weinberg continues: 
‘Unfortunately, although we do not know the exact underlying equations of string theory, 
there are reasons to believe that whatever these equations are, they have a vast number of 
solutions’.12 This leads to the concept of the multiverse – bubbles of universes formed at 
the so-called time of ‘inflation’ after the big bang. Our universe (in this scheme) is one of 
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these bubbles, corresponding to one of the solutions to the putative string theory 
equations. ‘If this is true’ writes Weinberg, ‘then the hope of finding a rational 
explanation for the precise values of the quark masses and other constants of the standard 
model that we observe in our big bang is doomed, for their values would be an accident 
of the particular part of the multiverse in which we live’.13 Weinberg concludes: 
 
Such crude anthropic explanations are not what we hoped for in physics, but 
they may have to content us. Physical science has historically progressed not 
only by finding precise explanations of natural phenomena, but also by 
discovering what sorts of things can be precisely explained. These may be 
fewer than we had thought. 14 
 
This near-fatalism in physics is quite recent – it may not of course persist, and 
would be robustly challenged by many physicists, including Lee Smolin in his 2013 Time 
Reborn.15 However, the back-projected effect of Weinberg’s speculation is to blunt, for 
example, MacDiarmid’s remark, ‘The ultimate triumph of mankind is already implicit in 
the revolution in physics’; the revolution in physics has not (at least yet) led to the grand 
unified theory of everything, or if it has, Weinberg is suggesting that such a theory would 
be without analytical power.16 It’s difficult to imagine Wright and McKinney being 
excited by ‘crude anthropic explanations’ as they sought to build an alternative 
intellectual worldview to the one which they saw as responsible for the war which had 
just ended with the nuclear bombing of Japan. Likewise, it’s difficult to imagine that 
Morgan, fascinated by the prospect of unbounded progress and exploration, would have 
been impressed by Weinberg’s suggestion that the aspects of the universe amenable to 
scientific explanation ‘may be fewer than we had thought’. The writing of these three 
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poets, in this particular regard, now seems tightly bound to their time. The same 
considerations, however, do not apply to Holub: ‘The root of the matter’ seems to use 
quantum mechanics to explore the limits of knowledge.17 There is little trace of scientific 
triumphalism in Holub’s work, (with the possible exception of ‘Immanuel Kant’), rather 
the poet is mostly concerned with the responsible application of the knowledge which has 
been discovered.18 Thus the development of science in poetry through the four chapters 
presents a contrast between literary assimilation of science, and a more reflexive inside 
view of the subject. 
 All four poets discussed were sceptical of the political order in which they lived. 
An association between science and political scepticism persisted through the twentieth 
century (an early exemplar would be the life of J. B. S. Haldane), and is encapsulated in 
the title of Freeman Dyson’s essay ‘The Scientist as Rebel’, quoted from in the 
Introduction.19 This association, I suggest, is key to the motivation of the four poets to 
consider integrating science is their work. At the time when all four poets were writing 
(generally speaking), science was starting to overcome moral distortions such as innate 
inequality and eugenics, and could more easily be seen as an ally of poetry. MacDiarmid, 
in part echoing Walt Whitman, welcomed the potential for science to liberate humanity. 
Wright discovered intellectual excitement in modern physics, and found that science was 
an ally in her conservation struggles. Morgan found that by embracing science and 
experimental poetry he could position his artistic persona as anti-establishment with 
respect to the traditional literary domain. Holub drew attention to the association between 
scientists and barbarians in Constantine Cavafy’s ‘Waiting for the Barbarians’; and 
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perhaps Holub found science a place where scepticism and independent thought could be 
maintained.20  
 Pushing harder, it could be argued that the materialism of science was the 
common factor which enabled all four poets to ground their political thinking. 
MacDiarmid wrestled with the alternative seductions of materialism, fatalism, and 
idealism in ‘On a Raised Beach’, and emerged with a poetic view, widespread in his late 
text, that these factors must be held together, almost as mutually corrective forces, lest 
one or the other gets out of control. The extent to which the poet achieved an integrated 
moderation in his life and work will continue to tantalise or divide his critics in strong 
measure. Wright found a different means to express the dialectic of materialism and 
idealism, though materialism transmutes in her work to the more open concept of realism. 
Wright’s search for a poetry which combined a historically realistic view of the 
destruction of the Aboriginal people and their culture with an ethereal spirituality was 
hauntingly successful; indeed, the trinity of concepts, poetry, science, and politics 
introduced in Chapter II is arguably more neatly encapsulated in Wright’s work than 
MacDiarmid’s. There is little expression in Morgan’s poetry or his life of political causes 
in the activist sense, though the emotional expression of political belief, for example a 
strongly felt Scottish nationalism, is widely present in his writing. His sympathy for the 
grounded poetry of Eastern Europe, as compared to what he saw as the idealist pessimism 
of T. S. Eliot, is clearly stated in the introduction to Sovpoems, and in various 
interviews.21 Elsewhere, Morgan’s talent for misdirection seems at first sight to throw 
attention away from political concerns, or sometimes appears as unsophisticated 
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worldviews either from Olympian heights, or the routinely prosaic, as in ‘Memories of 
Earth’.22 One reading would be that the poet’s need for an intensely private and hidden 
life is related to the unevenness in his writing; however, elegant expressions of political 
thought, as in ‘The First Men on Mercury’, are still widespread in Morgan’s work.23 
Another example is poem 92 of The New Divan, which seems to be a disguised, but 
passionate, anti-war statement – Morgan’s famous ‘war poem’ might be better described 
as an anti-war poem.24 
Holub, like Morgan, was not politically active, though his relentless interrogation 
of power and ideology, both under communism and capitalism, make him arguably the 
outstanding political theorist of the four. In Holub’s poetry of everyday life the plight of 
the victims of oppression might occur anywhere, even under the microscope: ‘Here too 
are the dreaming landscapes / lunar, derelict. […] And cells, fighters / who lay down their 
lives / for a song’.25 Holub was not as free as the other three poets to develop an 
independent political analysis, but the sceptical materialism he so forcibly expressed 
drives further into political philosophy than MacDiarmid’s visceral socialism, Wright’s 
somewhat apolitical activism, or Morgan’s emotional politics. Holub does not deny that 
ideas are essential, but ideas must always be checked and tested as best they can for 
moral integrity and against the reality of the factual world, lest ideas become ideology. If 
ideas are let loose from facts, if their proponents do not even question the known 
outcomes of their ideas, let alone the potential consequences, a situation such as Western 
rulers face in 2015 with respect to the War in the Middle East, may develop: that is, 
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fantasy visions of power and fact denial; warnings against such ideological distortion can 
be found, for example, in Holub’s poems ‘Suffering’ and ‘Skinning’.26 
The study of poetry and science, for all its troubled history, and for all it leaves 
out of almost any poet’s wider canon, nevertheless has the ability to penetrate deeply, at 
least in the four case studies presented, into poetic art. Once it is accepted by the scientist 
that science in art is no longer material science, and cannot conform to the same rules, 
then it is possible to explore the emotions and beliefs, such as fear, mistrust, euphoria, 
and hope, which science itself provides no secure means to express. This study shows, 
and I suggest it is true more widely, the importance of including a political analysis with 
the study of poetry and science, because part of science’s attraction to poets is surely its 
inescapably complex relationship with contemporary power: on the one hand innocent, 
and on the other central.  
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